Facts:

The cases at hand, consolidated under G.R. No. 120422 and G.R. No. 120428, arise from a scandal involving allegations of extrajudicial killings perpetrated by police forces in the Philippines. On May 18, 1995, eleven members of the notorious "Kuratong Baleleng" gang were purportedly killed in a shootout with various police agencies including the National Capital Regional Command, Traffic Management Command, Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, and others. However, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Eduardo de los Reyes publicly claimed on May 22 that there was no shootout and instead described the killings as summary executions. Following this revelation, relatives of the victims, including Myrna Abalora, Nenita G. Alap-ap, and Imelda Pancho Montero, filed sworn statements with the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), accusing the aforementioned police agencies of murder on May 24, 1995.

In response, Acting Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa directed the Deputy Ombudsman for Military

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Facts:

Consolidation and Procedural Background

• The cases were consolidated under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as they arose from the same factual milieu involving the alleged killing of 11 suspected members of the “Kuratong Baleleng” robbery gang on May 18, 1995.
• The consolidated case involved petitioners (including Chief Supt. Romeo Acop, Senior Supt. Francisco G. Zubia, and several task force personnel) and public respondents (including the Office of the Ombudsman, Acting Ombudsman Francisco Villa, and Deputy Ombudsman Manuel Casaclang).
• The petitions raised two central concerns: (a) the proper jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor to investigate the complaint; and (b) whether the conduct of the preliminary investigation, particularly the issuance of an order requiring the submission of counter-affidavits prior to any formal evaluation, constituted grave abuse of discretion.

Chronology of Events

• May 18, 1995 – Eleven suspected gang members were killed in an alleged shootout during operations by composite teams from various agencies (NCRC, TMC, PACC, CPDC, CIC).
• May 22, 1995 – SPO2 Eduardo de los Reyes exposed that no shootout occurred; instead, he alleged that the victims were subject to summary execution and subsequently submitted a sworn statement confirming his allegations.
• May 24, 1995 – The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) received sworn statements from relatives of the slain suspect, accusing several agencies of murder.
• May 26, 1995 – Acting Ombudsman Francisco Villa, via a handwritten note, directed Deputy Ombudsman Casaclang to monitor investigations being conducted by various bodies (CHR, Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, and the PNP Director for Investigation).
• Following Villa’s directive, Casaclang issued Office Order No. 95-17, instructing designated investigators to monitor these parallel investigations.
• May 29-30, 1995 – Casaclang sent written document requests to key figures such as Senator Raul Roco and CHR Chairman Sedfrey Ordonez; the CHR provided sworn statements and SPO2 Corazon de la Cruz testified before a Joint Senate Committee, corroborating the earlier testimony regarding summary execution.
• June 1, 1995 – Casaclang issued Office Order No. 95-18, creating a panel of investigators headed by Ombudsman Investigator Bienvenido Blancaflor, with other investigators as members.
• June 13-14, 1995 – Respondent P/Chief Supt. Job A. Mayo, Jr. filed a complaint accusing petitioners of murder in connection with the incident, and shortly thereafter, Casaclang ordered the petitioners and nine others to submit counter-affidavits and controverting evidence within ten days.
• Subsequent Developments – The petitioners did not comply with the 14 June order but instead raised issues before the Supreme Court in separate petitions (filed on 19 June, 20 June, and a supplemental petition on 3 July 1995), questioning both the jurisdictional validity of the Ombudsman's actions and the procedural propriety of setting the case for preliminary investigation without a required preliminary evaluation.

Institutional and Constitutional Context

• Jurisdictional Dispute – At the heart of the matter was the dispute whether the preliminary investigation power belongs solely to the Office of the Ombudsman or might be exercised by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (formerly the Tanodbayan).
• Legislative and Constitutional Debate – The petitioners argued that the 1987 Constitution did not confer prosecutorial or preliminary investigative functions on the Ombudsman, contending that:
• The Ombudsman’s duty to investigate is distinct from the power to conduct preliminary investigations, which they claimed remains with the Special Prosecutor.
• The Office of the Special Prosecutor is constitutionally separate and not subordinate to the Ombudsman.
• Debate on the Appointment of a Separate Deputy for the Military – Deliberations during the framing of the Constitution showed that a separate Deputy for the military establishment could be appointed to help address grievances of military personnel, raising a corollary issue on whether such a deputy may also handle cases involving civilian personnel.

Alleged Abuse of Discretion in the Preliminary Investigation

• Petitioners contested that Deputy Ombudsman Casaclang committed grave abuse of discretion by:
• Setting the case for preliminary investigation prematurely.
• Demanding counter-affidavits from the petitioners before conducting the mandatory preliminary evaluation as prescribed by Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07.
• The timeline indicated that the panel of investigators had submitted an evaluation report on 8 June 1995, and only on 14 June 1995 did Casaclang issue the order for counter-affidavits.
• Furthermore, motions filed later included a request to cite Acting Ombudsman Villa in contempt of court for allegedly preempting the Court’s authority by ordering the petitioners to file counter-affidavits.

Issue:

Jurisdiction of Investigative Bodies

• Whether it is within the power of the Office of the Ombudsman, as opposed to the Office of the Special Prosecutor, to conduct the preliminary investigation on the complaint filed against the petitioners.
• Whether the petitioners’ reliance on the decision in Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan is justified or requires re-examination of the established jurisdictional framework.

Authority of the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs

• Whether respondent Casaclang, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, was empowered to conduct a preliminary investigation involving government civilian personnel (specifically, members of the Philippine National Police).
• The implications of appointing a separate deputy for the military establishment and if such designation restricts his investigatory functions to military matters only.

Procedural Compliance and Alleged Abuse of Discretion

• Whether the issuance of the order on 14 June 1995 (mandating the submission of counter-affidavits) violated the procedural requirement of conducting a preliminary evaluation of the complaint as prescribed under Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07.
• If such measure, taken by respondent Casaclang, amounts to grave abuse of discretion justifying the relief sought by petitioners, including the citation of Acting Ombudsman Villa in contempt of court.

Ruling:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Separation and Allocation of Investigative Powers

• The Court’s decision underscored that the constitutional mandate confers upon the Office of the Ombudsman the authority to conduct investigations, including issuing orders for preliminary investigations.

• It reinforced that the power “to investigate on its own or on complaint” as conferred by the Constitution is not detachable, and any attempt to ascribe the preliminary investigation function solely to the Office of the Special Prosecutor is unsustainable.

Delineation of the Ombudsman’s Functions

• The original debates during the Constitutional Commission and subsequent legislative enactments (such as P.D. No. 1630 and R.A. No. 6770) clearly established a delineation between the Ombudsman’s role as a check on public officers and the prosecutorial functions which may be delegated to the Special Prosecutor.
• However, the Court clarified that the delegation or reallocation of functions through legislative enactments does not alter the fundamental jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over the preliminary investigation process.

Scope of the Deputy for Military Affairs

• The ratio was further extended to cover the role of the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, clarifying that despite the separate designation for military concerns, the deputy operates under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman and may be tasked with the investigation of cases involving non-military personnel as well.
• The legal rationale indicated that the constitutional grant allowing the Ombudsman “to exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law” permits flexibility in assigning responsibilities irrespective of the military or civilian character o

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