Title
Acebedo y Dalman vs. Sarmiento
Case
G.R. No. L-28025
Decision Date
Dec 16, 1970
A criminal case for property damage was dismissed due to a six-year delay violating the accused's right to a speedy trial. The court ruled reconsideration unconstitutional, barring double jeopardy.
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Case Digest (G.R. No. L-28025)

Facts:

  1. Filing of the Criminal Information: On August 3, 1959, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga filed a criminal information for damage to property through reckless imprudence against petitioner David Acebedo y Dalman and a certain Chi Chan Tan in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.

  2. Delay in Proceedings: No further proceedings occurred for several years. On May 19, 1965, petitioner moved to dismiss the criminal charge due to the lack of progress. Respondent Judge denied this motion on July 10, 1965.

  3. Trial and Postponement: After two more years, the trial finally began. The complainant testified on direct examination but was not fully cross-examined. On June 7, 1967, the trial was set to continue, but the complainant failed to appear. The provincial fiscal moved for postponement, but petitioner’s counsel objected and sought dismissal based on the right to a speedy trial.

  4. Order of Dismissal: Respondent Judge orally granted the motion to dismiss, citing the failure to start cross-examination of the complainant. However, later that same day, the judge reconsidered and reinstated the case upon learning that cross-examination had already begun.

  5. Petitioner’s Argument: Petitioner argued that the delay of over six years violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The initial dismissal, he contended, amounted to an acquittal, and reconsideration subjected him to double jeopardy.

Issue:

  1. Whether the dismissal of the criminal case based on the denial of the right to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal, barring reconsideration under the principle of double jeopardy.
  2. Whether respondent Judge’s reconsideration of the dismissal order constituted a grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court granted the writs of certiorari and prohibition, annulling the reconsideration order of respondent Judge and permanently dismissing the criminal case against petitioner. The Court held that the dismissal based on the denial of the right to a speedy trial amounted to an acquittal, and any reconsideration would violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

Ratio:

  1. Right to Speedy Trial: The right to a speedy trial is a constitutional guarantee aimed at protecting the accused from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. It ensures that an innocent person is freed from the anxiety and expense of prolonged litigation or, if guilty, that their guilt is determined promptly. A violation of this right warrants remedies such as habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.

  2. Dismissal as Acquittal: A dismissal based on the denial of the right to a speedy trial is tantamount to an acquittal. This principle is well-established in Philippine jurisprudence, as seen in cases like People v. Diaz, People v. Abano, People v. Robles, and People v. Cloribel. In these cases, the Court consistently held that such dismissals bar further prosecution under the double jeopardy clause.

  3. Double Jeopardy: The reconsideration of a dismissal order that amounts to an acquittal places the accused in double jeopardy. The constitutional prohibition against being tried twice for the same offense is absolute and cannot be circumvented by reconsidering a valid dismissal.

  4. Inapplicability of Cabarroguis v. San Diego: The case cited by respondent Judge to justify reconsideration is inapplicable. In Cabarroguis, the dismissal was based on the belief that the crime was civil in nature, not on the denial of the right to a speedy trial. The factual and legal contexts are entirely different.

  5. Judicial Discretion and Abuse: Respondent Judge’s reconsideration of the dismissal order, despite the clear violation of petitioner’s right to a speedy trial, constituted a grave abuse of discretion. The delay of over six years, coupled with the prosecution’s failure to proceed diligently, justified the dismissal and precluded any reconsideration.


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