Title
Acebedo y Dalman vs. Sarmiento
Case
G.R. No. L-28025
Decision Date
Dec 16, 1970
A criminal case for property damage was dismissed due to a six-year delay violating the accused's right to a speedy trial. The court ruled reconsideration unconstitutional, barring double jeopardy.

Case Digest (G.R. No. L-28025)

Facts:

David Acebedo y Dalman v. Hon. Malcolm G. Sarmiento, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, and the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga, G.R. No. L-28025, December 16, 1970, the Supreme Court En Banc, Fernando, J., writing for the Court.

Petitioner David Acebedo was prosecuted by the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga when an information for damage to property through reckless imprudence was filed on August 3, 1959 in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. For more than six years the case lay dormant with little prosecution activity. On May 19, 1965 petitioner moved to dismiss for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial; the trial court (the Court of First Instance) denied that motion by order of July 10, 1965.

After two more years a trial commenced, during which the complaining witness testified on direct examination but had not yet been fully cross-examined. At the continuation of the trial set for June 7, 1967 the witness failed to appear; the Provincial Fiscal moved for postponement. Counsel for petitioner objected and moved to dismiss again on speedy-trial grounds. The respondent judge orally granted dismissal that day, basing it on the fact that cross-examination had not yet begun — an order which the Court below treated as having the effect of terminating the prosecution. Later the same day the respondent judge reconsidered that dismissal and reinstated the case after being shown that cross-examination had, in fact, already begun.

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Supreme Court, alleging that the judge’s reconsideration constituted a grave abuse of discretion and that the prior dismissal operated as an acq...(Subscriber-Only)

Issues:

  • Did the respondent judge commit a grave abuse of discretion by reconsidering and setting aside his own order of dismissal given in open court on June 7, 1967?
  • Does an order of dismissal entered because the accused was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial amount to an acquittal that bars further prosecution under the protecti...(Subscriber-Only)

Ruling:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

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