Case Digest (G.R. No. L-12271)
Facts:
The case at hand involves Joseph Abelow as the appellant and the respondents comprising Jose de la Riva, Gonzalo G. Padua, and Luzon Surety Co., Inc. The events leading to this case began in October 1950, when Abelow initiated an action for replevin in the Manila court of first instance, seeking to recover certain personal properties from De la Riva and Padua, alongside the claim for damages. In compliance with the procedural requirements, Abelow submitted a bond for the manual delivery of the properties, which was endorsed by Luzon Surety Co., Inc. This bond allowed the court to issue an order for seizure and delivery of the aforementioned properties to Abelow, facilitated by a sheriff.
Subsequently, Abelow amended his complaint to include San Ildefonso Lumber Co. as an additional defendant since they were the actual custodians of the personal property in dispute. An amended bond was again submitted with Luzon Surety Co. Inc. as a signer. However, approximately one month later
Case Digest (G.R. No. L-12271)
Facts:
- Background of the Case
- In October 1950, Joseph Abelow filed an action of replevin in the Manila court of first instance against Jose de la Riva and Gonzalo G. Padua to recover certain personal properties along with damages.
- As required by law, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit accompanied by a “bond for manual delivery of personal property” under Rule 62. This bond was subscribed by Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
- Issuance and Subsequent Modification of the Seizure Order
- Based on the affidavit and associated bond, the court issued an order for the seizure and delivery of the personal properties.
- The order was executed by the sheriff after the complaint had been amended to add San Ildefonso Lumber Co. as an additional defendant, since it was the actual possessor of the personal property.
- An amended bond, also signed by Luzon Surety Co., Inc., was subsequently submitted.
- Reversal of Seizure Order and Court Proceedings
- Approximately one month later, the order of seizure was lifted upon the submission of a counter-bond, prompting the sheriff to return the seized properties.
- The replevin case proceeded to hearing, and a judgment was rendered:
- The defendants were absolved.
- The plaintiff was ordered to pay San Ildefonso Lumber Co. P12,986.00 with interest for damages incurred by the seizure.
- An additional sum of P1,500.00 was imposed for attorney’s fees.
- The Court of Appeals later affirmed the judgment from the trial court.
- Execution of the Judgment and the Issue of the Alias Writ
- Upon remitting the record to the trial court, a writ of execution was issued against the plaintiff.
- The writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as the sheriff found no leviable property in the name of Joseph Abelow.
- Defendants then filed a petition for an alias writ of execution against Luzon Surety Co., Inc., the entity that had subscribed the replevin bond.
- Luzon Surety Co., Inc. objected to the petition, arguing that:
- The final judgment did not contain any specific directive against the surety.
- It had no notice of the claim against the plaintiff that would implicate its liability.
- Jurisdiction was lost to include or amend the judgment against the surety after the finality of judgment.
- Under Rule 62, defendants were barred from recovering from the surety due to their failure to submit a claim against it or notify it before the entry of the final judgment.
- Lower Court’s Action and the Supreme Court’s Intervention
- Despite the surety’s objections, the Manila judge decreed execution against Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
- This decree prompted the appeal, wherein the Supreme Court scrutinized whether the surety could be held liable under the circumstances.
Issues:
- Whether the alias writ of execution against Luzon Surety Co., Inc. is proper, given that:
- The final judgment did not include any order directing the surety to pay.
- The defendants had not submitted any claim against the surety or notified it of such claim before or during the trial before the final judgment.
- Whether the procedural requirements under Rule 62 (sections 10 and in conjunction with Rule 59, section 20) were complied with, particularly regarding:
- The necessity of notifying the surety and including the surety in the proceedings before the judgment became final.
- The implications of failing to effect such notification and consequently, the proper exercise of the court’s jurisdiction in enforcing the surety’s liability.
- The significance of timing in the notification of the surety:
- Whether notification after the finality of judgment suffices to impute liability to the surety.
- The interpretation of “notification” in light of prior jurisprudence, specifically addressing the contested interpretations in Florentino vs. Domadag versus later cases like Visayan Surety and Liberty Construction Supply.
Ruling:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Ratio:
- (Subscriber-Only)
Doctrine:
- (Subscriber-Only)