G.R. No. 178635 - Abad vs. Farrales-Villamayor

On August 6, 2002, petitioner Servillano Abad and his wife, Dr. Estrella E. Gavilan-Abad, purchased a 428‑square meter registered property located at 7 Administration St., GSIS Village, Project 8, Quezon City.
The property was acquired from Teresita, Rommel, and Dennis Farrales, who are related to respondents Oscar C. Farrales and Daisy C. Farrales-Villamayor by family ties.
Teresita Farrales, one of the sellers, operated a boarding house on the property.

The Abads, not wishing to run the boarding house business themselves, agreed to lease the property back to Teresita for a monthly rental fee of P30,000.00.
Although the lease commenced well, Teresita eventually abandoned the property unexpectedly.
Consequently, the Abads took over the management of the boarding house by engaging Teresita’s helper, Bencio Duran, to oversee the operations.

On December 7, 2002, during repairs and repainting works at the boarding house attended to by Dr. Abad, house painters were hired at the property.
On December 8, 2002, respondents Oscar and Daisy, accompanied by two men, forcibly entered and took possession of the boarding house while the painters were present.
The intruders eventually left, but on December 10, 2002—coinciding with the Abads’ departure for abroad—they reentered by force and reclaimed possession of the property.

On March 10, 2003, Servillano Abad filed a complaint for forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, asserting his ownership and claim to prior physical possession of the property.
Respondents denied the act of forcible entry and countered by asserting their ownership by inheritance, claiming possession since birth and, in particular, that Oscar had resided at the property since 1967, supported by a Barangay certification.
Evidence presented by the respondents included rental receipts dating from 2001 to 2003, attesting to their continuous possession and operation of a boarding house business on the property.
The respondents also argued that the Abads, by leasing the property immediately after the purchase, never truly acquired prior physical possession, which is a prerequisite for an action for forcible entry.

The MeTC initially rendered a decision in March 2005 in favor of Abad, holding that as the registered owner he was entitled to possession.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) later affirmed the MeTC decision on October 26, 2005, noting that the mere complaint allegation of ownership implied prior possession and that the issue of jurisdiction had not been properly raised until appeal.
Subsequent motions by Abad for immediate execution and for attorney’s fees were partially granted by the RTC.
Respondents Oscar and Daisy filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA), which on March 8, 2007, annulled both the MeTC and RTC decisions on the grounds that the complaint failed to sufficiently allege and prove the jurisdictional fact of prior physical possession.
The CA noted that Abad’s reliance on title or lease to establish possession was inadequate when the critical requirement under a forcible entry case is the plaintiff’s actual, physical (de facto) possession before the dispossession.

Whether Abad’s complaint sufficiently alleged the jurisdictional fact of prior physical possession of the disputed property, as required to vest the Metropolitan Trial Court with jurisdiction over a forcible entry action.

Whether Abad was able to prove that he enjoyed prior physical possession of the property before being dispossessed, especially given the contention that merely owning the title or leasing the property does not equate to de facto possession.