137 Phil. 701
Before us for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 25234-R, dismissing the appeal from and in effect affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Registration Case No. 305, G.L.R.O. Record No. 1176.
The original application for registration and confirmation of title was filed by Alejandra Austria on
Alejandra Austria was the widow of the deceased Antonio Ventenilla. On
The averment of the oppositors was that the lands applied for were owned by Antonio Ventenilla; that when he died he left a will bequeathing them in usufruct to his wife Alejandra; and that upon her death they passed to the said oppositors as his heirs.
The trial court, in its decision rendered on
The ten parcels of land applied for may be classified into two groups. Parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10, by agreement of the parties at the trial, "passed into the possession of Alejandra Austria after the death of Antonio Ventenilla by virtue of the will left by the deceased Antonio Ventenilla and probated in Special Proceeding No. 237." With respect to the six other parcels (Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9) the parties reached no agreement. The oppositors contended that they belonged to the said deceased, while the petitioner insists that Alejandra Austria acquired them by purchase.
The issue in regard to parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10 is whether Alejandra Austria was a mere life usufructuary thereof, the naked ownership being in the oppositors, as collateral heirs of Antonio Ventenilla, or was the owner in fee simple, as residuary legatee under his will. The Court of Appeals did not make any categorical finding one way or the other on this issue, and disposed of it with this equivocal observation: "But, to say that a parcel of land passed into the possession of a person does not necessarily mean that said parcel of land formed part of the residuary legacy of said person, for it may mean that said parson had usufructuary right over said parcel of land."
The question, it appears, has already been passed upon by this Court in a previous case. A brief reference to antecedent facts is necessary, as they are set forth in its decision in G. R. No. L-10018,
The next incident took place thirty-eight years later when, on April 22, 1950 herein oppositors filed a motion in the same testate proceeding claiming, among other things, that Alejandra Austria was merely the life usufructuary of the estate of the deceased, the naked ownership belonging to the movants; that she was no longer able to administer the properties; and that she had been disposing of them in violation of her trust; and praying that said Alejandra Austria be removed as administratrix and another appointed in her place. The trial Court denied the motion and ruled that the estate case had long since been closed. On appeal to this Court the order was affirmed (G. R. No. 10018, supra.) The decision, penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, ruled as follows on the issue that is pertinent to the case now before us:
"We find no merit in the appeal. We agree with the lower Court that the proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of the deceased Antonio Ventenilla had long been terminated and closed, and that the issues now raised by appellants had been settled and decided by the court's order of October 5, 1910, approving the final accounts of the administratrix Alejandra Austria declaring said administratrix the residuary legatee of all the movable and immovable properties of the estate after the payment of the shares of the other heirs (sister and nephews and nieces of the deceased) in the proportion of P17.52 per stripes, conditioned upon their putting up of the bond required by law (sec. 754, Act 190)." x x x "Appellants also insist that appellee Alejandra Austria is not the residuary legatee of the estate of Antonio Ventenilla but only its life usufructuary. This stand has long been proven false and untenable when the Supreme Court found unmeritorious the appeal of appellants' predecessors from that portion of theThe foregoing, considered together with the agreement of the parties at the trial of this case that the four parcels (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10) passed into the possession of Alejandra Austria by virtue of the will of the deceased Antonio Ventenilla, as well as with the testimonial evidence concerning Alejandra's continuous possession as owner thereafter, is sufficient proof of title for purposes of registration.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals side-stepped the issue of ownership concerning the six other parcels (Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9). The documentary evidence for the appellant is that these six parcels were acquired by Alejandra Austria through purchase: Nos. 6 and 7 on
The contention of the oppositors below is that these parcels also belonged to the deceased Antonio Ventenilla. Even assuming this to be so, they would have passed to his widow, Alejandra Austria, as the residuary heir under his will; and as stated by this Court in Case G.R. L. No. 10018, supra, "she had been in possession and enjoyment of said properties all these years in concept of owner, being the residuary legatee thereof." In any event, whether as purchaser or as residuary legatee, such possession in concept of owner constitute sufficient registrable title.
The next issue relates to the donation of all the ten parcels, executed by Alejandra Austria in favor of Socorro A. Castro. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that said donation was mortis causa and consequently void because it did not follow the formalities required of a will, pursuant to Article 620 of the old Civil Code, the law in force when the donation was made on
Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the disposition made. "Did the donor intend to transfer the ownership of the property donated upon the execution of the donation? If this is so, as reflected from the provisions contained in the donation, then it is inter vivos; otherwise, it is merely mortis causa, or made to take effect after death." Sometimes the nature of the donation becomes controversial when the donee's enjoyment of the property donated is postponed until after the donor's death.
The donation at issue in the present case opens with the following disposition:
'QUE YO ALEJANDRA AUSTRIA, la primera parte, en consideracion a los meritorios servicios y buenas atenciones que me haya prestado desde su nina y de los que todavia me esta prestando y seguira prestandome hasta mi muerte la senorita SOCORRO A. CASTRO, hija legitima de mi primo de Segundo grado, Sergio Castro, hago constar por la presente que expontaneamente y sin influencia de nadie cedo y traspaso en concepto de DONACION ONEROSA e intervivos a la mencionada senorita SOCORRO A. CASTRO, en compensacion a sus ya expresados SERVICIOS, los bienes que a continuacion se describen a saber.'"After enumerating the properties donated, the deed of donation recites further:
'Tambien hago constar que es nuestro convenio con la citada Donataria que esta Donacion se ha hecho con las condiciones siguientes, a saber: (a) Que duranto el tiempo en que todavia viviere, La donataria Socorro A. Castro, no tendra ninguna intervencion ni derecho sobre los productos de los terrenos cedidos en concepto de donacion a su favor; '(b) A mi fallecimiento, la donataria pagara todos los gastos que se incurriesen por mi intierro de acuerdo con mi posicion social; y (c) Despues de mi fallecimiento, la nuda propiedad y el derecho de Usufructo de todos los citados bienes arriba descritos, se consolidaran inmediatamente a favor de la Donataria Socorro A. Castro con la obligacion de destinar anualmente cierta cantidad justa y suficiente de los productos de los terrenos aqui donados sitos en el barrio Caviernesan para el Sufragio de mi alma y el de mi finado esposo Dn. Antonio Ventenilla.'"It is quite clear from the terms of the donation that the donor intended to and did dispose of her properties irrevocably in favor of the donee, subject only to the conditions therein expressed, one of which was that the latter would have no right to the products during the donor's lifetime. This merely indicates a reservation in herself of the usufruct over said properties, which usufruct would be consolidated with the naked ownership of the donee upon the former's death. The use of the words "se consolidaran" implied transfer of the naked ownership, with which the beneficial title would be consolidated upon arrival of the term thus fixed. In the case of
By virtue of the donation executed by the original owner and applicant in favor of Socorro A. Castro the latter succeeded to the properties applied for, and hence registration in the name of her Intestate Estate, represented in this case by the petitioner as administrator, is in order.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the lands described in the original application for registration are ordered registered as indicated above, pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Act. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.Socorro A. Castro died during the pendency of this case in the Court of Appeals, and is represented by herein petitioner, administrator of her intestate estate, Special Proceeding No. 4847 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
Justo V. Sison, Susana V. Sison, Jose V. Sison, Socorro V. Sison de Vera, Elias Ventenilla, Maria Ventenilla, Juan Ventenilla, Nieva Ventenilla, Guadalupe Ventenilla, Vicente Ventenilla, Rosario Ventenilla, Manuel Soriano, Jose Soriano, Jr., Cesar Soriano, Oliva Soriano, Soledad Soriano, Benjamin S. Viloria and Paz S. Viloria.
Antonio Ventenilla died in 1909.
Reproduced in Article 738 of the new Civil Code.
Howard v. Padilla and Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-7064 and 7098,
Cited in Laureta v. Mata, 44 Phil. 668.