257 Phil. 31
The central issue in this case is the proper interpretation of a provision in the Deed of Restrictions on the title of a lot in the Forbes Park Subdivision which binds the owner to use his lot for residential purposes and not more than one single family residential building will be constructed thereon" (p. 35, Rollo) - a restriction that generally encumbers lots in the so-called "plush" residential subdivisions.
Forbes Park Association (hereinafter referred to as "FPA") is a non-profit and non-stock corporation organized for the purpose of promoting and safeguarding the interests of the residents and lot owners in that subdivision who automatically become members of the association and are bound by its rules and regulations stipulated in the Deed of Restrictions annotated on the back of their certificates of title.
Cariday Investment Corporation (CARIDAY for brevity) is the owner of a residential building in the Forbes Park Subdivision, hence, a member of the FPA. On the back of its certificate of title, TCT No. S-91329 (Annex A, p. 56, Rollo), is annotated a "Deed of Restrictions" whose pertinent provisions are as follows:
"RESTRICTIONS
The same restrictions are found in Section 1(b), Article IV of the associations rules and regulations (pp. 170-185, Rollo) and are hereunder quoted:
In case of violation hereof, the Board of Governors shall, after at least 10 days previous notice in writing to the member/resident concerned, order the disconnection of the water service supplied to the latter by the Association's deepwell pumps; Provided, however, that reconnection thereof shall only be made upon satisfactory showing that violation of this rule no longer exists and that the requisite actual cost of reconnection as estimated by the Association is duly deposited before such reconnection is made." (Underscoring ours; pp. 36?37, Rollo.)
In June 1986, Cariday, with notice to the FPA, "repaired" its building (p. 42, Rollo). After inspection of the "repairs," the FPA's retained civil engineer reported that "additions or deletions were made in the existing residence." A second inspection in May 1987 disclosed more violations of the restrictions. He observed that the building "can be used by more than one family." (p. 78, Rollo.)
Cariday admitted that its building has the exterior appearance of a single family residence but it is designed inside to allow occupancy by two families.
The FPA demanded that corrections be made in the structure to conform with the restrictions.
Without making the corrections, Cariday, on
In a letter dated
When Haden tried to move in on
On September 28, 1987, Cariday filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, a complaint (p. 42, Rollo) for injunction and damages (Civil Case No. 17933). It prayed that, pending the trial of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ordering the FPA to desist from cutting-off the water supply to its building, or to reconnect the service if it has been cut-off, and, further, to desist from preventing its tenants ingress into and egress from its aforementioned building. Cariday alleged that if the FPA was not restrained, Cariday would not only lose its tenants but their health would be seriously endangered. As a matter of fact, on
The FPA answered Cariday's complaint and opposed the application for preliminary injunction. It alleged that under its rules and regulations, it is empowered to disconnect water services whenever there is a deviation from previously approved plans and specifications of buildings and for violation of the "single-family residential building restriction" (p. 94, Rollo).
On
The Court of Appeals, after hearing the parties, annulled the writ of injunction. It held:
The Court of Appeals upheld the right of the FPA to prohibit the entry of additional tenants into Cariday's building and to disconnect the water service for violation of the restrictions:
"x x x. With respect to the refusal of the FPA to allow the entry of additional tenant into the building in question, suffice it to say that its authority is clearly provided for in art. VI, sec. 14 which provides as follows:'Sec. 14. MOVING IN OR MOVING OUT OF
In its petition for review of the Appellate Court's decision, Cariday avers that while it is indeed bound by the restriction to construct only "one residential building" on its lot, "nowhere in the rules and regulations is there a categorical prohibition and/or restriction preventing it from exercising its rights to let its residential building to two or more tenants" (p. 19, Rollo).
We find the petitioner's interpretation of the restriction unacceptable. The restriction clearly defines not only the type and number of structures (one residential building) that may be built on each lot, but also the number of families (a single family) that may use it as a residence. Indeed, the restriction of "one x x x residential building" per lot would have been sufficient, without incorporating the additional restriction of "a single family," (p. 35, Rollo) if the purpose, as petitioner contends, were only to limit the type of building but not its use or occupancy.
We are persuaded that the purpose of the restriction is to avoid overcrowding both in the houses and in the subdivision which would result in pressure upon the common facilities such as water, power and telephone connections, accelerate the deterioration of the roads, and create problems of sanitation and security in the subdivision. As correctly perceived by the petitioner itself, the restrictions are "for aesthetic consideration and for the preservation of the peace, beauty, tranquility and serenity of living at
Logic dictates that as the building rules and regulations of the FPA expressly prohibit the construction of buildings for multiple occupancy, such as hotels, motels, and condominiums, that prohibition may not be circumvented by building a house with the external appearance of a single family dwelling but whose interior is designed for multiple occupany. It is an elementary rule of reason that what may not be done directly, may not also be done indirectly.
However, recognizing Filipino custom and the cohesive nature of our family ties, the concept of a single-family dwelling may embrace the extended family which includes married children who continue to be sheltered in the family home until they are financially able to establish homes of their own. But leasing one's house in
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petition for review, We resolved to deny it, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, and Regalado, JJ., concur.DISSENTING OPINION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
I agree with the dissenting opinion penned by Justice Medialdea. The disputed contractual commitment having been given too restrictive a meaning by the dominant party, the Court should step in with a more liberal and reasonable interpretation.
I have no objection to the proposition that ownership restrictions which are intended to avoid overcrowding, deterioration of roads, unsanitary conditions, ugly surroundings, and lawless behaviour in residential areas may be enforced through the Court's coercive powers. There is absolutely no showing, however, that two families living in one big residence in
I believe that the zeal with which the private respondent enforces the disputed single family restriction is intended to insure that
Metro
I am not suggesting that affluent suburban enclaves should be allowed to deteriorate into monotonous boxlike government housing projects or, worse, into slums or squatter colonies. My only concern is with this Court's validating restrictions whose obvious purpose is to jack up property values to heights which are incongruous against the grinding poverty and hand-to-mouth subsistence of the overwhelming masses of our people.
The provisions of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights (Article XIII, Constitution) emphasize the social function of land. Congress must give the "highest" priority to measures which enhance the right of all the people to human dignity and reduce social, economic, and political inequalities through the equitable diffusion of wealth and political power (id, Section 1). The State is mandated to undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing housing program and an urban land reform program which seek to make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens, (id. Section 9). I am afraid that the Court's decision in this
The present Constitution expresses the impatience of the framers with what they perceived as an unfortunate lack of attention to the most pressing problem faced by the country. But even under the 1935 Constitution, the Court was less than enthusiastic when asked to enforce contractual commitments based on a laissez faire theory of government. In Alalayan v. National Power Corporation (24 SCRA 172, 181-182 [1968]) the Court ruled:
"It is to be admitted of course that property rights find shelter in specific constitutional provisions, one of which is the due process clause. It is equally certain that our fundamental law framed at a time of surging unrest and dissatisfaction (The phrase is Justice Laurel's, appearing in his concurring opinion in Ang Tibay v. Court, cited with approval in Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court, 70 Phil. 340 [1940]), when there was the fear expressed in many quarters that a constitutional democracy, in view of its commitment to the claims of property, would not be able to cope effectively with the problems of poverty and misery that unfortunately afflict so many of our people, is not susceptible to the indictment that the government therein established is impotent to take the necessary remedial measures. The framers saw to that. The welfare state concept is not alien to the philosophy of our Constitution. (Cf. Private property does not constitute for anyone an absolute and unconditioned right. x x x All men are equal in their right to a decent life. x x x It is not a system of justice where one man is very wealthy and another very poor. Where such a situation exists on a national scale, it becomes a matter of social justice. x x x [In the Philippines, while] a few have far more than they need, the vast majority lack even the barest essentials of life. Pastoral Letter of the Catholic Hierarchy, May 1, 1968) It is implicit in quite a few of its provisions. It suffices to mention two. "There is the clause on the promotion of social justice to ensure the well-being and economic security of all the people, (Art. II, Sec. 5, Constitution of theI realize the difficulty in pinpointing the line where restrictions on property ownership go beyond the constitutional bounds of reasonableness. Each case must be resolved on its particular merits. Insofar as this petition is concerned, however, I concur with the dissenting minority. I vote to grant the petition.
DISSENTING OPINION
MEDIALDEA, J.:
The main issue in this petition is whether the restriction against the construction of "more than one single-family residential building" should be interpreted to be also a restriction against the use of the building, after its completion, by more than one family, or whether it is merely a limitation as to the style or type of building and does not define its use after construction.
The majority has adopted the view invoked by respondent FORBES PARK ASSOCIATION, INC. that houses at the subdivision may be occupied by but a single family. I, however, read no such limitation and hesitate to imply one especially that which restricts proprietary rights. An owner should be at liberty to do what he wishes with his property. Any limitation to his right must be explicit and convincing. And any doubt that might arise between free use of property and restrictions thereto must be resolved in favor of the former. Committed to this principle, I am of the opinion that CARIDAY may, in the exercise of its proprietary rights, lease its building, unrestricted, to more than one tenant.
Aside from the case of Financial Building Corporation, et al. v. Forbes Park Association, G.R. No. 79319, April 6, 1988, there appears no Philippine case which touches on the interpretation of "one single-family residential building" restriction. In the
That the restriction under consideration is directed solely on the type or style and number of buildings which may be constructed on the lot is clear from this annotation at the back of CARIDAY's certificate of title, to wit:
"Lots may be only used for residential purposes and not more than one single-family residential building will be constructed thereon except that separate servant's quarters may be built. All building must be of strong material and of a type of Architecture that is in harmony with the surrounding landscape and homos of the vicinity. x x x." (Underscoring mine)The first sentence of the said annotation at the back of the title is also found in the Association's rules and regulations (Art. IV, Sec. 1(b)) where the proviso was elaborated by providing that a separate garage and bathhouses for swimming pools may also be built, and covers a situation where a member owns two or more lots.
That this restriction is only a building restriction becomes more evident when We consider that there is a separate rule (Art. IV, Sec. 1(c)) regarding the use and occupancy of the building after its completion, namely:
"c. Use and occupancy of a house. The use and occupancy of houses and other improvements insideSince the subject of use and occupancy is expressly defined in paragraph (c), such provision is deemed to have covered and embraced all and every restrictions regarding the subject, and We should not, therefore, imply from another provision in the Association's rules a restriction foreign to paragraph (c). "Implied restriction can arise and will prevail only when there is no expression on the subject matter of the implied covenant, and an express agreement or covenant excludes the possibility of an implied one of a different nature." (20 Am Jr. 2d, 12, p. 585)
As can be read from the Association's rules, the only restriction regarding occupancy is that it must be used solely for residential purpose. It does not limit the number of families which may occupy the building. The majority cites the restriction against hotels and motels as indicative of the intention to limit the number of families which may occupy a building. The reason advanced for the proscription is to avoid overcrowding of families in the houses and also at the subdivision.
It must be pointed out, however, that the injunction against the use of buildings at the subdivision as hotels and motels is not their use by more than one family but rather the commercial nature of such establishments. This is clear because hotels and motels were made examples of the broad category of commercial, business and office use of buildings together with restaurants, resorts, stores, etc. It does not in any way broach the idea on how many families may occupy a building house. In this connection, it must be stated that leasing of houses at
To my mind, the restriction under dispute is based on aesthetic consideration and this could be gleaned when We again read the annotation at the back of CARIDAY's certificate of title where, after providing that only one residential building may be constructed on a lot, mandates that the type of architecture of the building must be in "harmony with the surrounding landscape and homos of the vicinity." If We were to sustain Forbes Park's argument, strict compliance of the alleged implied restriction would effectively prohibit the homeowners from allowing families of their own children to reside with them, much less, their relatives. The inequity of this situation would leave Us no alternative but to make an exception to Our interpretation, that homeowner's married children may continue to live with their parents. And if another inequitable situation should arise, is it proper for Us to make an exception to Our exception? If We follow this through We would be inventing rules not otherwise existing according to Our prejudices, thus: blood brothers are allowed but not brothers-in-law; first cousins are allowed but not second cousins; best friends are allowed but not exceeding three months, and so on. Again a question should be asked on the argument that the proscription is to prevent overcrowding: How overcrowded are five families of the homeowner's children against five families of strangers?
Respondent Association cites the case of Forbes Park Association Inc. v. Hon. Federico Alikpala, Jr., CA-G.R. S.P. No. 121170, promulgated on
and which decision We, only last April 6, 1988, had affirmed in Financial Building Corporation, et al. v. Forbes Park Association, supra. A perusal of the case, however, supports CARIDAY's argument of its inapplicability.
In said case, the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic contracted with Financial Building Corporation (Financial for short) for the construction of a residential house at its lot at
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT this petition.