G.R. No. 181284 - Unduran vs. Aberasturi

Case Summary (G.R. No. 181284)

Key Dates and Constitutional Basis

Decision date applicable to this analysis: April 18, 2017. Because the decision postdates 1990, the 1987 Constitution is the constitutional framework under which the Court interpreted statutory and jurisdictional questions.

Governing Statute and Relevant Provisions

Primary statute: Republic Act No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). Central provisions discussed: Section 66 (jurisdiction of the NCIP), Section 65 (primacy of customary laws and practices), Sections 52(h), 53, and 62 (procedures and NCIP powers in delineation, identification, resolution of adverse claims), Section 54 (cancellation of fraudulent ancestral domain titles), Section 69 (quasi-judicial powers), Section 70 (no restraining order against NCIP from inferior courts), and Section 72 (penalties and customary law option). Administrative instruments referenced: NCIP rules and the Joint DAR-DENR-LRA-NCIP Administrative Order No. 01 (2012) identifying “contentious areas/issues.”

Procedural Posture and Core Relief Sought by Petitioners

Petitioners asked the Supreme Court to reconsider its en banc decision denying relief and affirming the CA’s affirmation of the RTC. Petitioners’ principal contention in the motions was that the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) — not the regular courts — has jurisdiction over disputes involving ancestral domain and ICC/IP rights regardless of the parties’ status, and that the Court’s interpretation of Section 66 unduly restricts NCIP jurisdiction.

Petitioners’ Key Arguments

Jurisdiction should be determined by the real issue presented in the pleadings, and defenses or subsequent pleadings (e.g., asserting ancestral domain) may justify NCIP jurisdiction even if not apparent from the original complaint. Petitioners invoked analogies to jurisprudence allowing certain defenses in answers to affect forum (labor and tenancy cases cited).
Section 66 should be read broadly so the NCIP has jurisdiction over claims involving ICC/IP rights even when opposing parties are not members of the same ICC/IP group.
Sections 46(g), 62, 69, 70 and 72 of IPRA and related provisions support the NCIP’s broad adjudicatory competence and its role as quasi‑judicial forum providing access to justice and recognition/enforcement of customary law, including imposition of customary penalties under Section 72 even against non‑IPs.

Court’s Threshold Ruling on Pleadings and Jurisdictional Allegations

The Court reaffirmed the settled rule that jurisdiction over subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint; it cannot be made to depend on defenses raised by defendants. The Court rejected petitioners’ analogy to tenancy or labor cases in which certain defenses may be considered, finding it inappropriate to allow defendant’s pleadings to determine jurisdiction in this context.

Principal Holding on NCIP Jurisdiction under Section 66

The Court held that, under Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP’s jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs is limited to cases that arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group. If the opposing parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP group (including disputes between IPs of different groups or between an IP and a non‑IP), the proper regular courts (e.g., RTC) shall generally have jurisdiction.

Statutory Reasoning: The Provisio and Exhaustion Requirement

The Court emphasized that Section 66 contains a proviso — a limiting clause — requiring exhaustion of all remedies provided under customary laws and a certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders that customary remedies have been exhausted. The Court interpreted these proviso conditions as inherently requiring that the disputing parties share the same customary law system; thus the NCIP’s Section 66 jurisdiction presupposes that both parties are members of the same ICC/IP group.

NCIP Primary Jurisdiction under Other IPRA Provisions (Exceptions)

The Court clarified that, although Section 66 is limited, the NCIP nonetheless possesses primary jurisdiction under other IPRA provisions over certain categories of disputes irrespective of the parties’ belonging to the same ICC/IP group: (1) adverse claims and border disputes arising from delineation of ancestral domains/lands (Sections 52(h) and 62); (2) cancellation of fraudulently issued Certificates of Ancestral Domain Title (CADTs) (Section 54); and (3) disputes and violations of ICC/IP rights between members of the same ICC/IP group (Section 72 as to customary penalties). The NCIP’s competence in these delineation/adverse‑claim and fraud‑cancellation matters flows from IPRA provisions that vest the NCIP/Ancestral Domains Office with primary adjudicatory and administrative functions in the recognition and certification process.

Appeal Route and Administrative Expertise

The Court noted that NCIP decisions on ancestral domain disputes are reviewable by petition for review to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, and that technical or fact‑intensive matters concerning delineation and ancestral domain recognition necessitate NCIP expertise and administrative discretion.

Concurrent, Primary, and Exclusive Jurisdiction: Limits and Legislative Intent

The Court rejected the notion that Section 66 conferred exclusive and original jurisdiction on the NCIP for all ICC/IP‑related disputes. Legislative history from the Bicameral Conference showed deliberate removal of “exclusive and original” language, demonstrating Congressional intent to allow regular courts to entertain such disputes in appropriate circumstances. The Court therefore declined to treat the NCIP’s jurisdiction as exclusive; it characterized NCIP jurisdiction under Section 66 as limited, and the NCIP’s jurisdiction under other provisions as primary with respect to certain delineation and fraud matters.

Relationship with Other Agencies and “Contentious Areas”

The Joint DAR‑DENR‑LRA‑NCIP Administrative Order No. 01 (2012) identified numerous “contentious areas/issues,” including overlapping claims between CARP titles, DENR permits and ancestral domain claims. The Court recognized that such contentious matters inevitably affect non‑IPs and members of different ICC/IP groups; it observed fairness and due process require that parties who are not members of the same ICC/IP group cannot be compelled to submit to another group’s customary law processes. The Court acknowledged administrative rules that provide procedures for exclusion/segregation of titled lands and specify appropriate forums (e.g., DAR Secretary, RTC) for challenge to titles, further supporting the limited scope of NCIP exclusivity.

Section 72 (Penalties) and Limits on Customary Law Application

The Court addressed petitioners’ reliance on Section 72 (permitting penalties under customary law): it ruled that imposition of customary penalties is legally viable only where both parties are members of the same ICC/IP group; customary penalties cannot, consistent with fair process, be imposed on persons who are not members or who belong to different groups. Where national criminal or civil remedies are pursued, regular courts have jurisdiction and may apply statutory penalties provided by law. The Court found it unlikely constitutionally and practically that customary penalties could be imposed on non‑IP persons due to requirements of publication and notice, and to due process.

Treatment of Precedents and Earlier Decisions

The Court reconciled prior jurisprudence (e.g., Lim v. Gamosa, Begnaen v. Spouses Caligtan, City Government of Baguio v. Masweng) and noted that some language in earlier cases referring to “original and exclusive” NCIP jurisdiction was obiter dictum or required careful contextual rea

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 181284)

Procedural Posture and Dispositive Ruling

Case reported at 808 Phil. 795, En Banc, G.R. No. 181284, decision dated April 18, 2017.
The dispositive portion of the Court’s en banc Decision dated October 20, 2015 stated: "WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2006, and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, in CA-G.R. SP No. 00204-MIN, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."
The present filing before the Court consists of petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of that en banc Decision.
The Supreme Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed the Court of Appeals decision and resolution.

Core Legal Issue Presented

Whether the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), rather than the regular courts, has jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving ancestral domain of Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) and Indigenous Peoples (IPs) regardless of the parties involved.
Specifically, whether Section 66 of Republic Act No. 8371 (IPRA) vests the NCIP with jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs even when the opposing parties are not both members of the same ICC/IP group or when one party is a non-ICC/IP.

Petitioners’ Principal Contentions

Petitioners maintain that NCIP (not regular courts) has jurisdiction over disputes involving ancestral domain of ICCs/IPs regardless of parties.
They argue that the general rule that jurisdiction is determined by allegations in the complaint admits exceptions and can be relaxed based on special circumstances in this case — namely, that the real issue involves conflicting claims over ancestral domain.
By analogy to jurisprudence allowing defenses in answers to inform jurisdictional determinations (Ignacio v. CFI Bulacan; Ferrer v. Villamor; Nonan v. Plan; Leoquinco v. Canada Dry Bottling Co.; Mindanao Rapid Co. v. Omandam), petitioners assert that defendant allegations showing a claim over ancestral domain should vest jurisdiction in NCIP.
Petitioners contend the Court’s interpretation of Section 66 as limiting NCIP jurisdiction to disputes among members of the same ICC/IP group is contrary to IPRA and the Constitution.
They assert that ICCs/IPs are governed by customary laws and do not require IPRA to enforce customary law among themselves; customary laws and dispute resolution should govern intra- and inter-ICC/IP disputes.
Petitioners argue Section 65’s primacy of customary laws and other IPRA provisions (Sections 46(g), 62, 69, 70, 72) support NCIP jurisdiction over disputes even when parties are from different ICCs/IPs or include non-IPs.
They highlight that Section 72 permits imposition of penalties under customary law even on non-IPs and thus negates limiting NCIP’s jurisdiction to disputes where both parties are members of the same tribe.
Petitioners cite The City Government of Baguio City v. Masweng and Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v. Masweng as authority that NCIP can have original and exclusive jurisdiction even if one party is a non-ICC/IP.
In their Supplemental Motion they reiterated: (1) jurisdiction may be determined by subsequent pleadings and defenses, (2) IPRA confers NCIP jurisdiction; (3) IPRA is social legislation to protect IPs, principally versus non-IPs; (4) NCIP is a quasi-judicial body mandated to enforce IP rights and customary law; (5) NCIP jurisdiction is not limited by tribal membership; (6) harmonized IPRA provisions support NCIP jurisdiction over disputes involving IP rights whether parties are IPs or not; and (7) NCIP competence advances access to justice and human rights enforcement for ICCs/IPs.

Court’s Overarching Conclusion

The Court unanimously denied the petition for review on certiorari and found no merit in petitioners’ motions for reconsideration.
The Court affirmed that jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents’ original and amended complaint, based on allegations therein, lies with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The Court held that Section 66 of the IPRA limits NCIP jurisdiction: NCIP has jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when such claims and disputes arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group and after exhaustion of customary remedies, subject to certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders.
When claims and disputes arise between parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, or when one party is a non-ICC/IP, the regular courts have jurisdiction, except in specific instances where NCIP has primary jurisdiction under other IPRA provisions (Sections 52(h), 53, 54, and 62).

Jurisdictional Principles Reiterated by the Court

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint which state ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.
The jurisdiction of a court cannot be made to depend on defenses raised by the defendant in the answer or motion to dismiss; otherwise jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant (citing Spouses Atuel v. Sps. Valdez).
A court of general jurisdiction may hear cases whose subject matter is not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of any other tribunal.
Administrative agencies acting in quasi-judicial capacity are tribunals of limited jurisdiction; they may exercise only such powers as are expressly granted by enabling statutes.

Interpretation and Effect of Section 66 (IPRA)

Section 66 provides NCIP jurisdiction "over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, that no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elder/Leaders...that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP."
The qualifying proviso under Section 66 is a limiting provision: it requires exhaustion of customary remedies and certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders who attempted to settle the dispute.
Those two conditions presuppose that the parties belong to the same ICC/IP group (because different ICCs/IPs have separate customary laws and Council structures) and cannot be met if one party is a non-ICC/IP or if parties belong to different ICC/IP groups with distinct customary laws.
Therefore, Section 66 limits NCIP’s quasi-judicial jurisdiction to cases where both parties are members of the same ICC/IP group and have exhausted customary remedies evidenced by the certification.

NCIP Primary Jurisdiction Under Sections 52(h), 53, 54 and 62 (IPRA)

The Court recognized that, despite Section 66’s limitation, IPRA vests the NCIP with primary jurisdiction in certain matters irrespective of whether parties are non-ICC/IPs or members of different ICC/IP groups:
- Section 52(h): Procedural role of the Ancestral Domains Office (ADO) in the delineation process, endorsement and rejection of claims, and requirement to assist contending parties in preliminary resolution of conflicts where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on boundaries, without prejudice to full adjudication under Section 62.
- Section 53 (notably subsections e–g): Procedures for publication, inspection, parcellary survey, rejection of patently false or fraudulent claims, and NCIP’s power to issue certificates of ancestral land where claims are meritorious; ADO’s role to assist contending parties and to forward reports to NCIP for evaluation and issuance of certificates.
- Section 54: NCIP’s power to review and cancel fraudulently acquired claims/CADTs upon written request and after due notice and hearing.
- Section 62: NCIP shall hear and decide, after notice, disputes arising from delineation of ancestral domains where adverse claims exist and cannot be resolved; provided that customary process governs disputes between/among ICCs/IPs regarding traditional boundaries and that NCIP shall promulgate rules and decisions are reviewable b