Case Summary (G.R. No. 199710)
Factual Background
Mercuria D. So wrote to the Office of the Bar Confidant alleging that Ma. Lucille P. Lee was defendant in Civil Case No. 740 and was unfit for admission to the Bar because of an irresponsible attitude toward monetary obligations, and attached the complaint for collection of sum of money. In her comment, Lee stated she had been unaware of Civil Case No. 740 until she registered for the oath taking, admitted borrowing P200,000.00 from So and paying P140,000.00 over ten months, and explained that business losses caused subsequent nonpayment while she requested additional time to settle the loan. The Office of the Bar Confidant reported that Lee's bar application disclosed another pending civil case, Civil Case No. 1436, captioned Nonoy Bolos v. Ma. Lucille Lee Jao, arising from several loans aggregating P1,450,000.00. The Court initially held Lee's request to sign the Roll in abeyance and required a manifestation on the status of Civil Case Nos. 740 and 1436.
Procedural History
Lee filed a petition on October 9, 2017 stating that Civil Case No. 740 had been dismissed pursuant to a Compromise Agreement and that she had complied with its terms. In her March 15, 2019 petition she reiterated the dismissal of Civil Case No. 740 and produced a Judgment by Compromise dismissing Civil Case No. 1436 following a compromise with Joseph "Nonoy" Bolos, under which Lee agreed to pay at least P15,000.00 per month starting one month after she signed the Roll. The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended on March 28, 2019 that Lee be allowed to retake the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys provided she inform the Court within one month of making her first P15,000.00 payment to Bolos and notify the Court upon full satisfaction of the debt.
The Parties' Contentions
So alleged that the pendency of Civil Case No. 740 demonstrated Lee's unfitness to be admitted to the Bar due to irresponsibility in meeting monetary obligations. Lee maintained that she had paid P140,000.00 of a P200,000.00 loan, had sought additional time after suffering business losses, and later entered into compromise agreements that resulted in the dismissal of the civil actions against her and set out payment terms to settle her obligations, including the P15,000.00 monthly payments to Bolos.
Issue
WHETHER Ma. Lucille P. Lee SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH AND SIGN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
The Court's Disposition
The Court adopted the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant to ALLOW Ma. Lucille P. Lee to retake the Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to the conditions that she (a) notify the Court within one month from making her first monthly payment to Joseph Bolos and (b) inform the Court upon full satisfaction of her monetary obligation in accordance with the January 29, 2019 Judgment by Compromise. SO ORDERED.
Legal Basis and Reasoning
The Court reiterated that the practice of law is a privilege, not a right, and that the State confers that privilege only on those who possess and continue to possess the qualifications required by law, citing Atty. Alcantara v. Atty. De Vera, 650 Phil. 214, 220 (2010) and In Re: Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath by Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., 348 Phil. 841, 846 (1998). The Court emphasized Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which requires every applicant for admission to the Bar to be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and to produce satisfactory evidence that no charges involving moral turpitude have been filed or are pending. The Court recited the accepted definition of moral turpitude as acts of baselessness, vileness, or depravity of private and social duties and catalogued the types of crimes and acts which jurisprudence had found to involve moral turpitude, including estafa, forgery, perjury, and other offenses cited in prior decisions.
Application of Doctrine to Civil Cases and to Lee's Circumstances
The Court explained that not every criminal act involves moral turpitude and that the determination whether an act constitutes moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact that depends on the circumstances, citing Pagaduan v. Civil Service Commission, 747 Phil. 590, 601 (2014); Dungo v. People, 762 Phil. 630, 659 (2015); and Teves v. Commission on Elections, 604 Phil. 717, 725 (2009). The Court reasoned further that not all civil cases reflect conduct evincing lack of moral fiber and that the mere pendency of a civil action should not bar a successful bar examinee from taking the Lawyer's Oath and signing the Roll, because allowing such a rule would permit the expedient filing of civil cases to jeopardize rightful admission. Applying those principles, the Court found that the pendency of Civil Case Nos. 740 and 1436 alone did not establish that Lee committed acts tainted with moral turpitude.
Consideration of the Compromises and Continuing Obligations
The Court noted that both civil actions against Lee were dismissed pursuant to compromises she executed with her creditors. The Court recognized that a debt existed to Bolos and stressed that deliberate failure to pay just debts constituted gross misconduct for which a lawyer may be sanctioned by suspension for
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Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 199710)
Parties and Procedural Posture
- Mercuria D. So filed a letter dated May 19, 2017 with the Office of the Bar Confidant alleging that Ma. Lucille P. Lee was a defendant in Civil Case No. 740 and was unfit for admission to the Bar due to alleged failure to meet monetary obligations.
- Ma. Lucille P. Lee responded by admitting receipt of a P200,000.00 loan from So, stating she paid P140,000.00 over ten months, and explaining subsequent defaults due to business losses.
- The Office of the Bar Confidant reported that Lee had disclosed a separate civil case docketed as Civil Case No. 1436 involving loans from Joseph "Nonoy" Bolos in the aggregate amount of P1,450,000.00 in her 2016 Bar application.
- The Court issued an August 1, 2017 Resolution holding Lee's request to sign the Roll of Attorneys in abeyance and required her to manifest the status of Civil Case Nos. 740 and 1436.
- Lee filed petitions dated October 9, 2017 and March 15, 2019 to retake the Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys, asserting that Civil Case No. 740 had been dismissed pursuant to a Compromise Agreement and that Civil Case No. 1436 had been dismissed by a Judgment by Compromise.
- The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended on March 28, 2019 that Lee be allowed to retake the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys subject to reporting conditions concerning payments to Joseph Bolos.
Key Factual Allegations
- So attached to her May 19, 2017 letter a copy of a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money filed as Civil Case No. 740 against Lee.
- Lee averred that she only learned of Civil Case No. 740 when she registered for the oath taking and that she did not intend to evade her obligation to So but requested additional time to settle the debt.
- The OBC reported that Lee had declared Civil Case No. 1436 in her bar application and that the case involved multiple loans from Bolos totaling P1,450,000.00.
- Lee represented that Civil Case No. 740 was dismissed under an approved Compromise Agreement and that she complied with the terms of that compromise.
- Lee further represented that Civil Case No. 1436 was dismissed by a Judgment by Compromise under which she agreed to pay Bolos at least P15,000.00 per month beginning one month after she signed the Roll of Attorneys.
- The OBC conditioned its recommendation on Lee notifying the Court within one month of making her first P15,000.00 payment and on notifying the Court upon full payment in accordance with the compromise.
Statutory Framework
- Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that every applicant for admission to the Bar be a citizen of the Philippines, be at least twenty-one years of age, be of good moral character, be a resident of the Philippines, and produce satisfactory evidence that no charges involving moral turpitude have been filed or are pending.
- The Court referenced the definition of moral turpitude as acts of baselessness, vileness, or depravity contrary to accepted rules of right and duty and noted that its determination is ultimately a question of fact.
- The Court observed that not every criminal act or civil case involves moral turpitude and that the pendency of a c