Title
Robles vs. Maog
Case
A.M. No. P-15-3304
Decision Date
Jul 1, 2015
Clerk of Court Atty. Duke Thaddeus R. Maog overstepped authority by modifying a writ, leading to a misconduct charge. The Supreme Court found him guilty but reduced his penalty to a reprimand, citing good faith, inexperience, and lack of prior offenses as mitigating factors.
clerk of court
attorney
judicial authority

Case Summary (A.M. No. P-15-3304)

Factual Background

The Ombudsman found that both respondents were court employees. On that basis, the Ombudsman deemed it proper to dismiss the complaint and to refer the matter to the Supreme Court for appropriate action, citing prior decisions such as Maceda v. Vasquez and Judge Caoibes v. Hon. Ombudsman, and in compliance with an Ombudsman memorandum dated 31 July 2003 issued by then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo.

The administrative finding against COC Maog stemmed from the writ that he issued pursuant to an RTC order. The RTC’s order, issued on 11 January 2007 by Judge Luis R. Tongco (Judge Tongco), granted plaintiff’s application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The order emphasized that it was granted “to preserve the status quo ante,” without delving into the merits of the principal action. It commanded the issuance of a writ directing defendants to open the LRTA Line 2 Santolan Terminal vacant compound and to provide plaintiff free and unhampered ingress and egress from the leased premises, conditioned upon posting of a bond in the amount of Two Million Pesos (Php 2,000,000.00), executed in favor of defendants as required under Section 4(b), Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

In implementing this directive, COC Maog issued a writ that did more than the RTC order required. While the RTC order commanded the opening of the vacant lot compound and the allowance of ingress and egress, the writ also stated: “turn over the possession and operation of the subject terminal to plaintiff.” This added clause became the core basis for the administrative determination that the clerk arrogated unto himself a judicial function.

Administrative Proceedings and the Court’s Original Resolution

In its Resolution dated 18 February 2015, the Court adopted and approved the factual findings, legal conclusions, and recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator. The Court found COC Maog guilty of simple misconduct, specifically for arrogating unto himself judicial authority by including in the writ a provision that exceeded the RTC order. The Court imposed a suspension for one (1) month, effective immediately upon receipt of notice, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

As to the other charges, including those against Sheriff Domingo R. Garcia, Jr., the Court dismissed them for lack of merit and because they were considered judicial in nature. The matter was thus limited, at the Court’s level, to the administrative liability of COC Maog for the issuance of the writ with the disputed clause.

The Motion for Partial Reconsideration

After the adverse resolution, COC Maog filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. He argued that he had a sufficient basis to include the phrase “and turn over the possession and operation of the subject terminal to plaintiff” because the phrase allegedly formed part of the prayer in plaintiff MEGATRAF’s application, which he claimed was granted unqualifiedly by the trial court.

He further contended that even if the “turn over the possession and operation” language was not included in the dispositive portion of the RTC order, the preservation of the status quo ante—reflected in the dispositive portion—necessarily included the turnover of possession and operation to MEGATRAF. According to his position, MEGATRAF had possession and operation of the transportation terminal under its lease with LRTA prior to LRTA’s alleged unilateral and untimely termination. He reasoned that excluding the clause would render the writ ineffective, because it would fail to preserve the status quo ante between the parties.

The Court’s Evaluation of Authority and Administrative Liability

The Court treated the written RTC order and the writ issued by the clerk as the controlling benchmarks. It held that COC Maog overstepped the bounds of his authority. Instead of quoting only the dispositive portion of the RTC order, he included language that he believed clarified the order. The Court emphasized that clerks of court perform administrative, not judicial, functions and that the issuance of writs by a clerk is governed by Section 4 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court. Under that provision, the clerk issues ordinary writs and process that do not involve functions appertaining to the court or judge. If an order needs clarification, it must be done through an amended order by the judge, and only the judge has that authority.

Accordingly, even assuming that COC Maog acted without bad faith and based on an honest belief that the writ conformed with the trial court’s order, the Court ruled that administrative liability still attached. The clerk’s addition of the “turn over possession and operation” clause was an act falling within the adjudicative function reserved to the judge, not the ministerial function reserved to the clerk.

Mitigating Circumstances and the Tempering of Penalty

Although the Court affirmed the finding of administrative liability, it considered whether the penalty should be tempered. The Court identified multiple circumstances that justified moderation.

First, the Court noted that COC Maog was barely five months into his appointment as clerk of court when he issued the disputed writ, and he admitted that it was the first such writ he had issued. The Court treated this as a rookie mistake.

Second, the Court considered that Administrator Robles did not bring the discrepancy promptly to the attention of the trial court. Instead, Administrator Robles filed an administrative complaint before the Ombudsman. Although the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on 13 March 2007, it was not referred to the Office of the Court Administrator until 21 June 2011. By then, the order and writ had already attained finality. The Court also noted that Judge Tongco had already retired and, in fact, had passed away in 2010, which further limited the opportunity to correct or clarify the alleged inconsistency.

Third, the Court stressed that the administrative matter was COC Maog’s first offense, and that no other administrative action had been filed against him during his twelve (12) years in the judiciary. It reiterated that in previous rulings it had refrained from imposing the actual penalties prescribed where mitigating factors existed. The Court observed that mitigating circumstances may include length of service in government, good faith, and other analogous circumstances.

The Court then catalogued the mitigating circumstances it found valid: (one) that COC Maog acted in good faith in issuing the writ; (two) that the incident occurred when he wa

...continue reading

Analyze Cases Smarter, Faster
Jur helps you analyze cases smarter to comprehend faster, building context before diving into full texts. AI-powered analysis, always verify critical details.

About Privacy Terms