Case Summary (G.R. No. 189723)
Factual Background: The Application for Original Registration
On 17 August 2004, Alaminos Ice Plant and Cold Storage, Inc. filed an application for original registration under the Torrens system of the 10,000-square-meter parcel described as Lot No. 6411-B in Alaminos City. The applicant traced its claim through prior owners. As found by the RTC, the original claimants were Juan Duldulao and Leonora Duldulao, who conveyed the land to their daughter, Mary Jane Almazan; the family had been the tax declarants from 1951 to 1997. Mary Jane Almazan later sold the land to Rissa Santos Cai, and the respondent acquired the land in April 2002, evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
After acquiring the property, the respondent enclosed the area with a concrete fence and constructed an ice plant. The application was docketed as Land Registration Case No. A-637 before the RTC, Branch 54, Alaminos City.
RTC Proceedings and Grant of the Application
In the RTC, the Government Oppositor, represented by the Solicitor General through City Prosecutor Abraham L. Ramos II, did not adduce evidence to support the opposition. The RTC thus found that the applicant, together with its predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession and occupation of the land “in the concept of owner” through acts characterized as open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than fifty (50) years—from 1951—and that the land was free from adverse claims or conflict.
Relying on the evidence presented, and after confirming the order of general default and considering that the publication, notices, and posting required by law were complied with, the RTC ordered the registration of Lot 6411-B in favor of the respondent.
CA Appellate Review and the Grounds Raised by the Republic
The Office of the Solicitor General, for the Republic, appealed. Its assignments of error were twofold. First, it alleged that the respondent failed to submit evidence of a certification that the land was alienable and disposable. Second, it argued that the respondent failed to prove specific acts of possession for the required period of at least thirty (30) years.
The respondent countered that a certification of alienability and disposability was unnecessary because, in its view, the land was not part of the public domain. It further emphasized the tax declarations it had presented to show continuous possession since 1951, and it argued that the Republic had not presented evidence of non-alienability.
During the appellate proceedings, respondent filed a Manifestation/Compliance dated 20 March 2009, apparently to show that the Office of the Solicitor General had received respondent’s brief. In that same submission, respondent reiterated its position on the irrelevance of alienability certification and appended, in addition, a certification from the CENRO dated 9 March 2009, identifying the land as alienable and disposable.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC. It held that the land was alienable and disposable based on the CENRO certification, which was said to have been submitted at the appellate proceedings. The CA thus accepted the land’s registrability and sustained the findings on possession.
The Parties’ Contentions in the Supreme Court
In its petition, the Republic argued that the CA committed reversible error on two questions of law. First, it contended that the appellate court improperly gave evidentiary weight to the DENR-CENRO certification because it was allegedly unoffered during trial and was unidentified. Second, it argued that the CA erred in ruling that respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had satisfied the possession requirements.
Respondent’s position, as reflected in the CA proceedings and reiterated in the Supreme Court arguments, essentially relied on the theory that the land was not public domain, and therefore that alienability certification was not required; at the same time, it invoked its tax declarations and claimed possession dating back to 1951.
Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Burden of Proof in Original Registration
Before addressing evidentiary issues, the Court rejected respondent’s proposition regarding the burden of proof in registration proceedings. The Court explained that the Regalian Doctrine under the Constitution presumes all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and lands not clearly shown to be within private ownership are presumed State property. While the registration process carries a burden of proof, the Court clarified that this burden is that the applicant must overcome the presumption of State ownership by presenting evidence that the land is alienable and disposable.
The Court reiterated that, as held in Republic v. Roche, the onus of proving alienability and disposability lies with the applicant in original registration. Thus, the government need not present proof that the land is incapable of registration once the presumption of State ownership stands.
Insufficiency of the CENRO Certification Under Controlling Doctrine
The Court held that the CENRO certification in this case was not sufficient to overcome the presumption of State ownership. It relied on Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, where the Court had required more than a bare certification by the CENRO or PENRO. In that earlier ruling, the Court had emphasized that the applicant must prove that the DENR Secretary approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application fell within the approved area through the required verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. It further required the applicant to present a certified true copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary, verified by the legal custodian of the official records.
In the case at hand, the Court held that respondent’s CENRO certification was not the type of proof that the doctrine requires. Consequently, the Court ruled that the presumption that Lot 6411-B was inalienable public domain remained unrebutted, rendering the land incapable of registration.
Evidentiary Defect: Lack of Formal Offer and Improper Reliance on an Unverified Document
The Court also ruled that even aside from insufficiency under the alienability doctrine, the certification had no evidentiary value for another reason: it had not been formally offered during trial. The Court explained that courts base factual findings and judgments only on evidence formally offered at trial. Because of the lack of formal offer, the appellate court could not validly give it probative weight.
The Court further observed that the certification appeared only during the appeal, meaning the CA relied on a document not previously scrutinized by the RTC. The Court reasoned that, in review, an appellate court cannot appropriate
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Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 189723)
- The case involved a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals Decision dated 30 September 2009 in CA G.R. CV. No. 90527.
- The petition challenged the appellate court’s affirmance of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos City Decision dated 25 October 2005 in Land Registration Case No. A-637 that granted original registration under the Torrens system.
- The Republic of the Philippines sought reversal and dismissal of the land registration application of Alaminos Ice Plant and Cold Storage, Inc., represented by Samuel C. Chua.
Parties and Procedural Posture
- The Republic of the Philippines served as petitioner and opposed the registration through the Office of the Solicitor General.
- Alaminos Ice Plant and Cold Storage, Inc., represented by Samuel C. Chua, appeared as respondent and applied for original registration in the land registration case.
- The RTC granted the application after confirming compliance with publication and posting requirements and after finding proof of ownership and requisite possession.
- The CA affirmed the RTC, emphasizing that the land formed part of the alienable and disposable public domain based on a CENRO certification submitted at the appellate stage.
- On review, the Supreme Court reversed the CA and dismissed the application on the ground that the proof of alienability and disposability was legally insufficient and evidentially unavailable.
Key Factual Allegations
- On 17 August 2004, respondent filed an application for original registration of a 10,000-square meter parcel of land located at Barangay Pogo, Alaminos City.
- The land was identified as Lot No. 6411-B, Cad-325-D of Plan CSD-01-013782-D.
- The land description referenced boundaries along National Road and adjoining lots in the subdivision plan, including lots 6411-C, 6947, Pogo Elem. School Site, 4027, and 6411-A.
- The trial court found that the original claimants were Juan Duldulao and Leonora Duldulao, who conveyed the land to their daughter Mary Jane Almazan.
- The trial court further found that Mary Jane Almazan sold the land to Rissa Santos Cai, from whom respondent acquired the property in April 2002, memorialized by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
- Respondent enclosed the land with a concrete fence and constructed an ice plant thereon after acquisition.
- Respondent and its predecessors-in-interest were alleged to have been tax declarants from 1951 to 1997.
- Respondent asserted acts of dominion beginning 1951, including occupation and cultivation, declaration for taxation, and payment of taxes.
Issues on Review
- The petition raised legal errors concerning whether the CENRO certification was properly considered as evidence since it was allegedly unoffered during trial and was allegedly unidentified.
- The petition also raised legal errors concerning whether respondent proved compliance with the required period of possession and occupation.
- The Supreme Court ultimately resolved the petition on the threshold issue of whether respondent presented legally sufficient and evidentially admissible proof that the land was alienable and disposable.
Statutory and Doctrinal Framework
- The Court described the Regalian Doctrine, embodied in the Constitution, under which all lands of the public domain belong to the State as the source of any claimed ownership.
- The Court held that lands not clearly appearing to be within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
- The Court clarified that in registration proceedings, the burden is not on the government to prove inalienability; rather, the applicant must overcome the presumption of State ownership.
- In original registration, the Court emphasized that the onus of proving alienability and disposability lies with the applicant, citing Republic v. Roche and Republic v. Dela Paz.
- The Court recited Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 on who may apply for registration, including those with open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
- The Court also cited Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 on confirmation of claims and issuance of certificates of title, including those with possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public dominion since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the