Title
Re: Vicente S.E. Veloso
Case
A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA
Decision Date
Jun 16, 2015
Three justices sought credit for prior non-judicial services (COMELEC, NLRC) for longevity pay and retirement benefits. Court ruled: MTC service credited, COMELEC/NLRC service mostly denied; RA 9347 not retroactive.

Case Summary (A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA)

Petitions and Reliefs Sought

  • Justice Salazar‑Fernando: credit MTC and COMELEC service as judicial service for longevity pay computation and adjust longevity pay (she sought increase from 10% to 20% effective May 25, 1999).
  • Justice Gacutan: credit NLRC Commissioner service (March 3, 1998–November 5, 2009) as judicial service for retirement and longevity pay; request longevity pay equivalent to 10% and retroactive salary/allowance adjustments from assumption of CA office (Nov 6, 2009).
  • Justice Veloso: motion for reconsideration of prior denial; sought crediting of his NLRC service as judicial service for adjustment of salary/benefits (including longevity pay).

Procedural History

  • The three letter‑requests/motion were consolidated for resolution. The Office of Administrative Services (OAS) and the Financial Management and Budget Office (FMBO) submitted recommendations: OAS recommended crediting Salazar‑Fernando’s MTC service but not her COMELEC service for current longevity; FMBO recommended crediting Gacutan’s NLRC service for retirement only (effective at retirement) and denying retroactive salary adjustment, and recommended denial of Veloso’s motion.

Governing Statute on Longevity Pay

  • Section 42, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980): grants a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of monthly basic pay to Justices and Judges for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary; includes non‑exceedance proviso regarding total salary after adding longevity pay.

Majority Holding — Salazar‑Fernando (MTC service)

  • The Court granted the request to credit Salazar‑Fernando’s service as MTC Judge (Feb 15, 1983–Jul 31, 1987) in computing her longevity pay. The service is clearly “rendered in the Judiciary” under Section 42 and thus creditable.

Majority Holding — Salazar‑Fernando (COMELEC service)

  • The Court denied the request to credit Salazar‑Fernando’s COMELEC service (Feb 14, 1992–Feb 14, 1998) for longevity pay. Section 42 applies only to service rendered in the Judiciary; the COMELEC is independent of the Judiciary and service there is not judicial service for longevity pay purposes. The Court declined to extend the reasoning in In Re: Justice Pardo beyond its factual bounds.

Majority Analysis — In Re: Justice Pardo and Limits on “Tacking”

  • The Court reviewed In Re: Justice Pardo (where a single, non‑interrupting return to the Judiciary after one stint in another branch was treated as continuous) and clarified that Pardo’s liberal construction was tied to his specific uninterrupted service record. The majority held Section 3 of BP 129 permits bridging only an original appointment and a single reappointment after one non‑judicial appointment; it does not authorize multiple breaks or repeated tacking of non‑judicial service to count as continuous judicial service.

Majority Holding — Gacutan (NLRC service and longevity pay)

  • The Court denied crediting Justice Gacutan’s entire NLRC service as judicial service for purposes of longevity pay (because Section 42 requires service “in the Judiciary”). The NLRC is attached to the Executive Department; service there does not meet Section 42’s requirement for longevity pay.

Majority Holding — Gacutan (retirement credit)

  • Notwithstanding the denial for longevity pay, the Court recognized that Gacutan’s NLRC service is creditable as government service for retirement purposes under RA 910 (as amended). RA 910 expressly allows service in other branches of government to count for retirement eligibility.

Majority Holding — Veloso (motion for reconsideration)

  • The Court denied Justice Veloso’s motion for reconsideration. RA 9347 (which amended Article 216 of the Labor Code to confer parity of rank/salary/benefits on NLRC commissioners) does not expressly provide retroactive effect and, as a rule, statutes apply prospectively. Even if RA 9347 were retroactive, conferral of CA rank/salary does not equate to service “in the Judiciary” for purposes of Section 42 longevity pay.

Majority Statutory Construction: Plain Meaning and Special vs General Law

  • The Court applied the plain meaning rule: Section 42 plainly limits longevity pay to service “rendered in the Judiciary.” As a specific provision about judicial longevity pay, BP 129 controls over more general statutes. General laws granting rank/salary parity (e.g., RA 9347, 9417, 10071) cannot override BP 129’s specific limitation.

Majority Distinction: Salary vs Longevity Pay (Nature and Computation)

  • The Court analyzed salary under Section 41 (fixed salary rates per salary schedule) and longevity pay under Section 42 (a 5% add‑on for each five years of judicial service). It concluded longevity pay is an add‑on benefit conditioned on judicial service and is not an integral or automatic component of the “salary” referred to in other statutes that grant equivalent salaries to executive officials.

Majority Rejection of Administrative Construction and Limits on Liberality

  • The Court held that contemporaneous administrative interpretations are advisory and not binding when conflicting with statutory language. It cautioned against liberal constructions that would amount to judicial legislation by expanding Section 42 beyond its clear text.

Prior Jurisprudence Revisited and Corrections

  • The majority reviewed prior rulings (e.g., Santiago, Gancayco, Dela Fuente, Guevarra‑Salonga) that had recognized certain non‑judicial service for longevity pay or retirement computation. The Court concluded those prior decisions were erroneous applications of Section 42 and should be abandoned going forward. Nevertheless, the Court recognized vested interests and equitable considerations: past longevity grants already enjoyed by retirees will not be withdrawn; incumbents who have already been granted longevity pay based on prior non‑judicial service will have such grants maintained but frozen at current levels pending compensation by subsequent judicial service.

“Moving On” Directives and Implementation

  • The Court: (1) noted OAS and FMBO memoranda; (2) ordered inclusion of Salazar‑Fernando’s MTC service in longevity computation; (3) denied inclusion of her COMELEC service; (4) denied Gacutan’s request for longevity pay based on NLRC service (but allowed retirement credit); (5) denied Veloso’s motion for lack of merit; and (6) directed the Clerk to handle longevity pay benefits consistent with the “Moving On” guidelines (including preserving vested grants and freezing certain incumbents’ added longevity credits).

Majority’s View on Separation of Powers and Rank Parity

  • The majority emphasized the constitutional principle of separation of powers: legislative or executive conferral of rank/salary parity does not convert executive officials into judicial officers or render executive service equivalent to judicial service for Section 42 longevity pay purposes. Congress can create parity in rank/salary but cannot (absent specific legislative text) alter the eligibility conditions of a special law like BP 129.

Concurring and Dissenting Positions — Overview

  • Justice Leonardo‑De Castro (concurring and dissenting) and Justice Velasco, Jr. (joined part) dissented from portions of the majority. They argued for a different legal characterization of “salary” and for giving effect to congressional intent in parity statutes.

Dissent (Leonardo‑De Castro) — Key Arguments

  • Salary includes longevity pay: Leonardo‑De Castro argued the term “salary,” as contemplated by parity statutes (RA 9417, RA 9347, RA 10071), should be understood to include longevity pay because longevity pay has been treated by the Court as forming part of salary in prior jurisprudence (e.g., Sandiganbayan longevity pay resolution and earlier decisions).
  • Legislative intent and contemporaneous construction: She stressed Congress enacted parity laws aware of longevity pay practice and intended to place certain
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