Title
Nieves vs. Duldulao
Case
G.R. No. 190276
Decision Date
Apr 2, 2014
Petitioner sought ejectment of tenants for unpaid leasehold rentals since 1985. SC ruled non-payment was willful, reinstating DARAB’s decision but limiting liability to last three cropping years.
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Case Summary (G.R. No. 190276)

Factual Background

Petitioner asserted that respondents had defaulted in the payment of leasehold rentals since 1985, and that the arrearages had accumulated to 446.5 cavans of palay for Ernesto and 327 cavans of palay for Felipe. Before the case was filed, a mediation was held in 2005 before the Office of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer and Legal Division, during which respondents admitted being in default in rental payments equivalent to two hundred (200) cavans of palay (Ernesto) and three hundred twenty-seven (327) cavans of palay (Felipe) and promised to pay.

After filing, Ernesto alleged that he merely inherited from his deceased father, Eugenio Duldulao, a portion of the back leasehold rentals, and he proposed to settle the arrearages in four (4) installments starting the dayatan cropping season in May 2006. Felipe, on the other hand, denied having incurred back leasehold rentals but offered to pay whatever arrearages might exist in six (6) installments, also beginning May 2006. Both respondents later maintained that they did not intend to renege and that supervening calamities, specifically flashfloods and typhoons affecting the area, prevented compliance.

Proceedings Before the PARAD

In a decision dated July 6, 2006, the PARAD declared that the tenancy relationship had been severed due to respondents’ failure to pay back leasehold rentals, and it ordered them to vacate the subject land while also requiring them to fulfill their rental obligations.

With respect to Ernesto, the PARAD rejected the claim that his father’s rental obligation had been extinguished by death. It ruled that upon the death of a leaseholder, the leasehold relationship continues between the agricultural lessor and the surviving spouse or next of kin of the deceased, and the rental obligations subsist.

As to Felipe, the PARAD found that unpaid rentals accumulated to three hundred twenty-seven (327) cavans of palay, and that his refusal to pay was willful and deliberate, warranting ejectment.

DARAB Proceedings

On April 16, 2007, the DARAB issued an order deputizing the DARAB Provincial Sheriff of Nueva Ecija and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Talavera, Nueva Ecija to supervise harvest implementation on the subject land. When the sheriff proceeded on April 27, 2007, the harvest had already been completed and the proceeds were reportedly used to pay respondents’ other indebtedness.

On December 13, 2007, the DARAB issued a decision affirming the PARAD. It reiterated that respondents were remiss in paying leasehold rentals, treated the omission as willful and deliberate, and thus sustained respondents’ ejectment.

Court of Appeals’ Reversal

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, in a decision dated June 4, 2009, granted the petition for review. The CA reversed the DARAB’s termination of the tenancy relationship. While it acknowledged respondents’ non-payment, it concluded that their omission was not deliberate or willful.

The CA credited respondents’ assertions about partial unpaid amounts, observing that Felipe failed to pay only two hundred ninety-three (293) cavans or sixteen point two eight percent (16.28%), while Ernesto failed to pay only one hundred seven point five (107.5) cavans or six percent (6%) of the total leasehold rentals from 1985 to 2005. It then relied on De Tanedo v. De La Cruz (De Tanedo) to conclude that respondents had substantially complied with their rental obligations and thus could not be ejected despite their failure to meet rent obligations as they became due.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a resolution dated November 5, 2009, prompting the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue Before the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court framed the sole issue as whether the CA correctly reversed the DARAB ruling ejecting respondents from the subject land based on non-payment of leasehold rentals under Section 36(6) of RA 3844.

Legal Basis and Reasoning

The Supreme Court held that agricultural lessees, by virtue of their security of tenure, may be ejected only for grounds provided by law. It emphasized that under Section 36 of RA 3844, once a tenancy relationship is established, the lessor bears the burden to prove the existence of a lawful cause for ejectment, as reflected in Section 37 of RA 3844.

In particular, for ejectment anchored on Section 36(6)—non-payment of the lease rental when it falls due—jurisprudence requires that the tenant’s failure must be willful and deliberate to justify dispossession. The Court cited the rule explained in Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo that the burden of proof rests on the agricultural lessor and that bare allegations cannot substitute for evidence.

Applying these standards, the Supreme Court found that respondents admitted failure to pay the full amount of their respective leasehold rentals as they became due, but invoked calamities such as flashfloods and typhoons as justification under the fortuitous event proviso in Section 36(6). The Court ruled, however, that the records were bereft of evidence substantiating that defense. It stressed that unsubstantiated claims are not equivalent to proof, and thus respondents could not benefit from the fortuitous event theory.

The Court further found the failure to pay to be willful and deliberate. It noted that respondents’ arrearages had accumulated over a considerable time from 1985 to 2005, and respondents did not deny petitioner’s claim of accumulated rentals. Although respondents invoked calamities, the fortuitous event defense failed for lack of evidentiary support.

The Court distinguished Antonio v. Manahan and Roxas v. Cabatuando. In Antonio, the Court had found that the tenants’ failure was not willful and deliberate because the landowner actually rejected the rentals tendered, which were limited to two years’ worth, and the tenants attempted to make up for rejected payments. In Roxas, the tenants similarly were not found to have acted willfully and deliberately because they withheld remittances in good faith due to serious doubts about the legality of a term affecting whether they would share in coconut produce. The Supreme Court ruled that these circumstances were absent here: petitioner did not reject duly tendered rental payments, and the legality of the agricultural lease contract was never put in issue in a manner that would show a good faith basis for withholding rentals.

The Court therefore concluded that, absent a proven fortuitous event defense and considering the prolonged period of default without a credible justification, respondents willfully and deliberately chose not to pay their leasehold rentals when due. It clarified the meanings of “willful” and “deliberate” and held that petitioner had established these elements in relation to respondents’ default. Accordingly, the Court upheld ejectment.

The Supreme Court then corrected the CA’s legal approach regarding “substantial compliance.” It held that the CA’s reliance on substantial compliance was misplaced because the defense operates only within the parameters of Section 36(2) of RA 3844, which covers failures to substantially comply with contract terms or Code provisions, unless the failure is caused by fortuitous event or force majeure. By contrast, Section 36(6) specifically governs non-payment of lease rental when it falls due, with its own explicit proviso keyed to crop failure of a specified extent due to fortuitous event. Since the present dispute involved non-payment of rentals, Section 36(6) applied, not Section 36(2).

The Court explained that it could not find any indication in Section 36(6) that substantial compliance with rent obligations could be raised as a defense. It further invoked statutory construction principles, particularly lex specialis derogat generali, to support that the more specific provision governing rent non-payment controls over any general phrase that might be construed as covering non-payment. It also clarified that De Tanedo did not support respondents’ theory because the substantial compliance analysis in De Tanedo related to a different ground for dispossession under the former Section 50(b) of RA 1199, involving violation or failure to comply with terms and conditions of the tenancy contract (and not merely failure to pay rentals as they accrue within a cropping season). The Court emphasized that De Tanedo a

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