Title
National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms, Inc. vs. Energy Regulatory Commission
Case
G.R. No. 226443
Decision Date
Oct 8, 2019
NASECORE challenged ERC's approval of MERALCO's rates, citing COA audit findings of excess profits. SC remanded issues of recoverable expenses, rate base valuation, and potential refunds to ERC for review.
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Case Summary (G.R. No. 226443)

Procedural Posture and Relief Sought

NASECORE filed a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals’ affirmation of ERC Orders dated 21 June 2011 and 4 February 2013, which had affirmed ERC decisions to declare MERALCO’s unbundled rates final. NASECORE challenged, among other things, the ERC’s treatment of the COA audit findings, the recoverability of certain operating expenses (notably pension and benefits), the inclusion in rate base of specified properties and facilities, and the characterization of amounts recovered in excess of lawful limits as over‑recovery refundable to consumers. The Supreme Court partly granted the petition.

Core Facts and Origin of COA Audit

Following this Court’s direction in MERALCO v. Lualhati, the ERC requested COA to undertake a complete audit of MERALCO’s books, records and accounts to determine whether the implemented distribution rates yielded a fair return and whether recovery of generation costs was revenue‑neutral to MERALCO. COA conducted a special audit covering test years 2004 and 2007 and transmitted its Special Audits Office Report No. 2009‑01, a rate audit of unbundled charges. The audit accounted for revenues from approved rates, reviewed property and equipment for rate base inclusion, inspected selected facilities, reviewed operating expenses for recoverability, and accounted for generation costs and revenues. COA used a cost‑based Return on Rate Base (RORB) methodology.

COA’s Principal Findings

COA’s audit disclosed excess or deficiency in MERALCO’s revenue under three alternative rates of return: the ERC‑approved 15.50% (based on MERALCO’s WACC for 2000), MERALCO’s actual WACC figures for 2004 and 2007 (12.80% and 11.70%), and a 12% reasonable rate of return established in jurisprudence. COA also disallowed certain operating expenses—principally increased pension and other benefits—and excluded certain property and equipment from the rate base as not used and useful during the test periods. COA recommended that its audit results be considered by the ERC in deciding the MERALCO cases.

ERC’s Orders and Reasoning

In its 21 June 2011 Order, the ERC affirmed its original findings and declared MERALCO’s unbundled rates final. The ERC declined to adopt COA’s conclusion of “over‑recovery” or excess revenue, explaining that COA had: (1) improperly applied disallowances derived under MERALCO’s Performance Based Regulation (PBR) application to the RORB application, contravening principles against retroactive rate‑making; (2) relied on historical costs and a 12% return contrary to law and jurisprudence permitting present market value and use of WACC for prospective ratemaking; and (3) failed to account for incrementals and differences in billing determinants (kWh sales) across years, rendering comparisons improper. The ERC denied NASECORE’s motion for reconsideration on 4 February 2013.

Court of Appeals’ Disposition

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ERC, holding that (a) while ERC had been directed to request COA assistance in Lualhati, a COA audit is not a prerequisite for ERC’s rate‑setting and the ERC is not compelled to adopt COA’s findings; (b) COA used different test years and accounting methodologies, and it was unlikely that COA would reach the same conclusion as ERC; and (c) ERC did not err in declining to adopt the COA Report in its entirety because the COA employed accounting methodologies different from that used by MERALCO in its rate application.

Issues Raised on Appeal to the Supreme Court

NASECORE framed the following principal issues: (1) whether ERC gave proper weight and credence to COA’s findings; (2) whether MERALCO’s operating expenses—specifically employees’ pension and other benefits—are recoverable from consumers for 2004 and 2007; (3) whether certain properties and facilities (e.g., Meralco Theater, Museum, Wellness Center, shooting range, sports/recreational facilities) should be included in the rate base; and (4) whether costs recovered by MERALCO in excess of lawful limits constitute “over‑recovery” subject to refund to consumers.

Legal Authority of COA and ERC’s Statutory Duties

The Court reiterated that Section 38 of the Government Auditing Code and Section 22 of the Administrative Code specifically authorize COA to examine and audit public utilities’ books and records in connection with fixing rates. Lualhati had required ERC to seek COA’s assistance in conducting a complete audit while allowing ERC to exercise its rate‑making authority. The Court stressed that COA’s audit was properly conducted as a post‑audit to inform ERC’s decision‑making and that COA “recommended” consideration of its results by ERC.

Rate‑Setting Principles and the Regulatory Balance

The Court restated established principles: regulation of public utility rates is a valid exercise of the State’s police power to protect the public from arbitrary or excessive charges while ensuring efficient service and a fair return to investors. Ratemaking considers three major elements: rate of return, rate base, and operating expenses, which combine in the traditional formula R = O + (V − D) r. Determinations on rates are technical and generally accorded deference when supported by substantial evidence, but judicial review remains available to assess whether rates are reasonable and just.

Methodologies: RORB, PBR, WACC, ODRC and Their Distinctions

The Court described the methodologies involved in the proceedings: RORB (historical cost base, benchmark rate of return, and present or market value for rate base), and PBR (performance‑based forecasting of costs and capital expenditures with incentives/penalties and use of reappraised asset bases optimized to lower of replacement cost or modern equivalent asset). The ERC had signaled a regulatory shift toward PBR for wheeling rates; MERALCO was an early entrant under PBR. The Court noted distinctions between RORB and PBR (treatment of corporate income tax, cost base type, valuation of rate base, method of determining allowed return, and regulatory approach – rate‑of‑return vs price/revenue cap). The Court also discussed Optimized Depreciated Replacement Cost (ODRC) and documented criticisms of ODRC/ODRC‑style revaluation methods, including risks of estimation error, potential to produce tariffs at odds with competitive outcomes, and wealth transfers from consumers to shareholders.

Supreme Court’s Assessment of ERC’s Consideration of COA Findings

The Court found that ERC failed adequately to consider COA’s findings and to discharge its statutory mandate to ensure electricity is provided “in the least cost manner” under EPIRA. On operating expenses, the Court observed that COA did not contest pension costs as necessary per se but disallowed amounts MERALCO failed to justify, given insufficient documentation (e.g., lack of detailed salary scales and benefits for comparative analysis). The Court agreed that consumers should not bear expenses not necessary or incidental to distribution utility operations and directed ERC to formulate parameters to determine when such expenses may

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