Title
Levi Strauss and Co. vs. Blancaflor
Case
G.R. No. 206779
Decision Date
Apr 20, 2016
Levi Strauss & Co. sought trademark registration for its "TAB DEVICE" but was denied by the IPO for lack of distinctiveness. Appeals to higher authorities were dismissed due to procedural lapses, including untimely filing, leading to the Supreme Court affirming the decision, emphasizing strict adherence to procedural rules.
trademark application
distinctiveness
common use

Case Summary (A.C. No. 8269)

Factual Background: The “TAB DEVICE” Mark and the IPO Rejection

Levi’s was a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware, United States of America. On October 11, 1999, Levi’s filed an application before the IPO to register the mark TAB DEVICE covering various goods. The TAB DEVICE trademark was described as a small marker or tab of textile material. It was affixed permanently to the exterior of garments and remained visible while the garments were worn.

The trademark examiner rejected the application on February 17, 2006. The examiner reasoned that there was nothing in the mark that served to distinguish Levi’s goods, such that the tab itself did not function as a trademark. The examiner also held that Levi’s could not exclusively appropriate the tab’s use because a textile tab was customarily used on the goods covered by the application.

Levi’s appealed to the IPO Director, and on July 5, 2006, the Director issued a decision affirming the examiner. Levi’s then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Director denied on March 7, 2011 for lack of merit. Later, on March 24, 2011, Levi’s filed an Appeal Memorandum with the Director-General, attaching a list of certificates of registration from other countries that allegedly covered “nearly identical TAB DEVICE” trademark registrations.

The Director-General’s Ruling Rejecting the Trademark Application

On March 12, 2012, the Director-General issued a decision rejecting Levi’s trademark application and dismissing Levi’s appeal. The Director-General held that TAB DEVICE was not distinctive because nothing in the mark enabled consumers to distinguish it from similar textile tabs. The subject mark, as characterized, consisted solely of a rectangular textile tab that did not indicate the origin or source of the goods so as to distinguish them from other similar products.

The Director-General adopted the Director’s observation that the garment industry practice involved sewing small textile tabs in the seams of clothing, a practice Levi’s could not monopolize through registration. The Director-General also declined to accord evidentiary weight to the foreign registration certificates and emphasized that rights to a mark were not acquired by registration in other countries. Further, the Director-General explained that under the Intellectual Property Code, the mark’s capability to distinguish one’s goods or services is the essence of mark registration, and that the registered marks offered by Levi’s were different from the subject TAB DEVICE mark.

Levi’s Attempt to Appeal Under Rule 43: Motions for Extension and the CA Dismissal

Under Rule 43, Levi’s had to file a petition for review with the CA within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Director-General’s ruling, or until March 29, 2012. Levi’s filed a first Motion for Extension of Time on March 28, 2012, requesting an additional fifteen days until April 13, 2012. Levi’s counsel stated that the extension was needed due to pressure from other equally important professional work and to gather further evidence.

On April 13, 2012, Levi’s filed a Second Motion for Extension of Time, again asking for an additional fifteen days until April 28, 2012. Levi’s claimed that the draft petition was almost complete but that it needed time due to pressure from other equally urgent professional work. Levi’s also stated that a consularized special power of attorney (SPA) needed for filing and verification was still en route from the United States.

Levi’s further asserted that the delay in SPA consularization was caused by the closure of the Philippine Consulate Office in San Francisco from April 5, 2012 to April 9, 2012, in observance of Holy Week and the Araw ng Kagitingan holiday. On April 27, 2012, Levi’s filed its petition for review with the CA.

The CA, however, dismissed Levi’s petition outright in a Resolution dated August 13, 2012. The CA found that Levi’s failed to show a compelling reason for the second motion for extension. The CA reasoned that Levi’s should have secured the necessary SPA earlier and anticipated the closure of the Philippine Consulate due to Philippine holidays. It also held that professional pressure from other urgent work was not a compelling reason.

Levi’s moved for reconsideration, and in a Resolution dated April 17, 2013, the CA denied it. The CA held that Levi’s should have been diligent enough to decide whether to proceed with filing the petition at the end of the first fifteen-day period, or until March 29, 2012. The CA further clarified that the first extension was not intended to allow Levi’s additional time to decide on filing, but only to gather further evidence and finalize the petition.

Issues Raised on Certiorari

Levi’s brought the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA resolutions. The core issue was whether the CA gravely erred in dismissing Levi’s petition for review for being filed beyond the extended reglementary period.

Levi’s argued that the CA should have granted the second motion for extension because its SPA had already been executed and notarized on April 3, 2012. Levi’s maintained that it sought consular authentication of the notarized SPA in compliance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Levi’s claimed it did not anticipate that the consulate office would be closed during the Holy Week and Araw ng Kagitingan holidays because these were regular working days in the United States. Levi’s also contended that the CA should not have denied the second motion for extension. It emphasized that the CA did not promptly act on the first motion, and it argued that no prejudice would result from granting the second extension. Finally, Levi’s pointed out that the CA granted the first motion only on June 1, 2012, which was allegedly three and a half months after Levi’s filed the CA petition for review on April 27, 2012.

Legal Basis and Reasoning: Strict Compliance with Rule 43’s Timelines and the Meaning of Compelling Reason

The Court held that Rule 43 governs appeals from quasi-judicial agencies such as the IPO to the CA. Under Section 4, Rule 43, the appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the final order or resolution. The rule permits one extension of an additional fifteen days upon proper motion and payment of the full docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period. A further extension may be granted only for the most compelling reason and in no case may exceed fifteen (15) days. The Court emphasized that motions for extensions are not granted as a matter of right but are addressed to the CA’s sound discretion. It further reiterated that the general rule is that a second motion for extension is not granted unless a compelling reason is shown.

Applying these standards, the Court found that the CA correctly held that Levi’s failed to present a compelling reason for the second extension. The Court reasoned that Levi’s admitted that it decided to proceed with the CA petition only after the lapse of the initial fifteen-day period. The Court concluded that this late decision necessarily delayed the execution and notarization of the SPA and, therefore, delayed the consular authentication by the Philippine Consulate offices. Levi’s could not, the Court held, excuse its delay by citing its failure to anticipate the consulate closure due to Philippine holidays. The delay, by Levi’s own account, stemmed from Levi’s own timeline and choices, not from circumstances beyond its control.

The Court also rejected Levi’s reliance on the CA’s alleged delayed action. The Court held that Levi’s could not assume that its second motion would be granted and then delay the filing of the CA petition. The Court explained that a party cannot base its filing strategy on the CA’s delayed resolution of a motion for extension. It cited Go v. BPI Finance Corporation, where the Court held that a party cannot use the CA’s delayed action on an extension motion as an excuse to delay filing, because a party cannot assume favorable action and, with failure to act, the motion must be treated as denied.

The Court acknowledged that the CA’s

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