Title
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 192289
Decision Date
Jan 8, 2013
A candidate disqualified by COMELEC en banc for not being a registered voter successfully challenged the jurisdiction, as initial disqualification petitions must be heard by a division, not en banc. The Supreme Court ruled the resolutions void, upheld due process, and ordered his proclamation as Vice-Mayor.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 192289)

Key Dates and Procedural Posture

Relevant dates and events: Ibrahim filed his certificate of candidacy on December 1, 2009; COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 09‑0946 on December 22, 2009; Ibrahim and others filed an opposition/petition on January 8, 2010 (SPA 10‑002 (MP) LOCAL); the COMELEC en banc denied the opposition by resolution dated May 6, 2010; the May 10, 2010 elections were held and Ibrahim received the highest number of votes for vice‑mayor; the MBOC suspended his proclamation under Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; Ibrahim filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 before the Supreme Court, which decided the matter.

Applicable Law and Institutional Rules

Governing legal provisions (as invoked in the decision): the 1987 Constitution (Article IX provisions delineating COMELEC’s authority and procedures, specifically Section 3(C) and the provision permitting certiorari review of Constitutional Commissions’ adjudications), Rule 64 of the Rules of Court (review of final COMELEC en banc decisions), the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) including Section 74 and Section 78 (on cancellation/denial of certificates of candidacy), Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 pre‑proclamation controversy provisions (Sections 241 and 243), RA No. 6646 (Section 6 regarding suspension of proclamation), and COMELEC internal resolutions and procedural rules (e.g., Rules 23 and 25 and Guidelines/Resolutions Nos. 8678 and 8696 referenced in the record).

Antecedent Facts Leading to the Resolutions

Acting Election Officer Rolan G. Buagas forwarded to the COMELEC Law Department a list (initially twenty names in the municipality and a larger set in a later memorandum) of candidates allegedly not registered voters in the municipalities where they ran. The Law Department identified 56 such candidates across Maguindanao and Davao del Sur and recommended retention in the certified list but urged motu proprio commencement of disqualification actions. The COMELEC en banc issued the December 22, 2009 Resolution disqualifying those candidates for not being registered voters, subject to filing of oppositions within two days and directing the filing of election offense cases for violations of the OEC.

Petition/Opposition Before COMELEC and its Denial

Ibrahim and fifty other candidates filed a Petition/Opposition (SPA 10‑002 (MP) LOCAL) on January 8, 2010, arguing that affected candidates had been allowed to run in 2004 and 2007 and, if genuinely unregistered, should have been disqualified earlier; they also asserted permanent residency and domicile in the places where they ran. The COMELEC en banc, by its May 6, 2010 Resolution, denied the Petition/Opposition, relying on certifications issued by Buagas and the Acting Provincial Election Supervisor (Estelita B. Orbase) that the candidates, including Ibrahim, were not registered voters. The COMELEC accorded the certifications presumptive regularity in the absence of evidence to the contrary and found the petitioners failed to prove registration or residence.

Election Result and MBOC Action

During the May 10, 2010 elections, Ibrahim obtained 446 votes, the highest in the vice‑mayoral race for Datu Unsay. The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC), chaired by Buagas, suspended Ibrahim’s proclamation citing Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which permits suspension of proclamation where a petition cannot be decided before completion of canvass and “the evidence of guilt is strong.”

Central Legal Issue Presented

The principal issue litigated was whether the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 Resolutions that effectively disqualified Ibrahim, and whether the MBOC was authorized to suspend his proclamation based on those en banc resolutions.

Petitioner’s Arguments

Ibrahim’s position emphasized the ministerial nature of the MBOC’s duties: if election returns are facially genuine and properly signed, canvassers must mechanically tabulate and declare results, and cannot reject returns based on collateral challenges to qualifications or alleged electoral irregularities. Because Ibrahim was the apparent winner, any doubts should favor upholding the voters’ expressed will. The petition relied on authorities recognizing the ministerial role of canvassing boards and stressed that the will of the electorate should not be frustrated by premature disqualification actions.

Office of the Solicitor General’s Position

The OSG supported Ibrahim’s petition, arguing that the COMELEC en banc’s disqualification action lacked proper prior proceedings and deprived candidates of due process, relying on Cipriano v. COMELEC. The OSG also invoked Bautista v. COMELEC and related precedent to assert that jurisdiction over cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy lies with COMELEC divisions, not the en banc, except in limited circumstances (e.g., when a division cannot reach the required vote or on motions for reconsideration). The OSG further maintained that the MBOC lacked authority to suspend proclamation and criticized the formulation of Section 5, Rule 25 as improperly using the word “shall” instead of the permissive “may,” arguing suspension is discretionary.

COMELEC’s Contentions in Defense

COMELEC challenged Ibrahim’s resort to certiorari under Rule 64, contending that he should have filed a pre‑proclamation controversy under Section 241 of the OEC to contest the MBOC’s suspension. COMELEC argued that because Ibrahim’s name remained on the certified list and his votes were canvassed, no actual prejudice flowed from the en banc resolutions, and the MBOC–not the en banc–had suspended the proclamation. COMELEC further asserted that Ibrahim was afforded opportunity to be heard via the opposition he filed and that, substantively, he was not a registered voter in Datu Unsay and therefore not qualified.

Procedural Determination by the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court held that certiorari under Rule 64 was the proper remedy to review final resolutions of the COMELEC en banc. The Court distinguished this controversy from a pre‑proclamation controversy: pre‑proclamation issues per the OEC (Sections 241 and 243) are limited to matters affecting the canvass or the legality/composition of the board and issues regarding returns (e.g., tampering, falsification, lost returns). The case before the Court implicated the COMELEC en banc’s authority to disqualify candidates and the MBOC’s power to suspend proclamation—matters not within the OEC’s narrow pre‑proclamation enumeration—and thus were properly raised by certiorari.

Jurisdictional Analysis: Division vs. En Banc

The Court concluded the COMELEC en banc was without authority to take initial cognizance and disqualify Ibrahim. Section 3, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and pertinent COMELEC rules require election cases to be heard and decided in division, with the en banc acting on motions for reconsideration or where a division cannot reach the necessary vote. The Court relied on Bautista and Garvida v. Sales, Jr. to underscore that cancellation/denial of certificates of candidacy involves quasi‑judicial functions that must be exercised initially by a division after due notice and hearing. By acting motu proprio and issuing final disqualification resolutions en banc without prior division proceedings, COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction and denied the prescribed procedural pathway.

Estoppel and Laches Considerations

The Court addressed whether Ibrahim was estopped from challenging en banc jurisdiction due to participation in proceedings and delay. It applied controlling authority that lack of jurisdiction over subject matter may be raised at any stage, and that estoppel by laches is an exceptional doctrine narrowly applied (Tijam v. Sibonghanoy). Given Ibrahim’s timely filing of the petition and the relatively prompt litigation of the issue, laches did not bar his challenge to jurisdiction.

Due Process Considerations

While acknowledging that Ibrahim had been afforded an opportunity to file an opposition to the en banc resolutions, the Court held that even substantial c

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