Title
Cariaga vs. Sapigao
Case
G.R. No. 223844
Decision Date
Jun 28, 2017
A barangay official's blotter entries led to a search warrant and firearm seizure; charges dismissed due to lack of probable cause and good faith.
falsification of public documents
false certification
slander by deed
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 84979)

Factual Background

Cariaga alleged that respondents made two allegedly spurious entries in the barangay blotter. The first, Entry No. 00054 dated August 3, 2012, allegedly recorded that an unnamed resident reported that someone was firing a gun inside Cariaga’s compound, and that when Sapigao went thereat, he confirmed that the gunfire came from inside the compound and was directed toward adjacent ricefields. The second, Entry No. 00057 dated September 26, 2012, allegedly stated that an unnamed but concerned resident reported to Sapigao that Cariaga and his companions attended the funeral march of former Kagawad Rodrigo Calivo, Sr. with firearms visibly tucked in their waists.

Cariaga claimed that police authorities used these blotter entries as basis to obtain a warrant for a search and seizure operation inside his residence and cattle farm on December 18, 2012. As a result, police confiscated a firearm and several ammunitions. Cariaga further stated that a criminal case for illegal possession of firearms filed against him was later dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City.

Contending that the blotter entries were false and were intended to dishonor and discredit him, Cariaga filed the complaint before the OPP, docketed as NPS-I-01e-INV-14B-00084.

Respondents’ Defense and Supporting Evidence

Sapigao denied the allegations and asserted that the entries were true, as he personally witnessed the events recorded. He presented a Joint Affidavit of barangay kagawads and an ex-barangay kagawad, attesting that during the funeral march of Calivo, Sr., they saw Cariaga and his employees with handguns tucked into their waists, and that firing of guns was a common occurrence in Cariaga’s farm.

Acosta maintained that she acted merely in her official capacity as barangay secretary and that she certified as true copies the photocopies of the blotter entries requested by police authorities. She denied committing any criminally actionable act.

Proceedings Before the OPP

By Resolution dated April 10, 2014, the OPP dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. The OPP found that the questioned blotter entries were made in good faith and were only for recording purposes, done in the performance of respondents’ official duties, and based on respondents’ personal knowledge of what transpired. The OPP held that Cariaga’s complaint and affidavits were chiefly general and blanket denials, which could not prevail over respondents’ positive and categorical accounts.

Proceedings on Motion for Reconsideration

Cariaga moved for reconsideration, but the OPP denied the motion in a Resolution dated July 28, 2014.

Proceedings Before the ORSP

Cariaga then filed a petition for review before the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP), Urdaneta City, which affirmed the OPP’s dismissal in a Resolution dated January 5, 2015. The ORSP reasoned that absent any showing of ill-motive, there was no basis to charge respondents with Falsification of Private Documents. It also found “colorable truth” to the statements because the search conducted on Cariaga’s residence and cattle farm resulted in the seizure of a firearm and ammunitions and in the subsequent filing of a case against Cariaga for illegal possession of firearms. It further held that the blotter entries were not intended to malign, dishonor, or defame Cariaga, and therefore respondents could not be held liable for Slander by Deed. Finally, it ruled that Acosta’s authentication of photocopies of blotter entries did not amount to issuing a false certification that would expose her to criminal liability for that offense.

Denial of Further Review and Resort to the CA

Cariaga filed a motion for reconsideration which the ORSP denied in a Resolution dated March 14, 2015. He then filed a petition for review before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 140206.

CA Dismissal for Non-Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

In a Resolution dated June 17, 2015, the CA dismissed the petition. It held that the ORSP was not the final authority within the hierarchy of the National Prosecution Service because an adverse ORSP resolution could still be appealed to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ). Thus, Cariaga’s immediate resort to the CA without first elevating the unfavorable ORSP ruling to the SOJ violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The CA later denied Cariaga’s motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated March 17, 2016.

Issue

The Supreme Court resolved whether the CA correctly dismissed Cariaga’s petition for review on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Supreme Court’s Ruling on Administrative Exhaustion

The Supreme Court denied the petition. While the CA’s conclusion was framed as a dismissal for failure to appeal the ORSP ruling to the SOJ, the Supreme Court clarified that the proper appellate path in the National Prosecution Service depended on the nature of the offenses charged and the courts that would have original jurisdiction over them.

The Court discussed the DOJ Department Circular No. 70 (July 3, 2000), which required that certain appealed resolutions of provincial or city prosecutors in cases subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation be brought by verified petition for review to the SOJ. It then explained that Department Circular No. 70-A (July 10, 2000) delegated to the ORSP the authority to resolve with finality appeals in cases cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs), provided the case was not in the National Capital Region and the matter was within the original jurisdiction of those courts. The SOJ retained power of review “in the interest of justice” through the Secretary’s supervision and control.

The Court further cited Department Circular No. 018-14 (June 18, 2014), which institutionalized guidelines on appealed cases and reiterated that appeals from provincial or city prosecutors, except those from the NCR, in cases cognizable by MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs, should be brought to the concerned province or city for final resolution by the regional prosecutor, subject to discretionary SOJ review. It described the rule’s controlling factors as: (a) whether the complaint was filed inside or outside the NCR; and (b) whether it was cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs.

Applying this framework, the Supreme Court found that Cariaga filed his complaint in the OPP in Pangasinan, which placed it outside the NCR. The Supreme Court also noted the jurisdictional division among the offenses charged: False Certification and Slander by Deed were punishable by imprisonment ranging from four months and one day up to two years and four months, thus falling within the jurisdiction of the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs. In contrast, Falsification of Public Documents was punishable by prision mayor, which lies within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.

Consequently, the Supreme Court held that only the ORSP ruling on Falsification of Public Documents could still be referred to the SOJ before resort to the courts. By contrast, the ORSP ruling regarding False Certification and Slander by Deed should already be deemed final in the hierarchy of the National Prosecution Service and, therefore, properly elevated to the courts. The Supreme Court concluded that the CA erred in completely dismissing the petition for non-exhaustion, since the CA should have resolved the merits as to the offenses that were already properly reviewable by the courts. It also addressed remand, but opted to resolve the substantive issues because the records already provided sufficient basis and because Cariaga sought a merits resolution.

Substantive Review of Probable Cause

The Supreme Court then proceeded to evaluate whether grave abuse of discretion attended the ORSP’s determination of probable cause. It relied on its recent reiteration in Hilbero v. Morales, Jr. that a prosecutor’s probable-cause determination is primarily an executive function and is generally beyond judicial interference. Judicial correction may be made through certiorari only when the determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, meaning a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or an arbitrary disregard of jurisprudential parameters for probable cause.

The Court reiterated the standard for probable cause: it exists when facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime was committed and that the respon

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