Title
Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. HontaNo.s, Jr.
Case
G.R. No. 157163
Decision Date
Jun 25, 2014
BPI challenged a writ of preliminary injunction preventing foreclosure on mortgaged properties; SC annulled the writ, ruling respondents failed to prove irreparable injury, but upheld proper venue as a personal action.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. 100514)

Factual background

Respondents obtained a loan from petitioner and executed promissory notes, real estate mortgages on several parcels, a continuing surety agreement, and a chattel mortgage on a Mitsubishi Pajero as security. Their outstanding obligation was asserted to be P17,983,191.49, of which they had paid about P13,000,000, their difficulty attributed to the 1997 Asian economic crisis. Respondents alleged they were compelled to sign pre-printed bank documents and that contractual terms (including checks and charges) were unlawful, prompting them to seek judicial relief.

Procedural history at trial court

On May 22, 2001 respondents filed Civil Case No. CEB-26468 in the RTC, seeking annulment/nullity of the promissory notes, mortgages, continuing surety agreement, and related reliefs, plus damages and attorneys’ fees; they also sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary injunction to prevent foreclosure. BPI filed an answer with affirmative defenses and a counterclaim and moved to dismiss on multiple grounds (including improper venue, non-payment of correct docket fees, lack of legal personality of a deceased plaintiff, absence of indispensable parties, lack of corporate authorization, and failure to state a cause of action). The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and granted the requested preliminary injunction conditioned on a P2,000,000 bond, enjoining BPI from commencing foreclosure, taking possession of the chattel, and using the contested postdated checks for criminal complaints. The RTC denied reconsideration.

Court of Appeals disposition

BPI petitioned the CA for certiorari. On appeal the CA affirmed the RTC orders. The CA found that (1) the allegation of non-payment of proper docket fees was not substantiated and, even if true, relief could be afforded in the interest of justice; (2) Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was a personal action and venue in Cebu City was proper because XM Facultad & Development Corporation had its principal office there; (3) the death of Zosima Borbon did not mandate dismissal because the action could continue in the original party’s name; and (4) the RTC did not commit grave abuse in issuing the preliminary injunction.

Issues on appeal to the Supreme Court

The appeal presented two principal issues: (1) whether Civil Case No. CEB-26468 should be dismissed for non-payment of the correct docket fee and for improper venue; and (2) whether the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against BPI and its agents was proper.

Supreme Court ruling — characterization of the action and venue

The Supreme Court held that the action to annul or declare null the loan contracts, the accessory real estate mortgage, and related instruments was a personal (transitory) action, not a real (local) action. The Court applied Rule 4: a real action affects title to or possession of real property and must be filed where the property lies; all other actions are personal and may be filed where the plaintiff or any principal plaintiff resides or where the defendant resides or may be found. The complaint sought nullification of contractual instruments on grounds of vitiation and illegality; it did not allege that title or possession of the mortgaged properties had passed to BPI. Precedents (including Chua v. Topros and Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena) were invoked to distinguish actions to annul mortgages from actions seeking recovery or foreclosure of real property. Because one of the principal plaintiffs (XM Facultad & Development Corporation) had its principal office in Cebu City, venue was proper there and the petition to dismiss for improper venue was denied. Consequently, the argument that docket fees should have been computed on the assessed value of the mortgaged real properties (as if a real action) was rejected for lack of legal and factual basis.

Supreme Court ruling — preliminary injunction: standards and application

The Court held that respondents were not entitled to the preliminary injunction. It reiterated the established equitable and procedural standards governing preliminary injunctions under Section 3, Rule 58: the applicant must show (a) a prima facie right to the relief sought that is to be protected by restraining or requiring acts; (b) that continuation or commission of the acts would probably work injustice to the applicant; and (c) that there is urgent and paramount necessity to prevent serious damage. The preliminary injunction is an extraordinary, preventive remedy that preserves the status quo pending adjudication; it should not determine merits or decide controverted facts.

Applying these standards, the Court found the RTC’s issuance of the writ to be plainly erroneous. Respondents had admitted the existence of mortgages and nonpayment of the full obligation; foreclosure is the lawful remedy of a mortgagee. The injunction sought effectively to prevent BPI from exercising its contractual and legal remedies to foreclose — acts which were not shown to contravene a prima facie right of respondents. The evidentiary showing necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction need only be prima facie, but it must still establish an existing basis of facts affording a present right directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined; respondents failed to make such showing.

Administrative Circular No. 07-99 and criminal prosecution injunction

BPI contended the RTC’s injunction violated Administrative Circular No. 07-99 and sought administrative sanction against the trial judge. The Supreme Court found AC No. 07-99 inapplicable because the case did not involve government infrastructure projects or Bureau of Customs seizure and forfeiture proceedings, which were the subject of that circular. Regarding the RTC’s injunction enjoining BPI from filing criminal complaints under BP No. 22 for alleged violations connected with postdated checks, the Court reiterated the general rule that courts will not enjoin criminal prosecutions by writs of injunction, with enumerated, narrow exceptions (e.g., protection of constitutional rights, double jeopardy, prosecution under invalid law, clear

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