Title
Quintin Artacho Llorente vs. Star City Pty Limited, represented by the Jimeno and Cope Law Offices as attorney-in-fact
Case
G.R. No. 212050
Decision Date
Jan 15, 2020
SCPL sued Llorente and EPCIB over unpaid casino drafts. Courts ruled Llorente and EPCIB liable; SC upheld RTC decision, holding both primarily liable under NIL.
A

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-1573)

Petitioners and Respondents

Petitioners in consolidated proceedings: (a) Quintin Llorente (G.R. No. 212050) who sought review of the CA decision affirming RTC judgment against him; (b) Star City Pty Limited (SCPL) (G.R. No. 212216) which also sought review. Respondent/third party of principal relevance: Equitable PCI Bank (EPCIB), which issued the two bank drafts and was initially held solidarily liable by the RTC and later absolved by the CA before the Supreme Court reversed that absolution in part.

Key Dates

Relevant procedural and transactional dates drawn from the record: negotiation of two EPCIB drafts to Llorente on 12 July 2000 (US$150,000 each; total US$300,000); drafts deposited by SCPL with Thomas Cook Ltd. on 18 July 2000; Bank of New York advised of a stop payment on 1 August 2000; final demand by SCPL on 22 August 2002; EPCIB asked for settlement on 30 August 2002; writ of preliminary attachment issued by RTC on 28 January 2003; Indemnity Agreement (Quitclaim, Indemnity and Confidentiality Agreement) between EPCIB and Llorente executed on 8 August 2002; RTC decision dated 16 April 2009; CA decision dated 30 September 2013; CA resolution denying reconsideration dated 10 April 2014; Supreme Court decision disposing consolidated petitions rendered January 15, 2020.

Applicable Law and Authorities Cited

Primary statutory and jurisprudential sources relied upon in the decisions: Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL), sections relevant to holder in due course (Sec. 52), liability of drawer (Sec. 61), and remedies on dishonor (Sec. 84); Revised Corporation Code, Sec. 150 (verbatim of former Sec. 133, Corporation Code / BP Blg. 68) regarding foreign corporations doing business without license; BP 129 jurisdictional thresholds; Civil Code provisions invoked (Articles 1311, 1207, 2154, 2163); precedents and doctrine cited in the record (cases cited by CA and RTC); American authorities on drafts and bank drafts used for doctrinal explanation.

Factual Background

SCPL alleged that Llorente, while a patron at its Sydney casino, negotiated two EPCIB bank drafts dated 12 July 2000 in the aggregate of US$300,000 to buy into SCPL’s Premium Programme. SCPL credited his front-money account and later deposited the drafts with Thomas Cook Ltd. SCPL received notice of a stop-payment order on the drafts, made repeated demands on Llorente and EPCIB for payment, and, when payment was refused, filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and sought preliminary attachment. Llorente countered that he had caused stoppage because SCPL committed fraud and unfair gaming practices, and also contended that SCPL lacked capacity to sue in Philippine courts under the “isolated transaction” rule. EPCIB denied liability, contending it acted on Llorente’s instructions to stop payment, lacked privity with SCPL, and filed a cross-claim against Llorente after reimbursing him.

Procedural History

SCPL’s complaint was docketed at RTC, Makati (Civil Case No. 02-1423). The RTC granted SCPL’s application for a writ of preliminary attachment, and on April 16, 2009 rendered judgment finding both Llorente and EPCIB solidarily liable for US$300,000 plus attorney’s fees and costs, denying counterclaims and cross-claims. Llorente and EPCIB appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment but modified it by absolving EPCIB from liability on the ground that EPCIB had already reimbursed Llorente under an Indemnity Agreement and equity would bar double recovery. The CA denied motions for reconsideration. Both Llorente and SCPL separately filed petitions for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court (Rule 45), leading to consolidated consideration.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

Significant issues identified were: (1) whether SCPL had the legal capacity to sue in Philippine courts under the isolated transaction rule and whether the RTC had jurisdiction; (2) whether SCPL was a holder in due course of the negotiable instruments; (3) whether EPCIB was properly discharged from liability by the CA given the Indemnity Agreement and the principle of unjust enrichment; and for Llorente, whether the designation of JJC Law as SCPL’s attorney-in-fact violated Section 69 of the Corporation Code.

Supreme Court’s Analysis on Capacity to Sue and Jurisdiction

The Court confirmed that the governing statutory provision (Section 150 of the Revised Corporation Code, mirroring former Section 133 of BP Blg. 68) does not bar a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines from suing here on a singular and isolated transaction, provided the pleading affirmatively states that the corporation is not doing business in the Philippines and that the action arises from a singular isolated transaction. SCPL’s complaint expressly averred it was a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines and that it sued upon a singular isolated transaction; this satisfied the pleading requirements and established legal capacity to sue under the isolated transaction rule. Regarding jurisdiction, the Court held RTC territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction was proper because the amount in controversy (US$300,000) exceeded the Metro Manila RTC threshold and because negotiable instruments drawn by a Philippine bank may be sued where they were drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored; here EPCIB, a Philippine bank, drew the drafts, giving Philippine courts territorial pertinence.

Supreme Court’s Analysis on Holder in Due Course and Good Faith

The CA’s finding that SCPL qualified as a holder in due course under Sec. 52 of the NIL was upheld. The Court reiterated the elements for holder in due course (complete and regular on its face; acquired before maturity and without notice of prior dishonor; taken in good faith and for value; and without notice of infirmity in prior title). SCPL showed value because the drafts were used by Llorente to buy into the casino’s Premium Programme providing commission/rebate rights; it had no notice of prior dishonor at the time of negotiation and had verified clear funds with EPCIB. The CA’s evaluation of good faith, supported by expert judicial affidavit evidence regarding the statistical possibility of no face cards in several baccarat deals and the fact that Llorente continued to play despite alleged irregularities, was sustained as sufficiently countervailing to Llorente’s fraud allegations.

Supreme Court’s Analysis on EPCIB’s Liability as Drawer

The Court reiterated the NIL rule that a drawer admits the existence and capacity of the payee and warrants that on due presentment the instrument will be accepted or paid, and that, if dishonored and necessary proceedings taken, the drawer will pay (Sec. 61). The drawer’s liability is ordinarily secondary but may become primary when conditions for presentment and notice are dispensed with or when the drawer countermanded payment; stopping payment ordinarily does not discharge the drawer’s liability to holders in due course. The Court held that EPCIB, as drawer of the negotiable bank drafts, was liable under the NIL, and that issuance of the Stop Payment Order (SPO) by Llorente did not relieve EPCIB’s liability to SCPL as holder in due course.

Supreme Court’s Rejection of CA’s Reliance on the Indemnity Agreement and Unjust Enrichment

The CA had absolved EPCIB on grounds that EPCIB had paid Llorente the face value under an August 8, 2002 Quitclaim, Indemnity and Confidentiality Agreement and that holding EPCIB liable would unjustly enrich Llorente. The Supreme Court found two principal flaws in that rationale: (1) the Indemnity Agreement was not formally offered in evidence and, therefore, had no proper probative weight; even if considered, it bound only EPCIB and Llorente and could not defeat SCPL’s rights as a holder in due course under the doctrine of the relativity of contracts (Civil Code, Art. 1311); (2) invoking unjust enrichment to excuse EPCIB’s statutory liability as drawer was improper because the NIL establishes the rights and liabilities of parties to negotiable instruments and equity cannot contravene those statutory obligations. Further, the Indemnity Agreement itself contemplated that Llorente would post an indemnity bond in favor of EPCIB, SCPL and other potentially prejudiced parties, reflecting EPCIB’s continued recourse against Llorente.

Supreme Court’s Determination of Nature of EPCIB’s Liability and Relief

The Court concluded EPCIB’s liability was individual and primary (not solidary) together with Llorente: the drawer became primarily liable after the SPO/dishonor, but solidary liability between drawer and endorser was not established because solidarity requires explicit contractual stipulation or statutory imperative. Therefore, SCPL may proceed to collect from either party, but cannot recover more

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