G.R. No. 140244 - Umandap vs. Sabio, Jr.

In August 1997, private respondent Domingo F. Estomo filed an action for damages against petitioner Joel R. Umandap, alleging breach of contract.
The claim centered on alleged unpaid collections, reimbursement of interest for finishing a contracted project, moral damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and other costs.

On February 3, 1998, substituted service was effected when process server Marmolejo attempted personal service on petitioner but was unable to locate him.

The summons and a copy of the complaint were left at petitioner’s home and office at No. 14-3rd St., New Manila, Quezon City with a person named Joseph David.
Joseph David, designated as the “receiving of said office,” refused to sign a receipt.

Petitioner failed to file an answer to the complaint, leading the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to declare him in default.
The RTC rendered a default judgment on May 8, 1998, ordering Umandap to pay specific sums for:

On August 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment by Default and Quash the Writ of Execution; the RTC denied this motion in an Order dated October 2, 1998.
A subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly denied on January 18, 1999.
Dissatisfied with these decisions, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The pivotal document in the controversy is the process server’s return, which was issued on February 13, 1998.

This return detailed that several attempts at personal service had been made without success, necessitating the substituted service.
It stated that the summons was left with Joseph David, who was duly noted as a person “of suitable age and discretion.”

The return did not specify all the efforts or the specific occasions on which personal service was attempted.
It failed to affirm that Joseph David met the required qualifications as the proper recipient at petitioner’s residence/office.
It allegedly did not comply fully with the statutory requirements for substituted service.

The Court of Appeals upheld the process server’s return by emphasizing the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions, as enshrined in the Rules on Evidence and court practice.
The appellate court found that petitioner’s unsubstantiated claims regarding insufficient attempts at personal service did not overcome the evidentiary presumption and dismissed the Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioner’s arguments regarding the impossibility of personal service and the alleged technical deficiencies in the return were deemed unconvincing, leading to the affirmation of the lower court’s decision.

Whether the substituted service of summons on petitioner through Joseph David, as manifested by the process server’s return, was valid and regular under the Revised Rules of Court.

Did the process server’s return sufficiently indicate the impossibility of personal service?
Was the chosen method of substituted service (leaving the summons at petitioner’s residence/office with Joseph David) proper and compliant with the statutory requirements?

Assuming that the service was valid, whether the Court of Appeals was justified in denying petitioner’s motion to set aside the default judgment, particularly in light of the petitioner’s failure to timely rebut or present counter-evidence against the default judgment and the alleged deficiencies in service.