G.R. No. 249410 - Basa-Egami vs. Bersales

On October 7, 2003, respondents John Velez and Clarissa Velez initiated a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Milagros Salting concerning a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 38079.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2524.
On March 28, 2006, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch LXXIV of Taguig City, Metro Manila, ruled in favor of the respondents, ordering the petitioner to vacate the subject property and to pay attorney’s fees and costs.
Subsequent to the MeTC decision becoming final and executory, the respondents moved for execution, which was opposed by the petitioner.

Petitioner initiated a separate action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 153, seeking the annulment of the sale of the property covered by TCT No. 38079.

The petition claimed that the subject property was acquired via a notarized document titled “Sale of Real Estate” executed with the heirs of Villamena.
Petitioner alleged that respondents obtained title through fraudulent means by the heirs of Villamena.

The MeTC decision had not attained finality as she was not properly informed of it since it was erroneously served on her deceased counsel.
She possessed a clear and existing right and interest in the property that warranted judicial protection through injunctive relief.

Based on the above, petitioner sought a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction restraining respondents and their agents from executing the MeTC ejectment decision.
The RTC, in its Order dated October 26, 2006, granted the writ of preliminary injunction to protect petitioner’s alleged interest, citing irreparable harm.

Respondents, aggrieved by the RTC’s issuance of the preliminary injunction, filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.
In their petition, respondents contested whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion by granting the injunction to stop the execution of the judgment in the ejectment case.
The CA, in its Decision dated November 29, 2007, held that:

The primary subject matter of petitioner’s separate action was the annulment of a deed of sale, not the ejectment case.
Petitioner lacked a clear and unmistakable right to possession of the property in light of the final MeTC decision.
Consequently, petitioner was not entitled to the TRO, and the RTC Order was set aside.

Petitioner then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, arguing that the CA decision failed to consider errors regarding service of the decision on her deceased counsel and her alleged clear right to possession.

The MeTC decision was improperly served on her counsel, who was deceased at the time, thereby prejudicing her right to be properly informed.
Her right to the subject property was clear and warranted the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the pending annulment suit should justify the suspension of proceedings in the ejectment case.

The petitioner’s claim was moot given that the MeTC decision had already been executed.
The separate actions for ejectment and annulment of sale were distinct and could proceed independently.
The petitioner’s failure to immediately notify the court of her counsel’s death rendered her argument baseless.
Finality in the ejectment case precluded any interference by a subsequent annulment suit.

Whether the service of the March 28, 2006 MeTC decision on petitioner’s counsel was valid despite the counsel’s death at the time of service.
Whether petitioner’s failure to notify the court of her counsel’s death constitutes negligence that nullifies any claim of improper service.

Whether petitioner possessed a clear and unmistakable right to possession of the disputed property sufficient to merit the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Whether the pending action for annulment of sale may serve as a ground to suspend the execution of the final ejectment judgment.

Whether the ejectment case, having attained finality and executory status, should remain undisturbed by the separate annulment case.
Whether the distinct nature of the ejectment proceeding and the annulment of sale action precludes the use of one to challenge the outcome of the other.