Facts:
The
Heirs of Peter Donton, through their legal representative
Felipe G. CapULONG (petitioners), sought review of the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated June 13, 2014 and Resolution dated January 21, 2015 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 97138, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215, Decisions and Orders that had dismissed petitioners’ complaint for
annulment of title and reconveyance of property with damages for
insufficiency of evidence. The controversy centered on a parcel of land with improvements located at
No. 33, Don Jose Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City, with an area of
553.60 square meters, previously covered by
TCT No. N-137480 registered in the name of
Peter Donton, but later transferred to respondents
Duane Stier and
Emily Maggay under
TCT No. N-225996. Sometime in
June 2001, while Donton was in the United States, he discovered that Stier and Maggay took possession and control of the property and managed his business operating thereat. Through legal demands in the Philippines, Donton sought their vacation and cessation of business operations, but to no avail. He then returned to the Philippines, learned that respondents allegedly used fraudulent means to transfer ownership, and discovered that his title had been cancelled and replaced by a new title in respondents’ names. Donton thus filed the complaint alleging that the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated
July 16, 2001 used to transfer the property to respondents bore a
forged signature of Donton; he also alleged that at the time of supposed execution and notarization he was in the United States, having left on
June 27, 2001 and returned only on
August 30, 2001. He further alleged a conspiracy with Registry of Deeds employees and argued that Stier, being an
American citizen and non-resident alien, was not allowed to own Philippine real property under the Constitution, while also contending that Maggay lacked capacity to purchase. He prayed for annulment and reconveyance, and damages in specified amounts, while respondents denied forgery and claimed that Donton had executed an
Occupancy Agreement on
September 11, 1995 acknowledging Stier’s residence, that Stier extended a
P3,000,000.00 loan secured by mortgage, and that until payment, Donton allowed Stier to occupy the property. Respondents also alleged that Donton executed a
Special Power of Attorney dated
September 11, 1995 authorizing Stier to sell, mortgage, or lease the property, and that after Donton failed to pay, respondents initially executed a “unilateral contract of sale” and eventually executed the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated
July 16, 2001. In trial, petitioners presented
Rosario C. Perez, a
Document Examiner II of the
PNP Crime Laboratory, who testified that a comparison of Donton’s alleged signatures on the deed with standard signatures showed “significant divergences,” concluding the signatures were not written by the same person, and she testified on her findings. After Donton died on
November 22, 2003, the RTC allowed petitioners’ substitution as plaintiffs. The RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that the Deed of Absolute Sale, being a public and notarized document, enjoyed the
presumption of regularity and that petitioners’ forgery allegation failed, and it refused to give probative weight to Perez’s expert findings because she admitted that the sample signatures were obtained not by court order but at Donton’s instance and the CIDG’s, with no verified source. The RTC also found that petitioners failed to prove Stier’s citizenship and failed to substantiate the claim that Maggay had no capacity to acquire real property, and it discounted the “absence” argument due to credibility issues. The Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that petitioners failed to show forgery by
clear and convincing evidence, that Perez’s testimony deserved little or no weight because the comparison specimens came from an unverified source, and that petitioners failed to prove Stier’s citizenship and other capacity-related allegations. Petitioners then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proof required for
annulment of title and reconveyance of property with damages.
Ruling:
Ratio:
Doctrine: