G.R. No. 194061 - Besaga vs. Acosta

The controversy arose over Lot Nos. 4512, 4513, and 4514 located in Barangay Port Barton, San Vicente, Palawan—parts of a six-hectare timberland.
The petitioner, Emelie L. Besaga, claimed that the lots were part of land occupied by her late father, as indicated in Tax Declaration No. 048, and applied for a Special Land Use Permit (SLUP) for a bathing establishment on February 11, 2003.
The respondent spouses, Felipe and Luzviminda Acosta, along with respondent Digna Matalang Coching, also sought SLUPs for a bathing establishment over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 based on waivers executed by registered survey claimants.

On September 10, 2003, the respondents challenged the petitioner’s SLUP application.
The DENR Regional Executive Director (RED) of Region IV-B (MIMAROPA) issued orders:

On December 1, 2003, the RED granted due course to the petitioner’s SLUP while rejecting the respondents’ applications.
On July 26, 2004, the RED denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration.

The respondent spouses filed an Appeal Memorandum on August 25, 2004, and paid the required appeal fee on September 10, 2004.
Respondent Digna Matalang Coching filed her appeal on September 16, 2004, aligning with the respondent spouses’ approach.

The RED issued a Certificate of Finality declaring its orders final and executory due to the respondents’ failure to file a Notice of Appeal.
On December 10, 2004, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) issued the SLUP to the petitioner, which was later converted on November 18, 2005, into a Special Forest Land-Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes.

On August 6, 2006, the DENR Secretary vacated the RED’s orders, amended the coverage of the petitioner’s SLUP (restricting it only to Lot No. 4513), and gave due course to the respondent spouses’ SLUP for Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514.
Subsequently, on October 17, 2006, the Secretary reversed his own decision, holding that the RED’s orders had attained finality, based on procedural deficiencies in the respondents’ appeal (i.e. filing a Memorandum instead of a Notice of Appeal and late fee payment).

The Office of the President intervened by reversing the October 17, 2006, resolution, thereby reinstating the RED’s orders.

The CA, in its decision and resolution, affirmed the Office of the President’s ruling, effectively upholding the respondent spouses’ preferential rights over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 through valid waiver affidavits executed by the survey claimants.
The petitioner then filed a petition challenging the CA’s ruling on the ground that the respondents’ appeal was defective due to non-compliance with Section 1(a) of DAO No. 87, series of 1990—arguing that the proper mode of appeal (i.e. a Notice of Appeal directly to the RED within 15 days) was not followed.

In support of her claim, the petitioner emphasized the Tax Declaration purportedly evidencing her father’s possession and occupancy of the disputed lots, along with statements from local barangay officials and occupancy documents.
The respondents relied on:

A notarized Affidavit of Waiver of Rights by Rogelio Maranon (registered survey claimant of Lot No. 4512).
A notarized Joint Affidavit of Waiver of Rights by Arturo Besaga, Jr. and Digna Matalang Coching (registered survey claimants of Lot No. 4514).

The petitioner also asserted that the strict compliance with the appeal procedures was mandatory and jurisdictional, contending that any deviation (filing a Memorandum rather than a Notice of Appeal and late fee payment) should lead to dismissal of the respondents’ appeal.

Whether the appeal by the respondents was correctly filed to the DENR Secretary instead of directly to the RED, as prescribed by Section 1(a) of DAO No. 87, series of 1990.
Whether the respondents’ appeal was perfected even though they did not strictly comply with the prescribed mode of filing (i.e. using a Memorandum of Appeal instead of a Notice of Appeal) and the timeliness/fee requirements.

Whether the rule requiring the Notice of Appeal is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, such that any deviation should bar the respondents’ right to have their appeal reviewed.
Whether the liberal interpretation of administrative rules on appeal, particularly in administrative proceedings, was correctly applied by the CA.

Whether the orders issued on December 1, 2003, and July 26, 2004, by the RED had attained finality and were thus unappealable.
Whether those orders could still be subject to modification or reversal by higher authorities.

Whether strict construction of procedural rules in this administrative context would violate the respondents’ right to a fair and effective review.
Whether the liberal construction of administrative rules should prevail in order to prevent perverting substantive justice.