Title
Vda. de Blas vs. Blas de Buenaventura
Case
G.R. No. L-22797
Decision Date
Sep 22, 1966
A niece contested a will's validity, withdrew opposition, and sought a fishpond devise; Supreme Court ruled her actions in good faith, entitling her to the devise and its fruits.
fruits and rents
probate proceedings
opposition

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-22797)

Initiation of Probate Proceedings and Grounds for Opposition

After Rosalina Santos sought probate, the probate court identified Maxima Santos’s nearest kin as brothers and a sister, along with nephews and nieces, with Flora Blas de Buenaventura appearing among the legatees or, more precisely, devisees under the will. Flora Blas de Buenaventura was not related by blood to the testatrix.

Flora Blas de Buenaventura and Justo Garcia filed an opposition on November 28, 1956, challenging probate on several grounds: the will allegedly was not executed in accordance with law; undue and improper pressure was allegedly exerted upon Maxima; Maxima’s signature allegedly was secured through fraud; and, at the time of execution, Maxima allegedly lacked mental capacity to make a will.

Withdrawal of Opposition and Subsequent Probate

After the probate court had received evidence from both parties but before the oppositors could close their evidence, Flora Blas filed, on November 6, 1957, a manifestation withdrawing her opposition to the probate. She stated that she was withdrawing her opposition and that, as a legatee, she was joining the proponent for the legalization of the will in order to protect and preserve her rights and interests. The decision described surrounding circumstances that allegedly motivated the withdrawal, including that Flora had to sell her house for P5,000 to pay for stenographic notes and that Rosalina later hosted a party at the Manila Hotel aimed at settling the case amicably. There, Atty. Jose T. de los Santos purportedly told Flora that he had learned of the sale of her house, urged her to withdraw her opposition, and assured that, from her legacy’s rent, she could start a business.

The proceedings continued solely as to the opposition of Justo Garcia. On December 24, 1957, the probate court issued an order allowing probate. After the order became final and executory, Flora filed on February 27, 1958 a petition praying for delivery to her of a fishpond as a specific devise under Item No. 3, Clause No. 6 of the will.

The No-Contest and Forfeiture Clause and the Probate Court’s Ruling

Rosalina Santos opposed delivery, relying on a forfeiture provision in the will. The will’s quoted text, translated from Tagalog, contained a directive that any person who contests or opposes the probate of the will, or the carrying out of its provisions, would lose any right to receive inheritance or benefits under the testament, and the inheritance or share would accrue to other heirs, devisees, and legatees who had not opposed.

The probate court, in an order dated April 30, 1958, sustained the theory that the no-contest and forfeiture clause was valid and effective, and held that Flora was deprived of her devise because she had opposed probate. It denied delivery of the specific devise and declared the same forfeited in favor of the other residuary heirs. Flora’s motion for reconsideration, superseded by an amended motion, was denied on March 7, 1959.

Issues on Appeal to the Court of Appeals and Certification to the Supreme Court

Flora appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a resolution dated March 25, 1964, the Court of Appeals certified the appeal to the Supreme Court because it presented questions purely of law. The Supreme Court identified two issues: first, whether Flora’s acts amounted to a violation of the no-contest and forfeiture clause; and second, whether the clause was valid.

The Supreme Court stated that it would first address the first issue, because it required an evaluation of whether Flora’s opposition was justified and whether her timely withdrawal precluded a violation of the forfeiture clause.

Supreme Court’s Assessment of Justification and the Effect of Withdrawal

The probate court had concluded that Flora had no justification for opposing the probate. It found that, from evidence presented during probate, Flora allegedly was aware of the true facts concerning the will’s execution and the testatrix’s mental condition, yet she still charged her benefactor with lack of sound mind. The probate court also reasoned that Flora was not related by blood, so her contest allegedly could not benefit her.

The Supreme Court disagreed. It found that Flora knew of an earlier will executed in 1953 in which she would receive much more than what she received under the 1956 will. It further observed that from 1953 until Maxima Santos’s death, Flora had not fallen out of favor. The Supreme Court found it significant that the relationship remained close, Flora had not given cause for alienation, and the testatrix had reared and spent for Flora’s education. It also noted that Flora was addressed as Flora Buendia in the will, yet she used the name Flas Blas as far as she could remember, apparently with the testatrix’s knowledge and consent, supported by school records and the circumstance that the testatrix had allowed the naming arrangement to continue over years.

The Supreme Court also referenced circumstances affecting reasonable doubt as to proper execution and capacity: the attesting witnesses were three brothers who were also lawyers of the executrix and compadres of those connected to the executrix; the notary public was also a compadre of an attesting brother-lawyer; and a nurse who attended Maxima on September 22, 1956 testified under oath that no one was inside the testatrix’s room when she administered medication at the precise time when the attesting witnesses and notary public testified they were inside. The Court described the testatrix’s physical condition as the most important factor. Maxima Blas, aged more than 86 years, suffered from multiple ailments, received several blood transfusions during August and September 1956 including two transfusions on September 22 with barely three hours between them, received dextrose vinoclysis on September 22 because she could not take food through the mouth, and began bleeding by mouth on September 23 such that her doctor cancelled a scheduled trip to the United States. The Court pointed to medical and documentary circumstances showing that documents executed before the alleged execution date were no longer signed but only thumbmarked, while the will appeared to be signed.

From these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that Flora’s opposition was not unjustified. It reasoned that a person situated as Flora was would likely have doubts and would have conducted inquiries, and that Flora’s findings strengthened her belief that something untoward occurred regarding the will’s execution. It further held that opposing probate in order to protect rights contributed to the courts’ duty to ascertain the truth of the testatrix’s last thoughts, which the probate system seeks to ensure.

The Court then treated the decisive factor as Flora’s subsequent conduct. It held that once Flora realized her mistake in good faith—based on strong doubts—she withdrew her opposition and joined Rosalina Santos in the petition for probate. It found that Flora should not be penalized for rectifying her error, especially because the will had been admitted and probate proceeded within a reasonably short period, enabling the disposition of property. It emphasized that the testatrix’s clause, properly read in its Tagalog form, enjoined not merely a contest or opposition to probate but also a contest or opposition to the probate and the carrying out of its provisions, as indicated by the phrasing “pagpapatibay at pag-bibigay-bisa.” The Court treated this as showing that the testatrix’s concern was ensuring that the testamentary dispositions would be carried out rather than precluding any contest per se. It concluded that Flora’s withdrawal—made before she rested her case—precluded defeat of probate and conformed to the testatrix’s wishes. The Supreme Court held that no prejudice had been done to the testatrix’s intention, and that Flora’s actions, taken as a whole, subserved rather than violated that intention.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that Flora did not violate the no-contest and forfeiture clause. Because the first issue was resolved against the forfeiture theory, it found it unnecessary to definitively discuss the second issue concerning the validity of the clause in the jurisdiction.

Disposition on September 22, 1966 and Remand for Delivery

The Supreme Court reversed the orders dated April 30, 1958 and March 7, 1959. It remanded the case to the court a quo with instruction that Flora’s devise under the will be forthwith delivered to her. It imposed no costs.

Resolution of November 29, 1966: Fruits and Rents, Interest, Damages, and Attorney’s Fees

Flora then moved for reconsideration, asking that she be awarded not only the devised fishpond but also all fruits or rents from the testatrix’s death on October 5, 1956 until delivery. The decision notes that Flora had not expressly sought such fruits or rents in her original petition for delivery of specific legacy. She first raised the point in an amended motion for reconsideration after the probate court denied her petition, and later included it in the assignment of error.

The Court granted relief on the fruits and rents issue. It relied on the Civil Code provisions governing specific and determinate legacies, holding that a devise of a specific thing includes its fruits and income accruing after the testator’s death, with delivery corresponding to the devised thing along with such fruits or income. It invoked Article 948, which provides that the legatee or devisee acquires ownership of a specific and determinate thing upon death and includes growing fruits and uncollected income, but excludes income due and unpaid before death. It also cited Article 951 on delivery of the thing devised with its accessories and in the condition it bore at death. The Court treated fruits and rents as accessions under Articles 441 and 442 and therefore as included with the devised thing, and it reinforced the result by applying Article 1166, which prov

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