Title
Reicon Realty Builders Corp. vs. Diamond Dragon Realty and Management
Case
G.R. No. 204796
Decision Date
Feb 4, 2015
Reicon sued for lease breach; CA dismissed petition on procedural grounds. SC ruled Reicon complied with service, CA erred, and reinstated petition for proper due process.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 204796)

Factual Background

The parties executed a lease dated January 9, 1991, under which Reicon Realty Builders Corporation leased certain property in Sta. Mesa, Quezon City to Diamond Dragon Realty and Management, Inc. for twenty years. Diamond sublet portions to Jollibee Foods Corporation and Maybunga U.K. Enterprises. Beginning in June 2006, Diamond allegedly failed to pay rental obligations and issued checks that were dishonored. Reicon sent a demand and purportedly terminated the lease by letter dated July 23, 2007, and subsequently executed separate leases with the subtenants.

Trial Court Proceedings

On November 12, 2009, Diamond filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages against Reicon, Jollibee, Maybunga, and others, alleging unlawful interference and seeking, among other relief, the annulment of Reicon’s unilateral termination and the separate leases. Reicon filed a special appearance and moved to dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over its person based on alleged improper service, lack of legal capacity of Diamond to sue due to alleged SEC revocation, and lack of cause of action for unlawful interference. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss in an Order dated June 9, 2010, and denied reconsideration on September 16, 2010, concluding that improper service of summons was not a ground for dismissal under Section 1, Rule 16, and that corporate existence could be challenged only by quo warranto under Sec. 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68.

Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals

Reicon filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in the Court of Appeals challenging the RTC’s denial of the motion to dismiss. The CA issued a Show Cause requiring proof of service and later recorded that its earlier notice to Diamond at Suite 305, AIC Burgundy Empire Tower was returned marked “RTS-Moved Out.” Diamond, through counsel Atty. Anselmo A. Marqueda, filed a manifestation in which it asserted that the certiorari petition must be dismissed for failure to serve a copy on its counsel of record, invoking the rule that service upon counsel constitutes valid service where a party is represented. In a Resolution dated May 21, 2012, the CA dismissed Reicon’s petition outright for non-compliance with proof of service under Section 3, Rule 46 and for failure to serve counsel under Section 2, Rule 13. Reicon’s motion for reconsideration was denied on November 21, 2012.

Issue Presented to the Supreme Court

The sole issue presented was whether Reicon’s petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was properly served upon the person of Diamond so as to vest the CA with jurisdiction over its person.

Supreme Court’s Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition. It reversed and set aside the CA Resolutions dated May 21, 2012 and November 21, 2012, and directed the Court of Appeals to reinstate the certiorari petition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 116845, subject to the conditions and directions stated by the Court.

Legal Basis and Reasoning on Service of Process

The Court analyzed Section 3, Rule 46, which requires filing of the petition with proof of service on the respondent, and Section 4, Rule 46, which provides that the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by service of its order or resolution indicating initial action on the petition or by voluntary submission. The records contained registry receipts and affidavits of service indicating that a copy of the certiorari petition had been mailed to the address Diamond had used in the RTC pleadings. The Court held that service of the petition upon the respondent at its last known business address complied with Section 3, Rule 46, because a certiorari proceeding is an original and independent action and, at the preliminary stage, service on the respondent itself is sufficient. The Court concluded that the rule in Section 2, Rule 13 requiring service upon counsel when a party has appeared by counsel did not automatically apply to the service of the petition in an original certiorari action.

Voluntary Submission and Special Appearance

The Court further determined that the CA had acquired jurisdiction by virtue of Diamond’s voluntary submission through its counsel’s manifestation dated May 5, 2011. The Court explained that although a special appearance may preserve an objection to jurisdiction, a party who seeks affirmative relief in the court’s proceedings is deemed to have submitted to jurisdiction. The Court cited Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy to the effect that filing motions seeking affirmative relief is considered voluntary submission unless a conditional appearance explicitly and unequivocally objects to jurisdiction. Because Diamond’s manifestation sought dismissal of the petition on the merits rather than specifically contesting the CA’s service of its order indicating initial action, the Court treated the filing as voluntary submission and not a conditional appearance challenging jurisdiction.

Precedents Considered

The Court relied on prior decisions addressing the nature of certiorari as an original proceeding and principles on acquisition of jurisdiction. The Court cited China Banking Corporation v. Cebu Printing and Packaging Corporation and Republic v. Caguioa in support of the proposition that service as required by the Rules and service upon the respondent at his recorded address may suffice for initial acquisition of jurisdiction in original actions.

Direction for Further Proceedings and Protection of Due Process

The Court directed the CA to reinstate t

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