G.R. No. L-22610 - Quiem vs. Serina

Case Summary (G.R. No. L-22610)

Factual Background: The January 2, 1964 Election and Its Aftermath

At the Municipal Board’s January 2, 1964 inaugural session, Quiem and Abas were the contenders for City Secretary. The Board took a secret ballot. Three board members voted for Quiem and three voted for Abas. One councilor abstained by casting a blank ballot. Because of the resulting tie, Vice-Mayor Serina, as presiding officer, cast a ballot for Quiem. Quiem then took his oath of office before Vice-Mayor Serina. The following day, January 3, Quiem took another oath before Judge Agustin Antillon of the Cagayan de Oro City Court.

On January 3, Abas challenged the validity of Quiem’s alleged election. Mayor Borja refused to recognize Quiem as the duly elected secretary. On January 7, the Mayor called the Board to a special meeting to discuss and resolve Abas’s protest, but no decision was reached on January 7 or on the Board’s session of January 9. The Board agreed to meet again on January 10 at 3:00 p.m. for the same purpose.

Petition for Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction; Dismissal on January 30, 1964

On the morning of January 10, Quiem went to court and filed a petition for prohibition, with a prayer for preliminary injunction, seeking to restrain respondents from conducting another balloting before the legality or illegality of his election was resolved. He posted a P1,000 bond. The trial court promptly issued the writ of preliminary injunction on January 10.

Respondents answered, raising a threshold defense: was there a failure of election of City Secretary. On January 14, in the meantime, the Board designated Orlando Bodriguex, one of its stenographers, as Acting Secretary. On January 22, Abas moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction. Quiem opposed on January 23.

On January 30, 1964, after a preliminary hearing conducted that morning, the court issued an order dissolving the preliminary injunction and dismissing the petition, without pronouncement as to costs. A motion for reconsideration was denied after the open-court ruling.

Certiorari Dismissed; Appeal Taken; February 24, 1964 Election of Abas

On February 10, 1964, Quiem filed a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for preliminary prohibitory and preliminary mandatory injunction. On February 11, 1964, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition because appeal was the proper remedy. On February 12, Quiem filed his notice of appeal and a cash bond. On February 13, the trial court gave due course to the appeal.

Thereafter, on February 24, 1964, the Board proceeded with the election of the secretary. Abas received five affirmative votes and was declared duly elected. From then on, Abas performed the functions of secretary.

The Issues Raised on Appeal: Due Process and the Validity of the Election

Before the Supreme Court, Quiem raised a threshold claim that he was denied due process because, in his view, the court did not give him an opportunity “to prove his allegations.” He also argued that Vice-Mayor Serina was not a member of the Board and therefore should not have voted in the election of the secretary.

Beyond those contentions, the central legal dispute concerned whether the blank ballot cast by the abstaining councilor could be recorded as a vote for either candidate. The outcome depended on whether Quiem could reach the vote threshold required by Republic Act 2259 to be elected city secretary.

Due Process in Prohibition; Summary Nature of the Preliminary Hearing

The Court rejected Quiem’s due-process argument. It observed that nothing in the minutes of the January 30, 1964 trial suggested that Quiem offered to present evidence. The Court noted that Quiem was represented by several lawyers and that the parties were heard from 3:30 a.m. to 11:50 a.m. on that date.

The Court held that due process requires notice and opportunity to be heard, and those safeguards were accorded. It emphasized that prohibition is summary in nature. It also treated respondents’ affirmative defense—lack of a cause of action due to an alleged failure of election—as a matter that could be resolved at a preliminary hearing, since a ground for dismissal may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, allowing a preliminary hearing “as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.” Since the pivotal facts were not disputed—there was an election, votes were cast, and the votes received by the candidates were tallied—the Court found that only questions of law were presented.

The Vice-Mayor’s Status as a Member of the Board and Right to Vote

Quiem contended that the Vice-Mayor was merely a presiding officer, not a member of the Municipal Board. The Court found the argument unpersuasive. It held that by legal mandate, the Vice-Mayor of Cagayan de Oro City was a member of the Municipal Board. The Court explained the legislative history: the city’s earlier charter model (as enacted under Republic Act 521 and related provisions) provided for an appointive Vice-Mayor who was “to be a member of the Municipal Board.” Later enactments made the Vice-Mayor elective and reiterated that he “shall be a member of the Municipal Board.” Further, Republic Act 2259 made the Vice-Mayor the presiding officer of the city council or municipal board in chartered cities, but it did not contain a clear indication that the Vice-Mayor ceased to be a member of the board.

The Court held that implied repeal is not favored. It harmonized the charter provision making the Vice-Mayor a member with Republic Act 2259 assigning him the presiding officer role. It stressed that Section 9 of Republic Act 2259 required a clear inconsistency before a law would be declared repealed, and it found no repugnance between the provisions.

Whether the Vice-Mayor Could Vote in Electing the City Secretary

The Court next addressed whether the Vice-Mayor, as presiding officer and member, could vote when the Board elected the city secretary. The Board’s power to elect was lodged in the Municipal Board. Logic supported the conclusion that a board member entitled to participate in the body’s actions was entitled to vote. The Court found no statutory basis denying the Vice-Mayor’s right to vote solely because he presided.

The Court distinguished the earlier case Rivera et al., vs . Villegas. In that Manila case, the Court had held that the Vice-Mayor possessed no more than the prerogatives of a presiding officer as such, including the vote “in case of a tie,” because the Manila charter expressly withheld from the Vice-Mayor the right to vote “except in case of a tie.” In contrast, the Cagayan de Oro charter was silent on any limitation of the presiding officer’s right to vote.

The Court applied Bagasao, et al., vs . Tumangan as controlling on this point. It noted that in both situations the Vice-Mayor was simultaneously a member and presiding officer, and the charter did not specify that he could vote only in a tie. In Bagasao, the Court had ruled that limiting the Vice-Mayor’s voting power to deadlock would curtail his prerogative as a member of the Municipal Board, and that no such limitation was authorized by the charter.

Accordingly, the Court held that Vice-Mayor Serina’s vote was properly cast and should be counted as a vote for petitioner. The Court rejected the suggestion that the vote should be disregarded because it was cast under a supposed intent to break a tie, emphasizing that the right to vote existed for members of the Board.

Vote Counting, the Majority Requirement, and Republic Act 2259

The Court then computed the result of the January 2, 1964 balloting. Three members voted for Quiem and three voted for Abas. The Vice-Mayor voted for Quiem, which the Court held should be counted, yielding four votes for Quiem against three for Abas.

It then addressed the statutory majority requirement for the election of the city secretary. Under Section 5 of Republic Act 2259, the city secretary “shall be elected by majority vote of the elective city council or municipal board.” The Court rejected Quiem’s construction that it meant only a simple majority of the quorum. It held instead that the law required a majority of the elective municipal board itself. Since there were eight elective members—the Vice-Mayor and seven councilors—and all were present at the balloting, a candidate needed at least five votes to win.

The Court explained the rationale. The secretary was not intended to be selected by a minority of elective members when the statute said “majority vote of the elective municipal board.” It referenced congressional deliberations indicating that the secretary is supposed to enjoy the confidence of the body to which he acts as secretary. If election depended only on a simple majority of a quorum, the secretary could be elected by a minority of the elective members, contrary to the statutory scheme.

Because no quorum issue existed—every elective member was present—the Court maintained that the required majority remained five.

Blank Ballot as Abstention: A Nullity Not Counted for Either Candidate

Having reached the dispositive issue, the Court fo

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. L-22610)

The controversy arose from the Municipal Board of Cagayan de Oro City’s election of a city secretary during the Board’s January 2, 1964 inaugural session.
Primitivo P. Quem was the petitioner and appellant who challenged the validity of the alleged election of Quem as city secretary.
Anastacio Abas was the respondent and appellee who contested the election and later was declared elected and performed the functions of city secretary.
Vice-Mayor Jesus Serina acted as presiding officer of the Board for the election, and the other Board members and the City Mayor Justiniano R. Borja were impleaded as respondents in their official capacities.
The dispute reached the Court through certiorari after an adverse preliminary injunction ruling and later proceeded through the petitioner’s appeal from the order dismissing the petition.

Key Factual Allegations

The Board conducted a secret ballot for the city secretary at the January 2, 1964 session.
Three councilors voted for Quem, three voted for Abas, and one councilor abstained by casting a blank ballot.
Because the votes were tied, Vice-Mayor Jesus Serina voted for Quem, and Quem then took his oath of office before the Vice-Mayor.
The next day, January 3, 1964, Quem took another similar oath before Judge Agustin Antillon.
On January 3, 1964, Abas challenged the validity of Quem’s alleged election, and the City Mayor Borja refused to recognize Quem as duly elected.
On January 7, 1964, the City Mayor called a special meeting to discuss and resolve Abas’ protest, but no decision was reached on January 7 or on the January 9 session.
The Board agreed to meet again on January 10, 1964 at 3:00 p.m. for the same purpose.
On the morning of January 10, 1964, Quem filed an action for prohibition with a request for preliminary injunction to restrain respondents from conducting another balloting before the legality or illegality of his election was resolved.
After requiring a P1,000 bond, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on January 10, 1964.
On February 24, 1964, after the injunction was dissolved, the Board proceeded with another election, and Abas received five affirmative votes and was declared elected, thereafter performing the functions of secretary.

Procedural History and Filings

The petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed on January 10, 1964 in Case No. 2297 before the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental.
Respondents answered and raised a threshold issue: whether there was a failure of election of city secretary.
The trial court gave notice of trial for January 30, 1964 at 8:30 a.m., and Abas moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction on January 22, 1964.
On January 30, 1964, after a preliminary hearing, the court issued an order dissolving the preliminary injunction and dismissing the petition without pronouncement as to costs.
The petitioner sought reconsideration, but the trial court overruled the verbal request after the order was dictated in open court.
On February 10, 1964, the petitioner came to the Court on certiorari with applications for preliminary prohibitory and preliminary mandatory injunction.
On February 11, 1964, the Court dismissed the certiorari for lack of merit because appeal was the proper remedy.
On February 12, 1964, Quem registered his notice of appeal from the January 30, 1964 order and filed a cash bond.
On February 13, 1964, the trial court gave due course to the appeal.
The Board conducted the subsequent election on February 24, 1964, after which Abas was elected and assumed the office.

Issues Raised on Appeal

The petitioner pressed that he was denied due process because the court did not allow him to “prove his allegations.”
The petitioner also argued that the Vice-Mayor was not a member of the Board and therefore should not have voted for the city secretary.
The petitioner claimed that the blank ballot cast by a councilor who abstained should be recorded as a vote for Quem, thereby supplying the number of votes required for his election.
The controlling legal controversy centered on whether abstention by means of a blank ballot in a contested election could be counted as an affirmative vote for either candidate.

Due Process Argument

The Court rejected the due process claim by noting that nothing in the trial minutes on January 30, 1964 showed that the petitioner had offered any evidence.
The Court emphasized that the petitioner attended the preliminary hearing with the assistance of multiple lawyers, yet no evidentiary matter was presented.
The Court applied presumptions of regular performance of official duties, including that a judge would not act contrary to official duty or violate the judicial oath.
The Court found no need for the taking of evidence because the pivotal facts were not disputed and the issues presented were solely questions of law.
The Court characterized the preliminary hearing as consistent with the rule that a ground for dismissal such as lack of cause of action may be pleaded as an affirmative defense and may be resolved in a preliminary hearing as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.
The Court held that the safeguards of notice, hearing, and opportunity to present one’s side were fully accorded, and thus the petitioner could not validly complain of a denial of due process.
The Court further noted that the nature of prohibition proceedings is summary, supporting the trial court’s summary disposition of the legal threshold issues.

Vice-Mayor’s Status as Board Member

The Court held that, by express legal mandate, the Vice-Mayor of Cagayan de Oro