Title
Pangkat Laguna vs. Commission on Elections
Case
G.R. No. 148075
Decision Date
Feb 4, 2002
Vice Governor Lazaro assumed Laguna governorship, faced disqualification over alleged premature campaigning and public works ban violations; COMELEC and Supreme Court ruled in her favor, citing lack of evidence and upholding her actions as official duties.
disqualification
candidate
election campaigning

Case Summary (G.R. No. 148075)

Factual Background

Respondent Lazaro, as Vice Governor, assumed the governorship by succession on 30 January 2001. On 28 February 2001, she filed her certificate of candidacy for the gubernatorial post.

On 4 May 2001, petitioner filed a petition to disqualify respondent Lazaro before the COMELEC. Petitioner alleged that respondent committed acts allegedly violating Section 80 (election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period) and Section 261(v) (prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds). Specifically, petitioner alleged that upon assuming the office on 30 January 2001, respondent publicly declared her intention to run for governor, and that she ordered on 7 February 2001 the purchase of fourteen thousand five hundred thirteen (14,513) items, including trophies, basketballs, volleyballs, chessboard sets, and t-shirts, allegedly worth P4,556,005.00, which petitioner claimed served no public purpose and was intended to promote her popularity as a candidate. Petitioner further alleged that on 8 February 2001, respondent directed the purchase and distribution of 1,760 medals and pins valued at P110,000.00 to various schools in Laguna, which petitioner likewise claimed had no meaningful public purpose and was meant to promote her candidacy. Petitioner argued that these acts amounted to premature campaigning because they were done before the start of the campaign period on 30 March 2001. Petitioner also argued that the same acts constituted a ground for disqualification under Section 68, in relation to Section 80, and that respondent violated Section 261(v) as implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 3479 when she caused the bidding of seventy-nine (79) public works projects on 28 March 2001.

Respondent Lazaro denied the allegations through an answer filed on 8 May 2001.

COMELEC Second Division Disqualification

In a Resolution dated 11 May 2001, the COMELEC Second Division granted petitioner’s disqualification petition and ordered respondent Lazaro’s disqualification as candidate for Governor of Laguna. Respondent Lazaro moved for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc.

While the case was pending, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proclamation under Sec. 6, R.A. 6646 on 17 May 2001. On 19 May 2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent Lazaro as the duly elected Governor of Laguna based on the results of the 14 May 2001 Elections. Petitioner later filed a Motion to Annul Proclamation and/or to Suspend Effect of Proclamation under Sec. 6, R.A. 6646 on 22 May 2001.

COMELEC En Banc Reversal

The COMELEC en banc promulgated its Resolution on 24 May 2001. It granted respondent Lazaro’s motion for reconsideration and reversed the Second Division’s disqualification ruling. The text of the dispositive portion declared that the Second Division resolution was reversed and set aside, and the motion for reconsideration was granted.

Issues Raised to the Supreme Court

Petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the COMELEC en banc Resolution of 24 May 2001 on the ground that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The case, as framed in the decision, required the Supreme Court to determine whether the COMELEC en banc committed such grave abuse in overturning the Second Division’s factual determinations on the alleged premature campaigning under Section 80 and the alleged public works ban violation under Section 261(v).

Parties’ Positions

Petitioner maintained that respondent Lazaro’s actions as incumbent provincial chief executive—ordering purchases and distribution of items to constituents and schools—constituted election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period under Section 80, and therefore supported disqualification. Petitioner further claimed that respondent violated Section 261(v) because she caused bidding of public works projects within the prohibited period, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3479.

Respondent Lazaro’s position, as reflected in the decision, was that she was performing the duties imposed by law as Governor and that the questioned purchases and programs were regular provincial government activities tied to sports and education programs. She also argued the absence of the type of solicitation and intent that would bring her acts within the statutory meaning of election campaigning. As to the public works ban theory, the decision indicates that the evidence presented by petitioner was insufficient to establish that public funds were released, disbursed, or expended during the prohibitive period.

Supreme Court’s Discussion on Certiorari and Evidentiary Weight of COMELEC Findings

The Supreme Court began by reiterating that, in controversies involving the true will of the electorate, the factual findings and determinations of the COMELEC must be accorded great weight and finality, absent any remarkable trace of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated tasks. It held that in a petition for certiorari, the Court generally would not disturb factual findings of administrative bodies such as the COMELEC, which are final unless grave abuse of discretion is shown. It further emphasized the presumption of regularity accorded to official acts concerning elections, and it cited Article IX-C, Section 2(3) for the Court’s limited posture in election matters, save for issues affecting the right to vote and for questions properly within judicial review.

Premature Campaigning: Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code

On the issue of premature campaigning, the Court held that respondent Lazaro was not guilty of violating Section 80. The Court explained that Section 80 prohibits election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period, but it rejected petitioner’s broad characterization of every act of beneficence as campaigning.

The Court affirmed the reasoning attributed to the COMELEC: not every act of beneficence by a candidate could be considered campaigning, because the term campaigning should not be stretched to cover every act that might influence a voter. The Court recognized that only those acts primarily designed to solicit votes fall under the definition and enumeration of election campaign and partisan political activity, as discussed through COMELEC Resolution 3636. The Court found that respondent Lazaro was not directly or indirectly soliciting votes; rather, she was performing legally imposed duties as Governor of Laguna. It also recognized COMELEC’s factual conclusion that the sports and education programs were implemented regularly, that the number of items purchased and the amounts involved were within the regular purchasing of the provincial government, and that questions concerning how funds were sourced and how the program was implemented were beyond the Court’s constitutionally mandated jurisdiction.

In support of the evidentiary approach, the Court relied on Lozano vs. Yorac, where it upheld COMELEC’s rejection of a vote-buying charge and stressed that it required more than tenuous inferences. It reiterated that there must be concrete and direct evidence or at least strong circumstantial evidence to establish the prohibited electoral offense.

Applying these standards, the Court concluded that petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the purchase and distribution of the questioned items were done for the purpose of promoting respondent Lazaro’s candidacy or were calculated to directly or indirectly solicit votes in violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Consequently, the Court ruled that respondent’s acts did not fall within the prohibition of Section 80 in a manner sufficient to disqualify her.

Public Works Ban: Section 261(v) and COMELEC Resolution No. 3479

On the second issue, petitioner claimed that respondent violated the 45-day public works ban under Section 261(v) because she caused the bidding of 79 public works projects on 28 March 2001. The Court disagreed.

The decision quoted Section 261(v) as expressly penalizing public officials who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, release, disburse, or expend public funds for kinds of public works, subject to specified exceptions, including work undertaken by contract through public bidding held or negotiated contract awarded before the forty-five-day period. The Court stressed that the prohibited act, by the statute’s text, was not merely the holding of bidding, but the release, disbursement, or expenditure of public funds during the prohibitive period.

The Court held that the evidentiary record was wanting

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