Title
Luzon Development Bank vs. Angeles Catherine Enriquez
Case
G.R. No. 168646
Decision Date
Jan 21, 2011
A buyer (Enriquez) purchased a house and lot under a Contract to Sell from developer DELTA, which later defaulted on a bank loan. DELTA assigned the property to the bank via dacion en pago. The Supreme Court ruled that DELTA retained ownership until full payment, allowing the transfer, and Enriquez must pay the balance to the bank.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 168646)

Factual Background

DELTA obtained a P4 million loan from the BANK on July 3, 1995 for the express purpose of developing Delta Homes I. To secure the loan, DELTA’s owner, Ricardo De Leon (De Leon), together with his spouse, executed in favor of the BANK a real estate mortgage over several properties, including Lot 4 covered by TCT No. T-637183. The real estate mortgage and the loan amount were later amended to increase the secured loan from P4 million to P8 million, and both were annotated on the same title.

DELTA then secured a Certificate of Registration and a License to Sell from the HLURB. In 1997, DELTA executed a Contract to Sell with Enriquez over the house and lot in Lot 4 for a purchase price of P614,950.00, with Enriquez making a downpayment of P114,950.00. The Contract to Sell provided that the contract could be considered null and void ab initio for Enriquez’s failure to pay three successive monthly installment payments, with payments forfeited as liquidated damages and expenses. It also stated that upon full payment, DELTA would execute a final deed of sale in favor of Enriquez.

When DELTA defaulted on its loan obligation, the BANK and DELTA proceeded not through foreclosure but through a dation in payment (dacion en pago). A Deed of Assignment in Payment of Debt was executed on September 30, 1998, wherein DELTA assigned and conveyed assigned real estate with improvements to the BANK in satisfaction of DELTA’s total obligation. The records were silent as to whether title was transferred to the BANK, but it appeared that the dacion en pago was not annotated on the TCT of Lot 4.

Unknown to Enriquez, Lot 4 was among the properties assigned to the BANK.

HLURB Proceedings and Decisions

On November 18, 1999, Enriquez filed a complaint before the Region IV Office of the HLURB. She alleged that DELTA violated its License to Sell by: (a) selling the units for a price exceeding the level allowed under BP Blg. 220, and (b) failing to obtain a clearance for the mortgage from the HLURB. Enriquez sought a refund of P301,063.42, damages, and administrative fines against both DELTA and the BANK.

In a June 1, 2000 decision, HLURB Arbiter Atty. Raymundo A. Foronda upheld the validity of the contract’s purchase price but ordered DELTA to accept a balance payment of P108,013.36 and, upon full payment, deliver the title free from liens and encumbrances. The arbiter also awarded Enriquez moral damages (P50,000.00), exemplary damages (P50,000.00), costs (P10,000.00), and administrative fines: P10,000.00 for violation of Section 18 of PD 957 and another P10,000.00 for violation of Section 22.

DELTA appealed to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. DELTA argued that it did not violate the license because clearance was allegedly not required for mortgages constituted on a subdivision project prior to registration. It also contested the moral and exemplary damages on the ground that Enriquez had no cause of action.

The HLURB Board held that developers must obtain HLURB clearance for mortgages regardless of the date secured, because the law made no distinction. It upheld liability for administrative fine based on violation of the clearance requirement, but it deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages because Enriquez had also been remiss in her monthly amortizations.

Both Enriquez and the BANK appealed to the Office of the President (OP). The OP adopted and affirmed the HLURB findings. The OP denied Enriquez’s motion for reconsideration.

Appeals to the Court of Appeals and the Issues Therein

Only the BANK appealed the OP decision to the CA. The BANK reiterated that DELTA could no longer deliver Lot 4 because DELTA had relinquished its rights to Lot 4 through the dacion en pago. As an alternative, it argued that if DELTA still retained ownership, its mortgage rights should be respected and DELTA should redeem in accordance with Section 25 of PD 957 before any delivery to Enriquez. It further sought exemplary damages and attorney’s fees on account of what it characterized as a baseless suit by Enriquez.

The CA ruled that the dacion en pago was invalid with respect to Lot 4. It held that DELTA had earlier relinquished its ownership over Lot 4 to Enriquez through the Contract to Sell. Consequently, the CA ordered DELTA to pay the BANK the value of Lot 4. The CA also rejected the BANK’s redemption argument under Section 25 of PD 957. It ruled that the BANK no longer had a first lien because the mortgage was extinguished by the invalid dacion en pago. It denied the BANK’s request for exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

Both DELTA and the BANK moved for reconsideration, but both motions were denied, leading to the present separate petitions.

The Parties’ Positions Before the Supreme Court

DELTA argued that the CA erred in holding that the Contract to Sell conveyed ownership. It emphasized that the Contract to Sell allowed title transfer only upon Enriquez’s full payment, which Enriquez had not yet completed. According to DELTA, since it remained owner of Lot 4, it had the right to enter into a dacion en pago and extinguish its loan obligation to the BANK. DELTA contended that the BANK’s acceptance of the assignment, without reservation or exception, extinguished the entire loan obligation, leaving DELTA with no further duty to pay the BANK the value of Enriquez’s property.

The BANK largely echoed DELTA’s position on the nature of the Contract to Sell and argued that because Enriquez had not fully paid, DELTA retained ownership and could validly convey Lot 4 to the BANK via dacion en pago. However, it maintained that if the dacion en pago over Lot 4 were invalidated and delivery to Enriquez were ordered, DELTA should still pay the BANK the corresponding value of Lot 4. The BANK posited that the dacion en pago extinguished the loan only to the extent of the value of the property actually delivered, and that if Lot 4 could not be delivered to the BANK due to the Contract to Sell, then DELTA’s remaining obligation should subsist to the extent of Lot 4’s value.

Enriquez did not file comments or memoranda in either petition. She manifested that she would just await the outcome, and the Court treated her waiver as relevant in relation to issues she did not pursue.

The Supreme Court’s Ruling: Mortgage Contract Void; Contract to Sell Does Not Transfer Ownership

The Court held that DELTA violated Section 18 of PD 957 by mortgaging properties in Delta Homes I, including Lot 4, to the BANK without prior HLURB clearance. Since the parties did not appeal the administrative fine on that ground, the Court treated the point as settled. It reiterated the established doctrine that a mortgage contract executed in breach of Section 18 of PD 957 is null and void and that the prohibition is construed as such that acts contrary to it are void. Because of the nullity, neither DELTA nor the BANK could assert rights arising from the void mortgage. As a result, the BANK’s P8 million loan effectively became unsecured.

The Court corrected the CA’s rationale regarding ownership. It held that the CA’s invalidation of the dacion en pago was predicated on a misapprehension of the nature of a contract to sell. The Court emphasized that a contract to sell is one where the prospective seller reserves transfer of title to the prospective buyer until the happening of an event, typically full payment of the purchase price. Under such a contract, full payment constitutes a suspensive condition. Until that condition is fulfilled, the obligation to sell does not arise, and ownership is retained by the prospective seller.

Applying these principles, the Court found nothing in the Contract to Sell that removed it from the general definition. The Contract to Sell expressly reserved DELTA’s ownership until full payment and even reserved the right to unilaterally void the contract upon non-payment of three successive monthly amortizations. Accordingly, DELTA did not transfer ownership of Lot 4 to Enriquez. Because ownership remained with DELTA, DELTA could transfer its ownership to another entity, and the dacion en pago was not automatically invalid on the ground used by the CA.

The Court then addressed why the BANK could not escape the consequences of Enriquez’s rights. It held that, because the subject property was a subdivision lot, the transaction was covered and protected by PD 957. The Court stressed the statute’s protective intent for subdivision buyers and pointed to Section 17 of PD 957 on registration, which provides that all contracts to sell and related instruments relative to subdivision lots and condominium units shall be registered by the seller, whether or not the purchase price is paid in full. The Court explained that registration serves to bind third parties and functions as notice to the whole world of the buyer’s prior right.

Although DELTA failed to register Enriquez’s Contract to Sell with the Register of Deeds, the Court held that this failure did not prejudice Enriquez or relieve the BANK from respecting the Contract to Sell. The Court reasoned that, under the circumstances, the BANK could not be considered an innocent purchaser for value. It held that the BANK knew the assigned properties were subdivision lots covered by PD 957 and knew the loaned amounts were for development of DELTA’s subdivision project, as reflected in promissory notes. It further noted that the technical description of Lot 4 indicated its inclusion within the subdivision development. Based on these circumstances, the Court held that the BANK knew or should have known of the possibility that assigned subdivision lots were already subject to contracts to sell with protected buyers. The Court adopted the rationale that a reasonable person, especially a financial institution, should conduct thorough investigation rather than rely solely on a clean title.

The Court relied on Keppel Bank Philippines, Inc. v. Adao to underscore that the general rule that a purchaser may rel

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