Title
Joson III vs. Nario
Case
G.R. No. 91548
Decision Date
Jul 13, 1990
Dispute over Nueva Ecija Vice-Governor's resignation validity; Supreme Court ruled resignation ineffective without acceptance, upholding Nario's position and Acting Governor designation.

Case Summary (G.R. No. 91548)

Factual Background

On December 7, 1989, Governor Eduardo L. Joson of Nueva Ecija took an indefinite sick leave, producing a temporary vacancy in the governorship. By virtue of the Local Government Code, Vice-Governor Narciso S. Nario assumed the office of Acting Governor. Nario fell ill soon thereafter and on December 18, 1989 executed a written waiver that purported to relinquish his right to assume the Acting Governorship in favor of Senior Board Member Tomas N. Joson III, effective December 19, 1989. Joson took his oath as Acting Governor on December 19, 1989.

Waiver and Tendered Resignation

On December 22, 1989 Nario tendered a voluntary resignation as Vice-Governor effective at the close of office hours that day. On December 23, 1989 Joson took oath as Vice-Governor and on December 26, 1989 forwarded to Secretary Santos an indorsement that communicated Nario’s resignation and advised that Joson had assumed the vice‑governorship pursuant to Section 49(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337. After further medical examination, Nario on January 2, 1990 wrote Secretary Santos withdrawing both his waiver as Acting Governor and his resignation and requesting that they be treated as without legal force and effect.

Administrative Acts of the Secretary of Local Governments

Secretary Luis T. Santos responded promptly. On January 3, 1990 he informed Nario that, for all legal intents and purposes, Nario was considered Vice-Governor and must discharge the powers and duties of that office. The Secretary then designated Nario as Acting Provincial Governor pursuant to Section 52 of the Local Government Code and directed him to exercise the powers of that office during the prescribed period. The Secretary issued a separate communication to Joson directing him to cease and desist from performing any functions of the Provincial Governor.

Petitioner’s Judicial Proceedings

On January 4, 1990 petitioner Tomas N. Joson III filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, docketed Civil Case No. 746-AF, seeking prohibition and injunction with a restraining order. The Executive Judge, Hon. Sendon O. Delizo, issued a status quo order the same day. Oppositions were filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of Secretary Santos and by counsel for Acting Governor Nario. A hearing took place on January 12, 1990.

Trial Court Ruling

On January 15, 1990 Judge Sendon O. Delizo dismissed Joson’s petition and lifted the temporary restraining order. The judge held that under prevailing jurisprudence acceptance was necessary for the resignation of a public officer to be operative and effective, citing Punsalan v. Mendoza. The judge further concluded that Joson prematurely sought judicial relief without exhausting administrative remedies and relied on Rosales v. Court of Appeals in that regard.

Issues Presented on Certiorari

Before the Supreme Court petitioner sought reversal of the Regional Trial Court decision, declaration that Nario’s withdrawal of his resignation was illegal and without effect, affirmation of Joson’s assumption as Vice-Governor and Acting Governor, and nullification of Secretary Santos’s designation of Nario as Acting Governor on January 3, 1990. Petitioner argued that because the Local Government Code did not fix the moment at which a vice‑governor’s resignation became effective, the resignation should be construed to take effect on the date specified therein without need of acceptance and that the statutory succession scheme demonstrated that acceptance was unnecessary.

The Parties’ Contentions

Joson emphasized the omission in the implementing rules and in the Code regarding the mechanism for a vice‑governor’s resignation and relied on the Code’s succession provision that a sanggunian member with the largest vote shall ipso jure succeed to the vice‑governorship, arguing that this indicated acceptance was unnecessary. Respondents maintained that established doctrine required acceptance by the proper authority for a resignation of public office to become operative, that a tendered resignation remained revocable until acceptance, and that Secretary Santos possessed the discretion to accept or reject the resignation and to treat Nario as Vice‑Governor.

Supreme Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court reaffirmed the rule that a public officer’s resignation is ineffectual until accepted by the proper authority and that mere tender of resignation does not create a vacancy. The Court relie

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