Title
De Vera vs. De Vera
Case
G.R. No. 172832
Decision Date
Apr 6, 2009
Geren, accused of bigamy, pleaded guilty but later sought to withdraw plea, citing voluntary surrender. RTC granted, mitigating penalty. SC upheld CA, denying Rosario's certiorari, citing procedural rules and double jeopardy.
bigamy
plea withdrawal
mitigating circumstance

Case Summary (G.R. No. 172832)

Factual Background

The Information charged that on July 31, 2003, accused Geren A. de Vera, being previously married to Rosario Carvajal Tobias-De Vera, contracted a second marriage with Josephine Juliano y Francisco while the first marriage remained subsisting. Upon arraignment, Geren A. de Vera pleaded guilty. Records show that the Information was filed with the RTC on February 24, 2005, and on March 1, 2005 the court found probable cause and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest; in the afternoon of that same day the accused surrendered to the court and filed a motion for reduction of bail, and later posted bail.

Trial Court Proceedings

After arraignment and plea, Geren A. de Vera filed a motion dated April 8, 2005 asking to withdraw his plea temporarily in order to prove the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The private complainant, Rosario T. de Vera, opposed the motion and later moved for partial reconsideration of the RTC decision. On June 6, 2005, the RTC granted the accused’s motion, appreciated two mitigating circumstances — plea of guilty and voluntary surrender — and sentenced the accused under the applicable provisions to the indeterminate penalty of six months arresto mayor as minimum to four years and two months prision correccional as maximum. The RTC referred the accused’s application for probation to the probation officer. The RTC denied the complainant’s motion for reconsideration in an Order dated August 25, 2005.

Appellate Proceedings

Dissatisfied, Rosario T. de Vera filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, invoking grave abuse of discretion in the RTC’s appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The CA, in a Decision dated February 28, 2006 and a Resolution dated May 24, 2006, denied relief and affirmed the RTC Order and Sentence. The petitioner then sought review by the Supreme Court under Rule 45, Rules of Court.

Issues Presented

The petition presented two principal contentions: first, that the CA erroneously failed to apply People v. Cagas regarding the requisites of voluntary surrender and therefore misapplied the doctrine to the facts; and second, that the CA incorrectly affirmed the RTC’s Orders and Sentence in appreciating the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender, warranting reversal under this Court’s appellate discretion.

Petitioner's Contentions

Petitioner argued that the requisites for voluntary surrender were not satisfied because a warrant of arrest had been issued and therefore arrest was imminent, making any subsequent surrender involuntary or compelled. Petitioner relied on this Court’s decisions in People v. Cagas, People v. Taraya, and People v. Barcino, Jr. to contend that the presence or issuance of a warrant precluded appreciation of the mitigating circumstance, and urged an increase in the penalty imposed.

Legal Analysis and Reasoning

The Court first addressed the procedural threshold under Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that a judgment of conviction may be modified only “upon motion of the accused” before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. The Court reiterated that this proviso protects the accused from being subjected to increased penalties without his consent and that therefore errors in a judgment of conviction cannot be corrected at the instance of the prosecution or private complainant unless the accused so moves. The Court examined the narrow exception recognized in prior jurisprudence where review by the prosecution had been allowed in an extraordinary case involving patent lack or excess of jurisdiction or a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, as in People v. Veneracion, but emphasized that such instances are exceptional and must clearly show that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. The Court held that mere misappreciation of mitigating circumstances does not constitute grave abuse of discretion for purposes of certiorari under Rule 65.

Evaluation of the Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender

Substantively, the Court recited the requisites for appreciation of voluntary surrender: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. The Court explained that the essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and an intent either to acknowledge guilt or to spare the authorities the trouble and expense of search and capture. The Court considered petitioner’s reliance on decisions that had added a fourth apparent requisite — absence of a pending warrant or information — and distinguished those authorities. The Court found People v. Cagas inapplicable because the accused there was actually caught by police, not truly surrendered; People v. Taraya and People v. Barcino, Jr. were distinguishable on their specific facts where a warrant had been issued and the circumstances showed lack of spontaneity or an intent to deny responsibility. The Court noted that the mere filing of an Information or the issuance of a warrant does not automatically render a subsequent surrender involuntary, citing People v. Oco, and that the facts surrounding the act of surrender determine entitlement to the mitigating circumstance.

Application of Law to Facts

Applying the foregoing doctrine to the present record, the Court observed that the Information was filed on February 24, 2005; on March 1, 2005 the court found probable cause and ordered the issuance of a warrant; that same afternoon Geren A. de Vera surrendered to the court and filed a motion for reduction of bail and thereafter posted bail, obviating the need to implement the warrant. The Court found these circumstances to demonstrate spontaneity and an acknowledgment of culpability, as corroborated by the accused’s eventual plea of guilty at arraignment. The Court therefore concluded that the RTC did not err in appreciating the mitigating circumstance o

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