G.R. No. 151322 - Copuyoc vs. De Sola

Case Summary (G.R. No. 151322)

Factual Background

Respondent alleged that she was the owner of Lot 25, Block 6 of the Xavierville Estate Subdivision based on TCT No. 87569, and that she had been in actual possession since June 7, 1993, when she supposedly bought the property from Christine C. Quesada by virtue of an Absolute Deed of Sale of Real Estate. She further alleged that petitioner began constructing a house without her consent and despite demands to stop and vacate.

Petitioner denied respondent’s allegations and asserted that he possessed the property lawfully by virtue of the September 6, 1995 Contract to Sell. He claimed respondent’s title was forged and that the property covered by her title was located in Tandang Sora, not Xavierville. He also asserted that the Bank of Commerce possessed the property for decades and had reconstituted title, referring to TCT No. RT-114371 (265907) covering the subject property and other properties in Phase I, and he alleged that a syndicate could procure forged titles after the Register of Deeds office was burned.

Procedural History in the MeTC

On January 15, 1997, the MeTC held a hearing on respondent’s application for a temporary restraining order and issued one the same day. After the parties submitted positions papers and supporting evidence, the MeTC rendered its Decision on September 22, 1997, dismissing the complaint for forcible entry. The MeTC dismissed the action because it found that the property over which the Bank of Commerce held title was not the property mentioned in respondent’s title, and thus there was no forcible entry.

The MeTC’s ruling effectively left the dispute over title and identity of the property unresolved within the forcible entry framework. Respondent’s counterclaim was likewise dismissed.

Appeal to the RTC

Respondent appealed to the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 225. In a Decision dated October 19, 1998, the RTC reversed the MeTC, ordered petitioner and those claiming under him to vacate Lot 25, Block 6 of the Xavierville Estate Subdivision, and implicitly ruled that respondent had the better right to physical possession.

In reaching that conclusion, the RTC disagreed with the MeTC on the identity of the property. It weighed conflicting testimony regarding whether the properties described in the titles referred to the same lot. It credited testimony suggesting that respondent’s lot and the Bank of Commerce lot were identical, and it also treated respondent’s belated submission of documentary evidence, including tax declarations, as strengthening respondent’s possession claim. The RTC also treated the subsequent filing of a quieting of title case by the Bank of Commerce as an implied admission that the titles covered the same property.

The RTC further ruled that respondent had prior possession because the June 7, 1993 Deed of Sale between respondent and Christine Quesada amounted to possession in legal contemplation.

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52132. The CA denied the petition in a Decision dated April 30, 2001, but did so “without prejudice to the outcome” of the pending Civil Case No. Q-97-30333, titled “Bank of Commerce v. Erlinda de Sola,” and to the filing of an appropriate plenary action to settle ownership.

The CA upheld the RTC’s findings on possession priority and the continued validity of respondent’s title until judicially nullified. The CA also held that any identity issue was properly threshed out in the quieting of title case. It recognized that respondent’s tax declarations indicated possession.

Issues Raised to the Supreme Court

Petitioner anchored his Supreme Court petition on alleged legal error, particularly in: (i) holding that respondent had priority of possession; (ii) admitting and relying on tax declarations presented for the first time on appeal; and (iii) not finding conclusive a report by the chief of the surveys division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that the properties described in the parties’ titles were not located in the same place.

Petitioner insisted that respondent never had actual and physical possession prior to the filing of the forcible entry case. He maintained that petitioner’s possession was linked to construction after the Contract to Sell took effect, while respondent’s alleged “regular visits” were insufficient to establish actual dominion. He also argued that the RTC should not have admitted respondent’s tax declarations only at the appellate stage and that those documents did not prove physical possession. Finally, petitioner maintained that respondent’s title and his contract description covered different property.

The Supreme Court’s Review Standard

The Court initially reiterated the general rule that it would not entertain Rule 45 petitions raising questions of fact, given the limited scope of review confined to errors of law. However, because the MeTC, RTC, and CA arrived at contradictory findings, the Court found it necessary to review and weigh the evidence anew as an exception to the general rule.

Nature of Forcible Entry and Controlling Issue

The Court explained that an action for forcible entry is summary in nature and is designed to recover physical possession through speedy proceedings. It underscored that forcible entry presupposes that the plaintiff was deprived of physical possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, making the defendant’s possession unlawful from the beginning. The Court reiterated the controlling principle that the core issue in forcible entry is mere physical or material possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure) or ownership. It emphasized that title is not involved and that courts will uphold respect for prior possession; a party with prior possession can recover even against the owner unless a person with a better right lawfully ejects him.

Because forcible entry is a civil case, the Court restated that the burden of proof lay on the plaintiff to establish the claim by a preponderance of evidence. Respondent, therefore, had to prove that she was illegally deprived of possession of the premises in dispute.

Correction of a Material Error: Mischaracterization of Petitioner’s Right to Possess

The Court then addressed a “basic error” in the rulings of the MeTC, RTC, and CA: the lower courts had entertained the impression that petitioner’s possession was based on an ostensible ownership claim. The Supreme Court held that petitioner’s right to possess did not derive from ownership. It derived from the Contract to Sell, which allowed him to take possession pending reconstitution of title and full payment of the purchase price, while ownership remained with the Bank of Commerce. The Court stressed the doctrinal point that in a contract to sell, ownership is reserved in the vendor and does not pass to the vendee until full payment.

The Court observed that the Bank of Commerce could even avail itself of an ejectment remedy against petitioner upon petitioner’s default in payment, because the vendor retained ownership. Although this point was not raised by the parties, the Court deemed it necessary to bring up in the interest of substantial justice and to avoid further litigation.

Priority of Possession and the Pre-Spoliation Perspective

The Court further ruled that a plaintiff in an ejectment case cannot succeed if the defendant had possession antedating the plaintiff’s possession, and that the court should look at the situation as it existed before the first act of spoliation. Using this framework, the Court compared the basis of petitioner’s and respondent’s claimed possession.

Petitioner’s alleged possession was grounded on the September 6, 1995 Contract to Sell, under which he was allowed to take possession pending payment. The Bank of Commerce’s purchase from Xavierville Estate, Inc. was by a Deed of Sale of Real Estate dated September 8, 1967, from which TCT No. 265907 issued on December 5, 1979.

Respondent’s claimed possession stemmed from a June 7, 1993 Absolute Deed of Sale between her and Quesada, which led to the issuance of TCT No. 87569 on June 8, 1993. The Court also traced respondent’s title back to prior TCT records, including TCT No. 76045 in Quesada’s chain, and noted that TCT No. 80618 in Quesada’s name was issued on February 18, 1993.

Respondent’s Alleged Possession Was Not Proved as Actual Dominion

The Court held that, under the surrounding circumstances, petitioner was in prior possession and entitled to remain. While the Court acknowledged that respondent’s deed of sale was executed earlier than petitioner’s contract to sell, it emphasized that a deed of sale is only a prima facie presumption of delivery of possession, and the presumption is destroyed if delivery is not effected due to a legal impediment or if the vendee fails to take actual possession.

The Court found that respondent never occupied the property from the time she allegedly bought it on June 7, 1993, or at any time thereafter. Respondent argued that “regular visits” constituted possession, but the Court distinguished the cited doctrine and held that respondent’s visits were not unequivocal proof of actual or physical possession. In a span of three years, respondent visited the property only five times. The Court also found that respondent constructed no improvements or fencing. It further noted that respondent did not even know the road number where the property was located because of the infrequency of her visits. These facts, the Court held, showed that respondent’s infrequent visits were not coupled with any actual exercise of dominion, and thus did not amount to possession for purposes of forcible entry.

In contrast, the Court found that petitioner established actual physical possession because he began constructing on the property soon after it was turned over to him under the Contract to Sell.

Tax Declarations an

Case Syllabus (G.R. No. 151322)

Parties and Procedural Posture

Mario L. Copuyoc (petitioner) and his spouse held a Contract to Sell dated September 6, 1995 as buyers, with The Bank of Commerce (formerly The Overseas Bank of Manila) as seller.
Erlinda de Sola (respondent) held Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 87569 in her name.
Respondent filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 35 a complaint for Forcible Entry with Injunction and Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order on December 18, 1996.
The MeTC dismissed the complaint on September 22, 1997.
Respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 225, which reversed on October 19, 1998 and ordered petitioner to vacate.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52132.
The CA denied the petition on April 30, 2001, while noting the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-97-30333 for “Bank of Commerce v. Erlinda de Sola.”
Petitioner filed a Rule 45 petition with the Supreme Court, asserting errors of law involving possession priority and the evidence used to establish possession.
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reinstated the MeTC’s dismissal.

Key Factual Allegations

Respondent alleged she was the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 25, Block 6 of the Xavierville Estate Subdivision, covered by TCT No. 87569, and that she had been in actual possession since June 7, 1993 after purchase from Christine C. Quesada via an Absolute Deed of Sale of Real Estate.
Respondent alleged petitioner commenced house construction on the property without consent and despite demands to stop and vacate.
Petitioner alleged he was the lawful possessor by virtue of the Contract to Sell executed on September 6, 1995 in his favor by the Bank of Commerce.
Petitioner disputed respondent’s title by alleging it was forged and that the property described in respondent’s title was located in Tandang Sora, not Xavierville.
Petitioner alleged that reconstitution and historical circumstances after the fire that gutted Quezon City Hall enabled forged titles, while the Bank of Commerce had possessed the property for 43 years.
Both parties relied on technical descriptions in their respective documents, each of which purported to identify Lot 25, Block 6 through metes-and-bounds references.
Respondent traced her title to prior TCTs culminating in TCT No. 87569, while petitioner traced the Bank of Commerce’s title history through TCT No. RT-114371 (265907).

Issuance of TRO and Conduct of Proceedings

On January 15, 1997, the MeTC conducted a hearing on respondent’s application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and issued a TRO on the same day after finding merit.
Petitioner filed an Answer with Counterclaim and Opposition to the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction, and denied respondent’s allegations.
When the parties’ counsels agreed to maintain the status quo, the MeTC required Positions Papers and supporting evidence, and then deemed the case submitted for decision.
The MeTC later dismissed the complaint and respondent’s counterclaim, characterizing respondent’s action as only an attempt to protect her interest.

Decisions of the Lower Courts

The MeTC dismissed the forcible entry complaint, finding that the property covered by the Bank of Commerce’s title was not the same as the property described in respondent’s title.
The RTC reversed and ordered petitioner to vacate, relying on its conclusion that petitioner’s and respondent’s titles referred to the same property and that respondent had prior possession.
The RTC credited evidence presented to show identity of the property, including testimony that the lot described in the Bank of Commerce’s title was identical to that described in respondent’s title, and an Order of Reconstitution statement linking identity to a prior reconstitution administrative order.
The RTC found that respondent had prior possession because the June 7, 1993 deed of sale to Quesada constituted possession in legal contemplation.
The RTC held that petitioner’s later acts amounted to encroachment on respondent’s possession.
The RTC also treated petitioner’s filing of a Quieting of Title action by the Bank of Commerce on February 1, 1997 as an implied admission of identity of the property.
The CA upheld the RTC, adding that respondent’s title could not be disregarded absent a judicial declaration of nullity and that possession could be inferred from respondent’s regular visits and tax declarations.
The CA acknowledged that the question on property identity could be threshed out in Civil Case No. Q-97-30333 pending before the RTC.

Issues Raised on Review

Petitioner argued that the CA wrongly held respondent had priority of possession.
Petitioner argued that the CA improperly considered tax declarations presented for the first time on appeal.
Petitioner argued that the CA should have treated as conclusive the report of the Chief of the Surveys Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources indicating the properties described in the parties’ titles were not in the same place.
Petitioner contended that despite respondent’s deed of sale, respondent was never in actual and physical possession before the forcible entry case, while petitioner was able to build improvements.
Petitioner contended that the Bank of Commerce had prior possession through fencing even before sale to petitioner, and that any lack of title could be explained by pending reconstitution.
Petitioner argued that respondent’s evidence did not establish the identity of the property and that the RTC and CA erred in concluding otherwise.

Governing Legal Principles

The Supreme Court reiterate