- Title
- Felices vs. Colegado
- Case
- G.R. No. L-23374
- Decision Date
- Sep 30, 1970
- Heirs partitioned homestead; Maria sold share, later repurchased by Colegado. Teofila sought redemption; SC ruled partition ended co-ownership, no redemption right.
146 Phil. 180
[ G.R. No. L-23374. September 30, 1970 ] TEOFILA FELICES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. FRANCISCO COLEGADO, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
D E C I S I O N
D E C I S I O N
ZALDIVAR, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, in its Civil Case No. 5510, on a question of law -- the facts having been stipulated by the parties in the court below.
Felipe Felices died on
Upon the insistence of Roman Iriola, the deed of conditional sale was signed by all the brothers and sisters of Maria, and soon after the execution of the deed Iriola took possession of the above-described property.
Sometime in 1951, Silverio Felices, Pedro Felices, Marta Felices and Maria Felices agreed to sell absolutely to Francisco Colegado their respective shares in the homestead for the total price of P8,500.00. Knowing, however, that such sale could not be validly effected because of the prohibition to alienate a homestead within five years from the issuance of the patent, they agreed to execute the document of sale later on. In the meantime, and inasmuch as the share of Maria Felices was still in the possession of Roman Iriola by virtue of its having been previously sold to him with right of repurchase, Francisco Colegado advanced the amount for the repurchase of Maria's share from Roman Iriola.
When the repurchase price was offered to Roman Iriola, the latter refused to allow the repurchase. The Felices brothers and sisters (Silverio, Pedro, Marta and Maria), therefore, consigned the amount for the repurchase with the court and filed Civil Case No. 1991 in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur to compel Roman Iriola to allow the repurchase and accept the proferred repurchase money. In the complaint, Teofila Felices, the other sister, who had a share in the homestead, was joined as party defendant along with Roman Iriola because she refused to join as a party plaintiff with her brothers and sisters.
On
On
Shortly thereafter, or on September 7, 1962, Teofila Felices, thru her lawyer, addressed a letter to Francisco Colegado informing him of her desire to redeem the parcel of land sold to him by Maria Felices and at the same time offering the sum of P2,053.61 as the redemption price of the land -- which amount was later on deposited with the Clerk of Court -- but this offer to redeem was refused by Francisco Colegado. On September 19, 1962, Teofila Felices commenced the present action against Francisco Colegado in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur (Civil Case No. 5510), asserting that being a co-owner defendant Colegado can be compelled to allow her to exercise the right or legal redemption over that portion which her sister Maria Felices had conditionally sold to Roman Iriola and later repurchased from Iriola by Colegado, invoking the provision of Article 1620 of the Civil Code which reads:
"A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. "Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common."In his answer, which contains a counterclaim, defendant Francisco Colegado maintains that plaintiff is now precluded to redeem the land in question. He bases his stand on Article 1088 of the same Code, and asserts that once a property is partitioned among the heirs, as in the case at bar, the sale by any one of the heirs of his share to a third person cannot be the subject of redemption by his co-heirs.
On
'That even before the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 73 on October 20, 1948 to the deceased Felipe Felices the children of the said deceased immediately after his death had already made a physical partition of the land among themselves, although no transfer certificate of title was actually issued in favor of each heir to his or her corresponding share'.
"The partition conferred upon each heir 'the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him' (Javelesa vs. Barrios, et al., 66 Phil. 107; Aliases vs. Alcantara, 16 Phil. 489, Alcala vs. Alcala, 35 Phil. 679). In other words, after the partition of the homestead of Felipe Felices immediately following his death onHence the present appeal by plaintiff Teofila Felices.
The only question to be resolved in this appeal is whether, or not, under the facts stated in the foregoing paragraphs, plaintiff-appellant can exercise the right of legal redemption of the land in question from defendant-appellee, pursuant to the provisions of Article 1620 and/or Article 1088 of the Civil Code. As correctly held by the trial court, Article 1088 of the Civil Code has no application in the present case because said article can only be availed of when a co-heir sells his share before the partition of the hereditary estate. That article refers to the hereditary right itself, in the abstract sense, without specifying any particular portion, although the proportionate participation of each co-heir is ascertainable. This article presupposes that there has as yet been no distribution of the estate among the heirs, for the moment such distribution has taken place, even in a state of pro-indiviso, the heirs ceased to be considered simply as co-heirs, but they have thereby become co-owners. Consequently, if one of the co-owners sells his share to a stranger, a co-owner may claim his right of redemption as a co-owner under Article 1620 of the Civil Code, not as a co?heir under Article 1088 of the same Code.
But in the instant case, We also find that plaintiff-appellant has no right to redeem the property as co-owner under Article 1620 of the Civil Code. Co-ownership exists when the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. It is an inherent and peculiar feature of co-ownership that although the co-owners may have unequal shares in the common property, quantitatively speaking, each co-owner has the same right in a qualitative sense as any one of the other co-owners. In other words, every co-owner is the owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract, because until division is effected such portion is not concretely determined.
In the case before Us, it is admitted by plaintiff-appellant herself that immediately after the death of their father, Felipe Felices, she and her brothers and sisters divided or partitioned the homestead among themselves extrajudicially, each heir taking physical and exclusive possession and control of his or her aliquot share. The portion given to Maria Felices, which plaintiff-appellant now seeks to redeem, is about one-fifth of the homestead on the northernmost part, marked out by metes and bounds, as described in paragraph 3 of the complaint. And when Maria Felices sold her share to Roman Iriola in 1949, she delivered to him the possession of the particular portion of the homestead constituting her distinct share, and since then Roman Iriola, and later his heirs upon his death, have continuously cultivated the land and introduced improvements thereon until the possession thereof was in turn delivered to defendant-appellee Francisco Colegado in 1962 pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals. There is, therefore, no doubt that at the time Maria Felices sold her share to defendant-appellee Colegado, and even prior thereto when she ceded the same property to Roman Iriola, the community of interest over the entire homestead of their father between her (Maria) and her brothers and sisters had already ceased, and so the claim of plaintiff-appellant to redeem the property under Article 1620 can not be sustained because when that property was sold by Maria Felices to defendant-appellee she (plaintiff-appellant) was no longer a co-owner of that particular property. The following ruling of this Court; speaking through Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, is pertinent to the resolution of the issue in the present case:
"The foregoing theory is untenable. Tested against the concept of co-ownership, as authoritatively expressed by the commentators, appellant is not a co-owner of the registered parcel of land, taken as a unit or subject of co-ownership, since he and the spouses do not 'have a spiritual part of a thing which is not physically divided' (3 Sanchez Roman 162), nor is each of them an 'owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract.... (3The foregoing sufficiently disposes of the issue raised in this appeal. However, even granting the claim of plaintiff-appellant that co-ownership of the homestead still existed as of the time defendant-appellee repurchased the share of Maria Felices from Roman Iriola still she can not exercise the right of legal redemption of the controverted property. The record shows that on
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against plaintiff-appellant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.Concepcion, C. J., on official leave.
Villamor, J., did not take part.
Original Certificate of Title No. 73 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 415 was later issued in the name of the "Heirs of Felipe Felices."
Roman Iriola died before the termination of Civil Case No. 1991.
"Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price or the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
Pages 62-63, Record on Appeal.
Castro, et al. v. Castro, 97 Phil., 705.
Castro, et al. v. Castro, supra; Caram et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al., 101 Phil. 315.
Saturnino v. Paulino et al., 97 Phil., 51.
Article 484, Civil Code.
See also Estoque vs. Pajimula, L-24419,
Estrada vs. Reyes, 33 Phil., 31; Magno vs. Viola and Sotto, 61 Phil. 80.