Facts:

This case involves an appeal by the United States against Saturnino Capillo and Petrona Paduga, following the dismissal of the case by the Court of First Instance of Manila. The defendants were accused of exposing a one-month-old legitimate child, the son of Saturnino Capillo and his deceased wife Vicenta Umanbang, to the risk of losing his civil status. On or about August 12, 1913, Capillo and Paduga allegedly conspired to take the child without the mother's consent and agreed to deliver him to Chua Pue Tee, with the intent of abandoning him. In exchange, they requested a loan of P150 to cover expenses after the mother's death, receiving a portion of that amount from Tee. The complaint indicated that under these circumstances, the child would lose his legitimate civil status as Capillo's son and could potentially be identified as an unknown child of Tee. The defendants initially pleaded not guilty. However, on September 1, 1913, they filed a motion akin to a demurre

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Facts:

Parties and Procedural Posture

• The case involves the United States as Plaintiff and Appellant and Saturnino Capillo and Petrona Paduga as Defendants and Appellees.
• An appeal was brought from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, which had dismissed the case upon a motion that functioned as a demurrer to the information.

Allegations Contained in the Information

• The information charged that on or about August 12, 1913, in Manila, the defendants conspired to unlawfully expose a one-month-old child—the legitimate son of Saturnino Capillo and his wife Vicenta Umanbang—to lose his civil status.
• It was alleged that:
• Saturnino Capillo, with the intent of causing his legitimate child to lose its civil status and in cooperation with Petrona Paduga, removed the child without the permission of the mother or any court authority.
• An agreement was made with a certain Chua Pue Tee, whereby the child was delivered to him and would not be reclaimed, with a sum of money (P150 requested and P106 received—divided as P50 for Capillo and P56 for Paduga) exchanged in relation to expenses incurred during the last sickness and death of Vicenta Umanbang.
• The heart of the charge was that this transaction endangered the child’s status as a legitimate offspring, reducing him potentially to that of an unknown or another’s child, thereby fulfilling the predicate of the crime.
• The information noted an aggravating circumstance—the involvement of a price, which purportedly added gravity to the offense.

Defendant’s Response and Pretrial Motions

• The defendants pleaded not guilty on August 21, 1913.
• Subsequently, on September 1, 1913, their counsel filed a motion in the nature of a demurrer and argument.
• The argument contended that:
• The facts alleged did not amount to a cause of action, as the information failed to show elements constituting the crime under Article 468, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.
• The offense, as defined by the statute, was meant for situations where a child entrusted for nursing or other lawful purposes was concealed or exposed, notably in contexts like those in Spain rather than the Philippine setting where the child's own mother typically nurses him.
• The trial court, recognizing the motion’s significance, treated it as a definitive challenge to the sufficiency of the complaint, leading to the withdrawal of the plea of not guilty and ultimately dismissing the case with imposed costs.

Issue:

Whether the facts as alleged in the information are sufficient to constitute the crime as defined under Article 468, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.

• Does the removal of a legitimate child for monetary transaction and without the mother’s consent satisfy the statutory elements of the offense?
• Is the act described equivalent to “exposing” a child in the unique manner that would result in the loss of the child’s civil status?

The Interpretation of the Term “expusiere” Under the Statutory Provision

• What is the proper meaning of the term “expusiere” in this context?
• Can it be interpreted as merely exposing or, as argued by the defendants, should it be understood as “abandonment”—the act of leaving an infant without intention to provide care, so as to cause loss of civil status?

The Proper Application of the Statute to the Facts

• Whether the conduct of the father—turning over the newborn to another person and receiving money—falls within the ambit of the statute designed to penalize abandonment intended to make a child lose its civil status.
• Whether the legislative intent was to cover what might essentially be a commercial transaction rather than a heartless abandonment aimed at nullifying a child’s legal identity.

Ruling:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

• (Subscriber-Only)