Facts:

The case involves Antonino Tanseco as the petitioner and appellee, and Pedro R. Arteche as the respondent and appellant. The action, filed on July 10, 1931, aimed to declare Arteche ineligible as provincial governor of Samar following his proclamation as governor-elect on June 26, 1931, after the general election held on June 2, 1931. Tanseco, a registered voter in Catbalogan, initiated the quo warranto proceeding alleging Arteche's lack of pre-election residential qualifications. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands initially received the petition but referred it to the Court of First Instance of Samar due to workloads. On July 29, 1931, the court received the case and subsequently scheduled it for hearing after Arteche's demurrer was overruled. On August 22, 1931, Judge M. L. de la Rosa ruled that Arteche's election was illegal as he lacked the necessary residential qualifications, awarding costs to Tanseco. Arteche then appealed this judgment, raising sever

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Facts:

Initiation of the Action

• The case arises from an action of quo warranto filed on July 10, 1931, by petitioner Antonino Tanseco—a registered voter of electoral precinct No. 4, Catbalogan, Samar.
• Tanseco sought to have respondent Pedro R. Arteche declared ineligible for the office of provincial governor of Samar.
• Section 408 of the Election Law permits such an action to be initiated within two weeks after the proclamation of the election, and the petition was duly filed in the Supreme Court in Manila within the prescribed period.

Proclamation and Transfer

• Pedro R. Arteche was proclaimed governor-elect of Samar by the provincial board of canvassers on June 26, 1931, following his election on June 2, 1931.
• Due to a congested docket, the Supreme Court decided on July 14, 1931, to refer the proceeding to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Samar.
• The petition and the order were transmitted by registered mail, with the CFI clerk receiving the papers on July 29, 1931.
• Although service of process by the Supreme Court did not reach the respondent, proper service was later effected after the case was transferred.

Trial Court Proceedings and Judgment

• At the CFI of Samar, after the respondent’s demurrer was overruled, Judge M. L. de la Rosa heard the merits of the case.
• On August 22, 1931, the trial court rendered a decision declaring Arteche’s election illegal due to his failure to meet the pre-election residential qualification, and consequently barred him from taking office.
• Costs were ordered in favor of the petitioner, and the respondent appealed the decision.

Technical and Procedural Questions Raised

• The respondent questioned:
• The sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations regarding his proclamation as governor‑elect.
• The timeliness of the petition, asserting that the proceedings in the CFI were initiated outside the prescribed two‑week period.
• Whether the CFI lost jurisdiction by failing to decide the case within thirty days after receiving the complaint.
• The Supreme Court clarified that:
• The general allegation that Arteche “has been declared governor‑elect” was sufficient because it implied a declaration by the competent provincial board of canvassers.
• The transfer from the Supreme Court to the CFI maintained the continuity of the action, thus preserving its timeliness.
• The statutory thirty‑day requirement was directory and not jurisdictional; hence, non‑compliance did not affect the court’s authority.

The Central Controversy: Residential Qualification

• Pursuant to Section 2071 of the Administrative Code, in order to be eligible for a provincial office, a candidate must be a qualified elector and a bona fide resident of the province for at least one year immediately preceding the election.
• The petitioner argued that although Arteche had early associations with Samar and voted there in previous elections, Arteche had been a resident of Manila from March 1927 due to his pursuit of higher education and his professional establishment.
• Arteche’s biographical background includes:
• Birth in Zumarraga, Samar, early education in Catbalogan, followed by high school studies in Calbayog and Tacloban.
• Employment in Manila, then teaching and subsequent enrollment at the University of Santo Tomas.
• Admission to the bar in March 1927, after which he began his professional practice in Manila and was registered as a voter there.
• Despite subsequent actions to cancel his Manila voter registration and the filing of a candidacy certificate declaring his residence in Catbalogan, the factual record reflected that from 1927 onward, Arteche’s primary residence and professional activities were centered in Manila.
• The trial court inferred that Arteche’s continued personal presence in Manila until his reappearance in Samar in 1931 did not satisfy the “bona fide residency” requirement necessary for eligibility.

Issue:

Jurisdictional and Procedural Questions

• Whether the initial general allegation of being “declared governor‑elect” was sufficient to establish the court’s jurisdiction.
• Whether the referral of the petition from the Supreme Court to the CFI preserved the continuity required for proper timeliness, given that the CFI received the papers after the two‑week period.
• Whether the failure of the CFI to issue a decision within thirty days after filing the complaint invalidated its jurisdiction.

Substance of the Election Contest

• Whether Pedro R. Arteche met the pre‑election residential qualification as required by Section 2071 of the Administrative Code.
• Whether Arteche’s long‑term residence in Manila, despite his earlier ties to Samar, equated to the “bona fide residency” in Samar necessary to hold a provincial office.
• How the intent to reside, evidenced by personal presence and domicile, factors into determining qualification for elective office.

Applicability of Precedents

• The appropriate use of precedents such as Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, Nuval vs. Guray, Yra vs. Abano, and Vivero vs. Murillo in deciding the issue of domicile and residency.
• Whether the respondent’s situation should be analogized to cases where temporary residency in another locality did not serve as a disqualification.

Ruling:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

• (Subscriber-Only)