Case Digest (G.R. No. L-2926)
Facts:
- Paz S. Jarin, Felicisima A. Palma, and Trinidad Palma paid P25,000 to Daniel Sarinas in exchange for a mortgage on lot No. 967 of the Imus Estate Subdivision in Cavite.
- The mortgage agreement stated that if the mortgagor paid the mortgagees the sum of P25,000 and the interest within two years, the mortgage would be discharged.
- On January 20, 1945, the mortgagor received an additional P25,000, and on February 19, 1945, the mortgagor received P50,000 in Japanese military or war notes.
- When the debtors refused to pay the stipulated equivalent of P2,000 in genuine money, the creditors filed a lawsuit on August 7, 1948, to collect the debt.
Issue:
- (Unlock)
Ruling:
- The Court of First Instance of Cavite lacked jurisdiction over the debt collection case.
- The dismissal of the complaint by the Court of F...(Unlock)
Ratio:
- The Court based its decision on the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
- Section 44 of the Act grants Courts of First Instance original jurisdiction over cases where the demand or the value of the property in controversy amounts to more than two thousand pesos.
- Section 88 of the Act provides that the justice of the peace and the judge of a municipal court have exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions arising in their municipality or city, as long as the value of the subject matter or amount of the demand does not exceed two thousand pesos, exclusive of interest and costs.
- In this case, since the action was to collect ...continue reading
Case Digest (G.R. No. L-2926)
Facts:
The case of Jarin v. Sarinas involved Paz Jarin, Felicisima Palma, and Trinidad Palma as plaintiffs-appellants, and Daniel Sarinas and others as defendants-appellees. On December 20, 1944, the plaintiffs-mortgagors entered into a mortgage agreement with the defendants-mortgagees. According to the agreement, the plaintiffs agreed to pay a certain sum of money and interest within a specified period. However, the defendants refused to pay the stipulated amount, claiming that the payment of the debt was suspended by Executive Order No. 25, as amended by Executive Order No. 32. As a result, the plaintiffs filed an action to collect the debt. However, the defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint. The Court of First Instance initially denied the motion to dismiss but later reconsidered and dismissed the complaint, stating that the facts alleged did not constitute a cause of action. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal...