Facts:

The case of Jose C. Go vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas concerns an appeal filed by the petitioner, Jose C. Go (referred to as "Go"), against the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 26, 2006, and its subsequent resolution dated June 4, 2007. The case began when an Information was filed against Go on August 20, 1999, for allegedly violating Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337, otherwise known as the General Banking Act. This Information charged Go with unlawfully borrowing funds and serving as a guarantor for loans from Orient Commercial Banking Corporation (referred to as "Orient Bank"), where he was the Director and President and CEO, during the period between June 27, 1996, and September 15, 1997. Go was accused of exploiting his position to obtain credit lines amounting to Two Billion Seven Hundred Fifty-Four Million Nine Hundred Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty-Seven Pesos without the required written approval from the majority of the Board of D

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Facts:

Filing of the Information and Alleged Violation

• On August 20, 1999, an Information was filed against petitioner Jose C. Go for allegedly violating Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1795.
• The Information charged that between June 27, 1996 and September 15, 1997, Go, then serving as Director, President, and Chief Executive Officer of the Orient Commercial Banking Corporation (Orient Bank), unlawfully utilized the bank’s deposits or funds and/or acted as a guarantor, indorser, or obligor without the requisite written approval of the majority of the bank’s Board of Directors.

Nature of the Allegations and Statutory Basis

• The Information alleged that by borrowing directly or indirectly—and by using the bank’s funds for facilitating and granting credit lines/loans (specifically including the New Zealand Accounts loans amounting to over TWO BILLION PESOS)—Go contravened the written approval requirement mandated by Section 83 of RA 337.
• The charge was couched in terms that included the phrase “and/or”, which the petitioner argued rendered the allegations vague by implying that he could be penalized for acting as a borrower, a guarantor, or both.

Pre-Trial and Trial Court Proceedings

• Go pleaded not guilty on May 28, 2001, and participated in the pre-trial conference during which the voluminous evidence was marked.
• Before trial commenced, on February 26, 2003, Go filed a motion to quash the Information—amending said motion on March 1, 2003—arguing that the Information did not allege a discrete or singular offense as required under the law, particularly because it failed to specify that his acts fell outside the lawful exceptions provided (i.e., within the credit accommodation limits).

Trial Court (RTC) Rulings

• The RTC granted Go’s motion to quash the Information on May 20, 2003, holding that the Information’s allegations were ambiguous and did not satisfy the requirement of particularity necessary to inform the accused of the offense.
• The RTC subsequently denied the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration of its ruling on June 30, 2003, thereby dismissing the charge at that level.

Appellate and Certiorari Proceedings

• The prosecution, disagreeing with the RTC’s orders, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), asserting that the Information was sufficient and that the use of “and/or” merely illustrated the various modes of committing the offense.
• On October 26, 2006, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision by annulling and setting aside the Orders of May 20 and June 30, thereby reinstating the criminal charge against Go.
• Petitioner Go subsequently elevated the case by filing a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, reiterating his contention that the Information was fatally defective in specifying the precise nature of the alleged offense.

Issue:

Sufficiency of the Information

• Whether the Information’s use of the phrase “and/or” renders the charge too vague or defective as to fail in informing the accused of the specific nature of the offense.
• Whether the Information adequately alleged the elements of the offense as required by Section 83 of RA 337, particularly in light of the statutory requirement of written approval for borrowing or guaranteeing loans.

Interpretation of Section 83 of RA 337

• Whether Section 83 penalizes a banking officer or director solely for acting in one capacity (as a borrower or as a guarantor) versus for acting in both capacities simultaneously.
• Whether the second paragraph of Section 83, which sets a ceiling on credit accommodations, constitutes an exception to the prohibition stated in the first paragraph or simply establishes a regulatory limit imposed on the bank.

Proper Exercise of the Court’s Discretion on Defects in the Information

• Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the Information without affording the prosecution the opportunity to cure defects through amendment, as prescribed under Section 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
• Whether the alleged defects in the Information (if any) warrant dismissal or require that the case be decided on the merits after proper amendment.

Ruling:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

• (Subscriber-Only)