Case Digest (G.R. No. 11728)
Facts:
The case involves Marcelina Cabunag as the petitioner and Vicente Jocson, the Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, as the respondent. The events leading to this case began when Cabunag was charged with a misdemeanor in the justice's court of Rosa, Batangas. Following her conviction, she appealed to the Court of First Instance, which received the case on August 11, 1915. However, there was a significant delay in the proceedings; the prosecuting attorney did not file an information until October 19, 1915, and the trial did not occur until March 8, 1916. Cabunag contended that the delay of two months and eight days, during which no action was taken on her case, allowed for the prescription of the misdemeanor under Article 131 of the Penal Code, which states that misdemeanors prescribe in two months. She argued that the prescription should have been interrupted from the commencement of the proceedings and should have resumed only after the proceedings were termin...
Case Digest (G.R. No. 11728)
Facts:
Conviction and Appeal:
Marcelina Cabunag was convicted of a misdemeanor in the justice's court of Rosario, Batangas. She immediately appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance of Batangas. The case was remitted to the Court of First Instance on August 11, 1915, and notice of the remission was given to the prosecuting attorney on the same day.Delay in Proceedings:
No action was taken on the case until October 19, 1915, when the prosecuting attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance. The trial did not take place until March 8, 1916, when Cabunag was convicted and sentenced.Claim of Prescription:
Cabunag argued that the delay in the proceedings—from August 11, 1915, to October 19, 1915 (two months and eight days), and the trial not occurring until March 1916—resulted in the prescription of the crime under Article 131 of the Penal Code. This article states that misdemeanors prescribe in two months and that prescription is interrupted by the commencement of proceedings but resumes if the proceedings are suspended without the fault of the defendant.Judicial Organization:
The trial court explained that under the American regime, the judicial system had changed. Courts of First Instance no longer operated continuously but held sessions during specific periods. The Province of Batangas, part of the 13th Judicial District, held regular sessions starting on the first Tuesday of February and August each year. The court was in session in Calapan, Mindoro, in October 1915, and upon returning to Batangas, it prioritized urgent cases. The court included ordinary cases, like Cabunag's, in the calendar for the next regular session in February 1916.No Negligence or Abandonment:
The court found no negligence or abandonment by the prosecuting officials. The delay was due to the new judicial system and the prioritization of urgent cases. The court also noted that Cabunag was at liberty under bail, which influenced the decision not to expedite her case.
Issue:
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Ruling:
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Ratio:
Prescription Under the New Judicial System:
The court held that the conditions under which criminal liability is extinguished by prescription have changed due to the reorganization of the judiciary under the American regime. The delay in Cabunag's case was not due to negligence but to the new system of scheduled court sessions and the prioritization of urgent cases.No Negligence or Abandonment:
The court emphasized that for the defense of prescription to succeed, there must be negligence or abandonment by the prosecuting officials. In this case, there was no such negligence, as the delay was a result of the new judicial system and the court's discretion in prioritizing cases.Certiorari as a Remedy:
The court did not decide whether certiorari was the proper remedy for addressing the alleged prescription of the crime. However, it addressed the merits of the case to provide clarity to the parties involved.Applicability of Article 131:
The court did not hold that Article 131 of the Penal Code had been repealed but found that the conditions for its application had changed. The delay in Cabunag's case did not meet the criteria for prescription under the new judicial system.
The petition was denied, and costs were imposed on the petitioner.