Facts:

The case involves Purita Bersabal as the petitioner against Honorable Judge Serafin Salvador, who serves as the judge of the Court of First Instance of Caloocan City, Branch XIV, along with private respondents Tan That and Ong Pin Tee. The events leading to this case began with an ejectment suit filed by the private respondents against the petitioner, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 6926 in the City Court of Caloocan City. The City Court rendered a decision on November 25, 1970, which the petitioner subsequently appealed to the Court of First Instance, resulting in Civil Case No. C-2036. During the appeal, on March 23, 1971, the respondent court ordered the Clerk of Court of Caloocan City to transmit the transcripts of stenographic notes from the City Court within fifteen days and allowed both parties thirty days to submit their respective memoranda. The petitioner received this order on April 17, 1971. However, the transcripts were not forwarded in time, prompting the p...

Facts:

Background of the Case

• Private respondents Tan That and Ong Pin Tee filed an ejectment suit (Civil Case No. 6926) in the City Court of Caloocan City against petitioner Purita Bersabal.
• A decision was rendered by the City Court on November 25, 1970, which subsequently led to an appeal by the petitioner to the Court of First Instance (Civil Case No. C-2036).

Orders on Submission of the Transcript and Memoranda

• On March 23, 1971, the petitioner sought to annul orders of the respondent judge issued on August 4, 1971, October 30, 1971, and March 15, 1972.
• In the March 23, 1971 order, the respondent judge directed the Clerk of Court of Caloocan City to transmit within 15 days the transcripts of the stenographic notes taken during the hearings in the City Court.
• The order also instructed that the counsels for both parties were given 30 days from receipt of the said order to file their respective memoranda, after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision.

Developments Regarding Submission of the Memorandum

• The petitioner received the March 23 order on April 17, 1971.
• On May 5, 1971, petitioner filed an ex-parte motion requesting to submit her memorandum within 30 days from the receipt of the notice regarding the transcript, as the said transcript had not yet been forwarded to the respondent court.
• The motion was granted by the respondent court on May 7, 1971.

Dismissal of the Appeal and Subsequent Motions

• Before the petitioner received notice about the submission of the transcript—and hence before her memorandum submission period could properly commence—the respondent judge issued an order on August 4, 1971, dismissing her appeal for failure to prosecute (i.e., for not filing the memorandum).
• The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration on September 28, 1971, arguing that her ex-parte motion had been granted and that she was entitled to file her memorandum once the transcript was received.
• Private respondents opposed the motion on September 30, 1971.
• Subsequently, on October 2, 1971, the petitioner filed her memorandum (dated October 18, 1971).
• The motion for reconsideration was denied on October 30, 1971.
• On January 25, 1972, the petitioner filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was denied on March 15, 1972.

Certification and Referral by the Court of Appeals

• Since the issues raised were solely questions of law, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court on October 13, 1972 pursuant to Section 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (as amended).

Issue:

Interpretation of the Applicable Law

• Whether the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 45 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended by R.A. No. 6031—which states that courts shall decide appealed cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts, with the option for parties to submit memoranda and/or briefs with oral argument—is to be read as making the submission of such memoranda optional rather than mandatory.

Grounds for Dismissal of the Appeal

• Whether the mere failure of the appellant to submit the memorandum within the prescribed period constitutes sufficient ground to dismiss the appeal on the basis of failure to prosecute.
• Whether the Court of First Instance was legally empowered to dismiss the appeal for the petitioner’s alleged failure to file a memorandum, even though the submission of the memorandum was an optional requirement under the statute.

Procedural Fairness and Litigant’s Right to Appeal

• Whether dismissing the appeal, even before proper notice was given regarding the submission of the transcript (and thus the start of the 30-day period), violates the litigant’s right to due process in the appellate procedure.
• How the timing of orders and motions impacted the petitioner’s ability to prosecute her appeal properly.

Ruling:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

• (Subscriber-Only)