Facts:

The case involves Linda Mohamed Barrueco, represented by her grandmother and guardian ad litem, Ciriaca Sulayao, as the petitioner, against Qunoco Abeto, the Judge of First Instance of Manila, Branch VI, and Juliana Veloso, represented by her mother and guardian ad litem, Maria Blanco, as the respondents. The events leading to this case began with the intestate estate proceedings of the deceased Julio Veloso Barrueco, which were filed under civil case No. 55129. Linda Barrueco claimed to be the acknowledged natural daughter and exclusive heir of Julio Veloso Barrueco, asserting her right to the entire estate. In contrast, Juliana Veloso filed a petition on January 11, 1940, later amended on April 3, 1940, seeking compulsory acknowledgment as a natural child of the deceased. The case was set for hearings multiple times, with significant delays due to various adjournments. The petitioner opposed Juliana's petition, and the respondent judge, Quirico Abeto, set hearings for A...

Facts:

Background of the Case

• The case involves an original action for prohibition filed by Linda Mohamed Barrueco, represented by her guardian ad litem, Ciriaca Sulayao.
• The petition seeks to prohibit Judge Quirico Abeto from proceeding further in civil case No. 55129 concerning the intestate estate of the deceased Julio Veloso Barrueco, specifically regarding the petition filed by Juliana Veloso for her compulsory acknowledgment as a natural child of the deceased.
• Linda Mohamed Barrueco claims to be the acknowledged natural daughter and the exclusive heir of the deceased, and thus entitled to the entire estate.

Procedural History and Events Leading to the Dispute

• The civil case in question was already pending before Judge Quirico Abeto of Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
• Juliana Veloso, represented by her guardian ad litem Maria Blanco, filed a petition on January 11, 1940 (later amended on April 3, 1940) praying for her compulsory acknowledgment as a natural child of Julio Veloso Barrueco.
• Linda Mohamed Barrueco, along with the Consul-General of Spain in the Philippines acting as administrator of the estate, answered and opposed this petition.
• The hearing schedule began on April 24, 1940, for the petition, with multiple postponements ordered:
• Initially set for April 24, 1940, when evidence was received.
• Postponements followed on May 4, June 3, June 11, and June 21, 1940.
• On July 18, 1940, the hearing was again postponed after a motion filed by the attorney for Juliana Veloso, leading to further scheduling issues.
• Controversy arose when:
• On July 16, 1940, a motion for postponement was filed by the respondent’s attorney, citing a conflict with another court proceeding.
• Linda Mohamed Barrueco objected, asserting that the postponement exceeded the period allowed by court rules.
• The judge subsequently set new hearing dates (August 1 and August 19, 1940) without proper notification to the petitioner’s counsel.
• On August 19, 1940, instead of proceeding to trial, the petitioner’s counsel filed a motion for dismissal on the ground that the respondent judge had lost jurisdiction due to adjournments exceeding one month (or cumulatively, three months) as regulated by Rule 31, section 4 of the Rules of Court.
• Eventually, on September 10, 1940, the respondent judge denied the motion for dismissal but granted the petitioner a five-day period to institute an action against him, leading to the trial being set for September 17, 1940.
• On September 16, 1940, the petition for prohibition was duly instituted.

Contentions Raised

• The petitioner contended that:
• The series of adjournments, particularly from July 18 to August 19, 1940, and cumulatively from April 24 to August 19, 1940, exceeded the permissible periods as mandated by Rule 31, section 4 of the Rules of Court.
• The judge lacked explicit, written authorization from the Chief Justice to effect such postponements and therefore had forfeited his jurisdiction over Juliana Veloso’s petition.
• The respondents argued that:
• There was no single postponement exceeding one month because the rescheduling for August 1, 1940, was noted, and the postponements prior to July 1, 1940, could not be counted against the limits imposed by the new rules.
• Under Rule 133, which applies to further proceedings in cases pending when the Rules of Court took effect, the postponements after July 1, 1940 (i.e., July 18, August 19, and September 17 hearings) complied with the limit of three months in total.

Issue:

Jurisdictional Issue

• Whether the respondent judge, by postponing the trial beyond the period allowed under Rule 31, section 4 of the Rules of Court, forfeited his jurisdiction over the petition for compulsory acknowledgment.
• Whether the adjournments (particularly from July 18 to August 19, 1940) constituted a violation significant enough to invalidate further judicial proceedings.

Application of Procedural Rules

• Whether the periods before and after July 1, 1940, should be treated differently, considering the effectivity of the Rules of Court and the rule on postponements.
• Whether the alleged violation of the maximum period for adjournments is a mandatory or merely directory provision of the Rules of Court.

Notification and Notice Concerns

• Whether the petitioner’s counsel’s lack of notification regarding the rescheduled hearing for August 1, 1940, affected the validity of the judge’s subsequent actions.

Ruling:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

• (Subscriber-Only)