Title
Arteche vs. De la Rosa
Case
G.R. No. 40055
Decision Date
Oct 18, 1933
Elected governor Arteche assumed office despite nullified election, faced criminal charges; Supreme Court upheld judge's discretion, denied disqualification and writs.
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Case Digest (G.R. No. 40055)

Facts:

Background of the Case

  • Pedro R. Arteche was a candidate for provincial governor of Samar in the last general elections and was elected. However, his election was declared null and void by Judge Mariano L. de la Rosa in Civil Case No. 2709 on August 22, 1931. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court on September 13, 1932 (G.R. No. 36300).

Assumption of Office

  • Despite the nullification of his election, Arteche assumed the office of provincial governor of Samar on October 16, 1931, after consulting the Chief of the Executive Bureau and the Secretary of Justice. He acted on their opinion that he could assume office pending the appeal of the decision.

Criminal Charges

  • On September 20, 1932, Jose Quisumbing, the provincial fiscal of Samar, charged Arteche with a violation of the Election Law for assuming the office of provincial governor while knowing he was disqualified (Criminal Case No. 8635). The respondent judge issued an order for Arteche's arrest.

Procedural Developments

  • Arteche waived his right to a preliminary investigation and requested a hearing set for December 15, 1932. He also filed a petition for the inhibition and disqualification of Judge de la Rosa, claiming the judge was a principal witness for the defense. The motion was denied.
  • On July 3, 1933, the provincial fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the case, citing insufficient evidence to prove Arteche’s guilt. The respondent judge denied the motion, stating the reasons were insufficient to justify dismissal.

Petition to the Supreme Court

  • Arteche filed a petition with the Supreme Court seeking:
    1. A writ of injunction to stop Judge de la Rosa from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 8635.
    2. A declaration that the judge exceeded his jurisdiction and abused his discretion.
    3. A writ of prohibition to disqualify Judge de la Rosa and assign another judge to the case.

Issue:

  1. Whether Judge Mariano L. de la Rosa exceeded his jurisdiction or abused his discretion in denying the motion to dismiss Criminal Case No. 8635.
  2. Whether the respondent judge should be disqualified from hearing the case due to alleged bias or his role as a potential witness.
  3. Whether the petitioner is entitled to the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and injunction.

Ruling:

  • The Supreme Court denied the petition. It held that:
    1. The denial of the fiscal's motion to dismiss was a judicial act within the discretion of the respondent judge, and mandamus cannot be used to control or review such discretion.
    2. There was no valid reason to disqualify Judge de la Rosa, as he was not disqualified under the Code of Civil Procedure, and there was no legal basis for calling him as a witness.
    3. The petitioner’s concerns about a fair trial were premature, and any errors in the trial could be addressed through the right of appeal.

Ratio:

  1. Judicial Discretion: A judge’s decision to deny a motion to dismiss is a judicial act within their discretion, and mandamus cannot be used to compel a judge to decide a case in a particular way.
  2. Disqualification of Judges: A judge is not disqualified from hearing a case merely because they are alleged to be a witness unless there is a legal basis under the Code of Civil Procedure.
  3. Remedies for Unfair Trial: If a defendant believes they were deprived of a fair trial, the proper remedy is an appeal after the trial, not a preemptive writ.
  4. Premature Claims: Allegations of bias or unfair treatment before the trial are premature and cannot be the basis for extraordinary writs.


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