Facts:

The case of Arsenio Bartolome v. Isaac Ampil, G.R. No. L-8436, was decided on August 28, 1956. The plaintiff-appellant, Arsenio Bartolome, initiated legal action against the defendant-appellee, Isaac Ampil, to recover the sum of Three Thousand Pesos (₱3,000.00) based on a promissory note dated December 17, 1941. The note was acknowledged by Ampil, who received the amount from Bartolome. The complaint was filed on July 12, 1954. In response, Ampil filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court agreed, stating that the statute of limitations for an ordinary promissory note payable on demand begins from the date of demand, and since more than 12 years had elapsed from the date of the promissory note to the filing of the complaint, the case was dismissed without costs. Bartolome appealed the dismissal, raising the issue of w...

Facts:

Parties and Nature of the Case

• Plaintiff-Appellant: Arsenio Bartolome.
• Defendant-Appellee: Isaac Amphil.
• Subject Matter: Recovery of the amount stipulated in a promissory note.

Details of the Promissory Note

• Date of Issue: December 17, 1941.
• Place of Issue: Manila, Philippines.
• Amount: Three Thousand Pesos (₱3,000.00).
• Specific Wording: The note explicitly mentioned the sum received by the defendant as a form of acknowledgment, with the inscription “RECEIVED from Mr. Arsenio Bartolome.”

Initiation of the Case and Trial Court Proceedings

• Date of Filing: July 12, 1954, when the complaint was initiated to recover the stated amount.
• Motion to Dismiss: Filed by the defendant on the ground of prescription (statute of limitations).
• Trial Court’s Ruling:
• Held that, in the absence of an express contrary intention, the statute of limitations for an ordinary promissory note payable on demand begins from the date the demand is made.
• Noted that the Moratorium Law had been declared unconstitutional in Ruffer vs. Esteban (49 Official Gazzette, 1807), implying that its effect on suspending prescription was questionable.
• Found that from December 17, 1941 up to July 12, 1954, more than 12 years had elapsed.

The Issue of the Moratorium Law

• Main Question in the Appeal: Whether the Moratorium Law, notwithstanding its declared unconstitutionality, suspended the running of the prescriptive period for the promissory note.
• Relevant Precedents:
• Montilla vs. Pacific Commercial, G.R. No. L-8223 (Dec. 20, 1955).
• Manila Motor Company vs. Manuel T. Flores, G.R. No. L-9396 (Aug. 16, 1956).
• Computation of the Suspended Period:
• The suspension was computed not from November 18, 1944 (due to the limitation of Executive Order No. 25 which applied only to obligations contracted after December 31, 1941) but from March 10, 1945—the effectivity date of Executive Order No. 32, which covered all obligations irrespective of the contract date.
• Period before Suspension: From December 17, 1941 to March 10, 1945 was 3 years, 2 months, and 23 days.
• Period after Suspension: From July 26, 1948 (when the Moratorium Law was lifted, except for provisions benefiting war sufferers under Republic Act 342) until the filing of the complaint on July 12, 1954 amounted to 5 years, 11 months, and 16 days.
• Total Computed Period: Adding both periods resulted in 9 years, 2 months, and 9 days, which is less than the prescribed 10-year period.

Outcome at the Trial Level

• The trial court dismissed the complaint on the basis that the prescriptive period had lapsed, without awarding costs.
• Plaintiff-Appellant subsequently appealed the dismissal of the case.

Issue:

• Whether the Moratorium Law, despite its prior declaration of unconstitutionality in Ruffer vs. Esteban, nevertheless suspended the running of the prescriptive period for the promissory note.
• Whether the period during which the prescriptive period was suspended, when properly computed, falls short of the statutory 10-year limitation period.
• The proper date from which the suspension of the prescription should be considered, focusing on the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32 versus earlier dates covered by Executive Order No. 25.

Ruling:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

• (Subscriber-Only)