Facts:

On October 24, 1960, Salvador Aprueba and Asuncion Modoc, the petitioners and appellants, filed a petition for mandamus against respondent Rodolfo Ganzon, the City Mayor of Iloilo City, in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The petitioners had operated a cafeteria at Stall 17-C in the city market since 1950. However, on October 1, 1960, the City Mayor ordered the closure of their cafeteria, alleging violations of a city ordinance. The petitioners protested, claiming that Aprueba met with the respondent on October 3, 1960, where he was informed that the cafeteria could only be reopened upon payment of all back accounts. Despite settling their financial obligations, the respondent denied the reopening of the store, citing the need for compliance with health regulations. Aprueba was also informed that the stall would be repurposed as an extension of the city health office. The petitioners stated they had no delinquency in rental payments and had adhered to health regulations, a

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Facts:

Background of the Case

• Petitioners Salvador Aprueba and Asuncion Modoc, owners and operators of a cafeteria in Stall 17-C of the Iloilo City market since 1950, filed a petition for mandamus on October 24, 1960.
• The petition sought to compel the respondent, Hon. Rodolfo Ganzon, the City Mayor of Iloilo City, to reopen their cafeteria which had been closed on October 1, 1960.

Alleged Facts Presented by Petitioners

• Petitioners claimed their cafeteria was closed after the mayor’s order, despite their protestations against the closure.
• It was alleged that on October 3, 1960, petitioner Aprueba was told by the mayor that the store could be reopened only upon paid-back accounts.
• Even after paying the alleged back accounts, the mayor allegedly refused to allow reopening, further criticizing petitioner Aprueba for his political stance against the mayor’s candidacy.
• Petitioners contend that they had complied with health rules and, despite having no rental delinquencies, were excluded from the use of the stall, violating a duty owed by the public officer.
• They maintained that the mayor's actions were motivated by personal, political vendetta intended to harass and persecute them.
• Petitioners sought not only the mandamus order to reopen the cafeteria but also damages for moral injury and reimbursement of attorneys’ fees amounting to P5,500.00, with additional P5.00 daily damages until the reopening.

Respondent’s Defense and Counterclaims

• The mayor, as respondent, filed an answer with a counterclaim denying the material allegations of the petition.
• The defense asserted:
• The remedy of mandamus is inappropriate since petitioners’ right to remain in the stall is based on an implied contract of lease, a contractual privilege—not an absolute right enforceable by mandamus.
• Mandamus is not available to compel the performance of contractual obligations, especially when no official duty or trust is implicated.
• Petitioners, particularly Modoc, lacked legal capacity to sue, as the operation by a person other than the lessee (Aprueba) violated Ordinance No. 93, s. 1947.
• Further, respondent justified the closure by invoking Section 10(m) of the City Charter, which grants the mayor discretion to grant or refuse municipal licenses for reasons of public interest and proper public administration.

Procedural History

• The trial court dismissed the petition for mandamus on November 19, 1962, ruling that mandamus was the improper remedy given that the petitioners’ right was merely a license—a privilege subject to the mayor’s discretion.
• Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.
• Consequently, petitioners sought appellate review, raising as the sole issue whether the trial court correctly dismissed their petition for mandamus.

Issue:

Central Issue

• Whether the Court of First Instance correctly dismissed the petition for mandamus filed by petitioners.

Sub-Issues

• Whether the petitioner’s right to occupy and operate the cafeteria in Stall 17-C was a clear, well-defined legal right enforceable by mandamus.
• Whether the alleged contractual obligation under the implied lease contravened the principle that mandamus cannot be used to compel performance of purely contractual duties.
• Whether the exercise of mayoral discretion under Section 10(m) of the City Charter, in the context of municipal licensing, falls within the proper scope of mandamus review.

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Ruling:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

• (Subscriber-Only)