Title
Antonio vs. Tanco, Jr.
Case
G.R. No. L-38135
Decision Date
Jul 25, 1975
A regional director was indefinitely suspended for issuing exclusive seaweed permits, violating policy. His mandamus petition was dismissed; exhaustion of administrative remedies was required.
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Case Digest (G.R. No. L-38135)

Facts:

Background of the Case

  • Hilario C. Antonio, the Regional Director of Regional Office No. IV of the Bureau of Fisheries, was charged with incompetence and conduct highly prejudicial to the best interest of the service on September 5, 1973, by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Arturo R. Tanco, Jr.
  • The charges were based on Antonio's issuance of twelve seaweed permits to eleven individuals closely related or associated with each other, covering the entire seaweed areas of Manila Bay. This was contrary to the official policy prohibiting exclusive rights over seaweed areas.
  • Antonio was also accused of testifying as a witness for the permitees in a court case against himself and the Acting Director of Fisheries, effectively testifying against himself.

Administrative Proceedings

  • Antonio was suspended immediately upon being served the formal charge on September 14, 1973.
  • He filed an unsworn answer, justifying his actions by citing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 45 and 45-1 and invoking a precedent set by Acting Director Felix Gonzales.
  • On October 24, 1973, Antonio sent a telegraphic request to President Ferdinand Marcos, seeking immediate reinstatement, arguing that his suspension was arbitrary and that he was implementing existing laws.
  • The request was referred to Secretary Tanco, who, on April 17, 1974, recommended denying Antonio's reinstatement, stating that the charges were serious and the evidence of guilt was strong.

Legal Actions Taken by Antonio

  • On November 16, 1973, Antonio informed the Director of Fisheries that he would return to duty, citing Section 35 of the Civil Service Law, which mandates reinstatement after 60 days of suspension if no final decision is made.
  • The Secretary rejected this, stating that Antonio's reinstatement could not be granted under Presidential Decree No. 6.
  • On January 29, 1974, Antonio filed a petition for mandamus, quo warranto, and prohibition in court, seeking reinstatement and challenging his suspension.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The Solicitor General argued that:
    1. Mandamus would not lie because Presidential Decree No. 6 and Letter of Instruction No. 14-A allowed indefinite suspension without reinstatement after 60 days.
    2. Quo warranto was not applicable because Antonio’s suspension did not terminate his position as Regional Director; his assignment to Region IV was merely revoked.
    3. Prohibition was premature because the investigation was still pending, and Antonio had not exhausted administrative remedies by awaiting the President’s decision on his reinstatement request.

Issue:

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Ruling:

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Ratio:

  1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: The Court reiterated the principle that parties must exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention. This ensures an orderly procedure and respects the competence of administrative agencies.
  2. Prematurity of Judicial Action: Since Antonio’s request for reinstatement was still pending before the President, the matter was not yet ripe for judicial adjudication. The Court emphasized that mandamus should not be used to bypass administrative processes.
  3. Effect of Presidential Decree No. 6: The Court recognized that Presidential Decree No. 6 had altered the rules on administrative discipline, allowing for summary proceedings and indefinite suspension in cases where the charges are serious and the evidence of guilt is strong. This decree effectively overruled the 60-day reinstatement rule under Section 35 of the Civil Service Law.
  4. Preventive Suspension as a Precautionary Measure: The Court affirmed that preventive suspension is not a penalty but a precautionary measure to ensure the integrity of the investigation process. It is inherent in disciplinary actions and does not violate due process.

Concurring Opinion (Justice Barredo)

  • Justice Barredo concurred but added that the petition should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action rather than prematurity. He emphasized that Presidential Decree No. 6 had repealed Section 35 of the Civil Service Law, and thus, Antonio had no legal basis for seeking reinstatement.
  • He noted that the decree was part of the broader effort to clean the public service of undesirable officials and employees, and any delay in this process would undermine the objectives of the martial law administration.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court dismissed Antonio’s petition, holding that his suspension was valid under Presidential Decree No. 6 and that his mandamus action was premature. The Court emphasized the importance of exhausting administrative remedies and respecting the executive branch’s authority in disciplinary matters.


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