Title
Amatan vs. Aujero
Case
A.M. No. RTJ-93-956
Decision Date
Sep 27, 1995
Judge reprimanded for accepting plea bargain for Attempted Homicide despite victim's death, violating legal principles and fairness.
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Case Digest (A.M. No. RTJ-93-956)

Facts:

    Criminal Complaint and Information

    • A criminal complaint was filed by the Philippine National Police Station Commander in Bato, Leyte, accusing Rodrigo Umpad, alias “Meon”, of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code for the fatal shooting of Genaro Tagsip on September 14, 1987.
    • Following preliminary investigation by the provincial fiscal’s office, an information was filed charging Umpad with the crime of homicide based on the facts that he deliberately, willfully, and unlawfully shot Tagsip with a firearm, causing a fatal gunshot wound to the victim’s head.

    Plea Bargaining and Arraignment

    • During arraignment, the parties, with the consent of both the offended party and the Public Prosecutor, agreed to a plea bargain.
    • Under the plea agreement, Umpad pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide, despite the original information charging him with homicide, and accepted a penalty ranging from four years, two months and one day of prision correccional as minimum to six years as maximum.

    Judicial Decision

    • On June 27, 1990, the respondent judge sentenced Umpad in accordance with the plea bargain, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Homicide with the agreed penalty.
    • The decision was recorded without explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the apparent mismatch between the severity of the crime (homicide) and the plea (attempted homicide).

    Complaint Against the Judge

    • On October 16, 1992, Pedro S. Amatan, a brother-in-law of the deceased, filed a letter-complaint addressed to the Chief Justice accusing Judge Vicente Aujero of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, and gross misconduct in the disposition of the case.
    • The complainant contended that the sentence entered—finding the accused guilty of Attempted Homicide instead of homicide—was indicative on its face of judicial error due to the obvious inconsistency given the victim’s death.

    Judge’s Explanation and Governing Rule

    • In his defense, the respondent judge argued that he relied on Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended, which allows an accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense with the consent of the offended party, regardless of whether such lessor offense is necessarily included in the original charge.
    • He further explained that during a June 27, 1990 conference, the wife of the victim consented to the plea bargain, influenced by her need for monetary indemnity to support her orphaned children.

    Legal and Administrative Observations

    • The Deputy Court Administrator, in a memorandum dated February 5, 1993, recommended dismissal of the complaint, explaining that Section 2, Rule 116 provided for a liberal application of plea bargains and that the fiscal’s consent was aimed at abbreviating the proceedings given the lack of conclusive evidence for a homicide conviction.
    • However, the jurisprudence highlights that a plea to a lesser offense such as attempted homicide is inherently inconsistent with the factual element of death in a homicide charge, thereby creating an absurd and unjust result.

Issue:

    Validity and Application of Plea Bargaining

    • Whether it is proper for an accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense under Section 2, Rule 116 even when the factual element (the death of the victim) essential to the original crime (homicide) is present.
    • Whether the judicial reliance on a rule allowing lesser offense pleas justifies a sentence that appears logically inconsistent with the established crime.

    Judicial Competence and Judicial Discretion

    • Whether the respondent judge’s acceptance and application of the plea bargaining agreement reflected gross ignorance of law and judicial incompetence when the gravity of the factual situation (victim’s death) mandated recognition of the true offense of homicide.
    • Whether the judge’s decision, although technically in line with the letter of Section 2, Rule 116, should have been tempered by common sense, and principles of right and justice to avoid an absurd outcome.

    Impact on Judicial Administration

    • Whether a judge who fails to exercise due prudence and common sense in applying legal provisions may be subject to administrative sanction despite the provision’s ambiguities.
    • Whether the unique circumstances of the case, including the respondent judge’s imminent retirement, mitigate or excuse the misapplication of the law.

Ruling:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

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