Facts:

This case involves a legal dispute between Roberto P. Almario as the petitioner and the Court of Appeals, Hon. Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., the People of the Philippines, and Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) as the respondents. The events date back to October 22, 1992, when the informations were filed against Almario for estafa through falsification of public documents in Criminal Case No. 91-6761 and for estafa in Criminal Case No. 91-6762, with RCBC as the offended party. After Almario's arraignment on March 18, 1992, the pre-trial was concluded on October 21, 1994. Continuous trial hearings were set for December 1994, and in January and February 1995, but these were repeatedly cancelled due to various reasons including the elevation of the presiding judge to the Court of Appeals and inadequate proof of notices to the accused and their counsels.

On September 8, 1995, the case was dismissed by the trial court upon a motion for lack of prosecution due to the absenc

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Facts:

Criminal Charges and Involvement of Parties

• Petitioner, Roberto P. Almario, is accused in two criminal cases:
• Criminal Case No. 91-6761 for estafa through falsification of public document.
• Criminal Case No. 91-6762 for estafa, with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) as the offended party.
• The informations in both cases were filed on October 22, 1992.

Pretrial and Trial Proceedings

• After arraignment on March 18, 1992, pretrial was held and terminated on October 21, 1994.
• Continuous trial was scheduled for December 1994, January 1995, and February 1995; however, all these hearings were cancelled due to the elevation of the presiding judge and the subsequent lack of a trial judge immediately appointed.
• Subsequent postponements included:
• The hearing set for June 21, 1995, postponed for lack of proof of notice to all accused and their counsel.
• The hearing on July 17, 1995, postponed at the private prosecutor’s request due to the absence of witnesses, without objection from petitioner’s counsel.
• The hearing on July 24, 1995, cancelled due to lack of proof of service of notice to petitioner’s three co-accused.
• The cases were then rescheduled for trial on September 8 and 25, 1995.

Dismissal and Reconsideration by the Trial Court

• On September 8, 1995, petitioner’s counsel motioned for dismissal on the grounds of failure to prosecute and to secure a speedy trial when the private complainant did not appear.
• The dismissal order noted that while petitioner’s case was dismissed, warrants were issued for the arrest of co-accused (Spouses Susencio and Guillerma Cruz and Dante Duldulao).
• On October 25, 1995, the trial court reconsidered its earlier dismissal order:
• Relying on the precedent from Hipolito vs. Court of Appeals, it held that there had been no vexatious or oppressive delay warranting a speedy trial violation.
• The dismissal order was set aside and the criminal cases against petitioner were reinstated.

Appellate Proceedings and Petitioner’s Allegations

• Responding to the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 9, 1995, the trial judge issued an order on April 11, 1996 denying the motion based on the absence of unreasonable delay.
• Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction against:
• The presiding judge of Branch 139 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City;
• RCBC; and
• The People of the Philippines.
• The Court of Appeals, through resolutions dated November 21, 1996, and January 7, 1997, denied the petition and upheld the trial court’s reconsideration order.
• Petitioner contended that the reversal in the dismissal order and the subsequent reinstatement of the case constituted double jeopardy and amounted to an abuse of discretion against his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

Issue:

Whether the delays and postponements in the trial proceedings amounted to unreasonable or oppressive delays that violated the petitioner’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.

• Analysis of each postponement, including cancellations due to lack of proper notice and administrative reasons.
• Consideration of whether the delays were justified under the circumstances.

Whether the dismissal of the case, initially effected upon the motion of petitioner’s counsel (with petitioner’s express consent), and its later reconsideration, violated the doctrine of double jeopardy.

• Determination of whether a dismissal made with the accused’s consent qualifies as a bar against subsequent prosecution.
• Examination of the exceptions related to insufficient evidence and denial of the right to a speedy trial.

Ruling:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

• (Subscriber-Only)