Facts:

The case involves Allied Leasing & Finance Corporation as the petitioner and Emeterio Sia and Lucia Sia, doing business as Emiluz Printing Industries, as the respondents. The events leading to this case began on March 4, 1985, when the petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money along with a petition for a writ of replevin against the respondents in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 52114. The complaint alleged that the petitioner had leased several printing equipment to the respondents under four lease agreements. These agreements stipulated that upon default in payment of monthly rentals, all amounts due would become immediately demandable without notice. The respondents defaulted on their payments despite the petitioner's demands.

On March 11, 1985, Judge Eutropio Migrino of Branch 151 issued an order granting the writ of replevin, conditioned upon the petitioner posting a bond of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,...

Facts:

1. Filing of the Complaint and Issuance of Writ of Replevin:

• On March 4, 1985, petitioner Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation filed a complaint for sum of money with a petition for the issuance of a writ of replevin against respondent-spouses Emeterio Sia and Lucia Sia. The complaint alleged that the petitioner leased printing equipment to the respondents under four lease agreements, and the respondents defaulted on their monthly rental payments.
• On March 11, 1985, the trial court issued an Order granting the writ of replevin, conditioned on the petitioner posting a bond of P2,000,000. The writ was issued ex-parte.

2. Default and Motion to Quash Writ of Replevin:

• On January 8, 1986, the trial court declared the respondents in default for failing to file their Answer.
• On November 27, 1986, the respondents filed a motion to quash the writ of replevin, followed by a motion to set aside the Order of default on November 30, 1986.

3. Inhibition and Reassignment of the Case:

• On March 18, 1987, the presiding judge voluntarily inhibited himself, and the case was reassigned to Branch 165, presided by Judge Milagros V. Caguioa.
• On April 27, 1988, the trial court set aside the Order of default, and the respondents filed their Answer on May 6, 1988, claiming ownership of the printing equipment and alleging that the lease agreements did not reflect the true agreement.

4. Quashal of the Writ of Replevin:

• On January 30, 1989, the trial court quashed the writ of replevin, stating that the true nature of the transaction (whether lease or chattel mortgage) and ownership of the equipment were in dispute.
• The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on July 14, 1989.

5. Petition for Certiorari:

• On October 24, 1989, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the trial court's Orders dated January 30, 1989, and July 14, 1989.
• The appellate court dismissed the petition on December 11, 1989, citing unreasonable delay. Upon reconsideration, the appellate court reiterated its dismissal on January 30, 1990, stating that the petitioner was guilty of laches.

6. Supreme Court Proceedings:

• The petitioner filed the instant petition with the Supreme Court, which initially denied the petition on July 16, 1990, but later granted the motion for reconsideration on October 15, 1990, giving due course to the petition.

Issue:

• (Unlock)

Ruling:

• (Unlock)

Ratio:

1. Reasonable Period for Filing Certiorari:

   • Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not specify a fixed period for filing a petition for certiorari. The timeliness of such a petition is measured by the reasonableness of the duration from the commission of the act complained of to the filing of the petition. In this case, the 95-day delay was deemed reasonable.

2. Mandatory Counterbond in Replevin:

   • Under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60, a defendant in a replevin suit may demand the return of the property by filing a counterbond. The trial court's failure to require a counterbond before quashing the writ of replevin was a grave abuse of discretion. The respondents' claim of ownership over the equipment did not justify the quashal without a counterbond.

3. Substantial Rights and Remedies:

   • The Court emphasized that denying the petition for certiorari would deprive the petitioner of its substantial rights and leave it without a remedy. The trial court's Orders were highly irregular, and the petitioner's filing of the petition within a reasonable period was justified.

WHEREFORE, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals and the Orders of the trial court. Costs were imposed against the private respondents.