Title
Alimpoos vs. Court of Appeals
Case
G.R. No. L-27331
Decision Date
Jul 30, 1981
Petitioners challenged the dismissal of their appeal in a Habeas Corpus case, alleging improper detention. SC ruled appeal timely but improper remedy; Habeas Corpus not for criminal liability.
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Case Digest (G.R. No. L-27331)

Facts:

    Parties and Case Background

    • The petitioners include two groups:
    • The Offended Parties – Petitioner–spouses Eliseo Alimpoos and Ciriaca Alimpoos.
    • The Witnesses – Petitioners Pedro Baclay, Catalino Yamilo, Rafael Capampangan, Dalmacio Ygot, Eufrocina Estores, and Sgt. Millardo M. Pates.
    • The respondents are:
    • The Accused – Reynaldo Mosquito; his wife, Matilde A. Mosquito;
    • The Appellate Tribunal (represented by the Court of Appeals), and the Trial Judge (Montano A. Ortiz) of the Court of First Instance of Agusan.
    • The case involves a petition for certiorari filed to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which had upheld the Trial Court’s dismissal of the Offended Parties’ notice of appeal in a habeas corpus proceeding.

    Nature of the Proceedings and the Warrant

    • The underlying matter is a Habeas Corpus proceeding initiated by the Accused and his wife challenging his detention.
    • The detention stemmed from his arrest in Criminal Case No. 458 filed for Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries, where the allegedly robbed property belonged to the Offended Parties.
    • The Accused was detained by the Chief of Police of Bayugan on the basis of a warrant of arrest issued by a Municipal Judge, without the observance of certain legal prerequisites in the issuance of such a warrant.

    The Issuance of the Order and Subsequent Appeal

    • On March 26, 1966, after a hearing in the habeas corpus case, the Trial Judge issued an Order declaring the Accused’s detention illegal, and accordingly:
    • Granted the writ of habeas corpus and a writ of preliminary injunction (subject to the filing of a bond).
    • Enjoined the Municipal Judge and other defendants from proceeding with the criminal prosecution in Criminal Case No. 458.
    • The Order contained a crucial last page showing mailing and service particulars, including:
    • Dates on which copies of the Order were dispatched and received (notably March 30 and March 31, 1966).
    • Registered mail receipts that later indicated a reception in Cebu City only on April 11, 1966.
    • Counsel for the Offended Parties claimed to have received the Order only on April 4, 1966 (via personal handing over by Eliseo Alimpoos), and maintained that notice for purposes of the appeal should be reckoned from that later date rather than the date indicated on the Order copy.

    Procedural and Substantive Issues in the Appeal

    • The appeal was filed by counsel for the Offended Parties and the Witnesses from Cebu City on April 4, 1966.
    • The Accused opposed the appeal arguing it was filed beyond the 48-hour reglementary period prescribed for habeas corpus cases.
    • The Trial Judge, on April 23, 1966, dismissed the appeal on the ground that the notice was received out of time as per the record on the last page of the Order.
    • The Offended Parties then resorted to a mandamus proceeding before the Court of Appeals to compel the Trial Judge to act on their appeal.
    • The Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R. No. 37781-R) denied the mandamus, basing its decision on the record indicating the counsel had received the Order on March 30, 1966, thereby affirming that the appeal was untimely.

    Additional Factual Considerations Regarding the Nature of the Habeas Corpus Action

    • The original and amended complaints filed by the Offended Parties contained multiple causes of action – including habeas corpus and claimed damages – although the proceedings were conducted solely under the habeas corpus remedy.
    • The Offended Parties argued:
    • That a party being represented by counsel requires that the notice be sent directly to the counsel.
    • That due to the manner of service (registered mail to a Cebu office), the actual receipt of the copy might have been delayed until as late as April 14, 1966.
    • The judicial records, including the notation on the Order’s last page and the registered mail envelope, reveal that service to counsel was effected on March 30 and March 31, 1966 – a point relied upon by the Trial Judge and the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

    Timeliness of the Appeal

    • Whether the registered dates printed on the Order, indicating receipt on March 30/31, should control the computation of the 48-hour period for filing an appeal in a habeas corpus proceeding.
    • Whether counsel’s assertion of actual receipt on April 4, 1966 – based on being handed a copy by the Offended Party in Cebu City – is determinative in establishing the proper notice date.

    Standing and Proper Party to Appeal

    • Whether the Offended Parties (and the Witnesses) have the requisite legal personality to interpose an appeal in habeas corpus proceedings.
    • Whether, in cases arising from criminal proceedings, the control of the appeal right is vested in the government (i.e., the Provincial Fiscal) rather than the private parties who are not responsible for the Accused’s detention.

    Appropriateness and Scope of the Relief Granted

    • Whether the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus and the accompanying preliminary injunction (which enjoined further prosecution in the criminal case) was proper given that the proceedings were solely channeled as a habeas corpus action.
    • Whether the Order erroneously included the enjoinment of the criminal prosecution when the proper remedy might have been to address the legitimacy of the warrant of arrest or to order a preliminary investigation.

    The Nature of Habeas Corpus Proceedings

    • Whether the complainant’s filing of damages and additional causes of action in a habeas corpus case is procedurally proper, given that such proceedings are not designed to serve as a suit between private parties.
    • Whether the relief granted under habeas corpus, limited to discharge from unlawful detention, should preclude remedies such as damage awards.

    Award of Costs

    • Whether it was proper for the Trial Judge to impose “costs” against the defendants in the habeas corpus action, particularly in light of the doctrinal position that when a person is unlawfully detained and then discharged, the costs should generally be taxed against the Republic.

Ruling:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

  • (Subscriber-Only)

The determination of notice and timeliness:

  • The legal computation of the 48-hour reglementary period in a habeas corpus proceeding must rely on proper and effective service, which in cases represented by counsel is not necessarily determined by service on the principal party.
  • The court’s reliance on its records (showing service on March 30/31, 1966) was a pivotal factor in finding the appeal untimely, even though the actual receipt by counsel may have been delayed.

    The proper scope of habeas corpus proceedings:

    • Habeas corpus is not a conventional suit between parties but an extraordinary remedy aimed solely at securing the release of an unlawfully restrained person.
    • As such, a petition in a habeas corpus case should not include relief for damages or other collateral remedies beyond the remedy of release, as no judgment against a private party can properly be entered.

    The control of the appeal in criminal-related detention cases:

    • Under Section 19 of Rule 41, when detention arises from criminal proceedings, the right to control the appeal vests in the state (through the Provincial Fiscal), not in a private party who was not responsible for the detention.
    • The abandonment of the motion for extension and the lack of action by the Provincial Fiscal effectively removed the Offended Parties’ standing to control the appeal.

    The error in judicial procedure regarding the issuance of the warrant:

    • The Municipal Judge’s failure to conduct a proper preliminary investigation before issuing the warrant of arrest was a critical mistake that resulted in an illegal detention.
    • However, the appropriate remedial action should have been to quash the warrant or order a proper preliminary examination rather than enjoining the criminal prosecution as a whole.

    The caution against using habeas corpus as a substitute for other available remedies:

    • The Cour

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