Facts:

The case of Bianito Alejandro v. Hon. Gerardo M. S. Pepito involves a petition for certiorari that arose from the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Branch III. The petitioner, Bianito Alejandro, was arraigned for the crime of homicide on July 6, 1979, where he entered a plea of not guilty. During this arraignment, he admitted to killing the deceased but claimed it was in self-defense. The presiding judge, Hon. Gerardo M. S. Pepito, issued an order that mandated the defense to present evidence of self-defense before the prosecution was allowed to present their evidence to disprove it. This order was contested by Alejandro through a motion for reconsideration, arguing it violated the established sequence of trial proceedings as set forth in Section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. The prosecution countered, asserting that the order was not mandatory and cited relevant jurisprudence to support their position. The judge, however, denied Alejandro's motion for reconsideration i

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Facts:

Arraignment and Plea

• Petitioner, Biánito Alejandro, was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the crime of homicide before the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Branch III.
• During the arraignment, the accused admitted in open court that he killed the deceased but claimed that he acted in self-defense.

Order of Trial and Evidence Presentation

• On July 6, 1979, the presiding judge issued an order requiring that the initial hearing be transferred and directing that the accused’s evidence on self-defense be presented first, followed by the prosecution’s evidence to disprove that claim.
• The order deviated from the normative sequence prescribed in Section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the prosecution must present its evidence first before the defense.

Motion for Reconsideration

• Petitioner moved for reconsideration, later amending his motion, arguing that the trial court’s change in the order of evidence presentation was violative of Section 3, Rule 119.
• He contended that by permitting the defense to present evidence prior to the prosecution, the court was prejudicing his substantial rights by creating an impression that the prosecution had already established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• The petitioner asserted that such a procedural deviation amounted to grave abuse of discretion and an excess of jurisdiction.

Opposition by the Prosecution and Trial Court’s Response

• The prosecution opposed the motion, citing precedents like U.S. vs. Gaoiran, which allowed a departure from the standard order when it did not prejudice the defendant.
• The trial court, in an order dated October 9, 1979, denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, maintaining that the change in sequence did not infringe on the accused’s rights.
• The court justified the alteration on the basis that the accused had already admitted the killing and that the streamlined procedure would save time by dispensing with redundant proof of death and injuries.

Petition for Certiorari and Restraining Order

• Petitioner elevated the matter by filing a Petition for Certiorari, claiming that the order allowing the defense to go first was a grave abuse of discretion and rendered him prejudiced.
• Petitioner argued that the change in evidence presentation order violated the statutory requirement of due process and the fundamental right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
• A Restraining Order was issued on December 12, 1979, enjoining the respondent judge from proceeding further with the hearing under the altered sequence.
• The Solicitor General, while confessing that the petitioner’s grounds were proper, recommended the annulment of the controversial orders so that the trial would proceed in accordance with law.

Constitutional and Procedural Considerations

• The Philippine Constitution protects accused persons by mandating that no one shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without the due process of law.
• Section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court clearly prescribes the order of trial in criminal cases, emphasizing that after the plea of not guilty is entered, the prosecution must present its evidence first.
• The trial court’s deviation from this prescribed order was challenged as it potentially jeopardized the fundamental rights of the accused by undermining the procedural safeguard of the presumption of innocence.

Issue:

• Whether the trial court’s decision to allow the defense to present its evidence on self-defense before the prosecution’s evidence contravenes Section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.

• Whether the alteration in the order of trial prejudices the substantial rights of the accused by fostering a presumption of guilt prior to the prosecution’s case.

• Whether the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction and abused his discretion by altering the prescribed sequence in a bid to expedite the trial, thereby compromising due process.

• Whether the justification for the change—namely, the accused’s open admission of the killing coupled with his claim of self-defense—sufficiently authorizes a departure from the established procedural order without infringing on the accused’s right to a fair trial.

Ruling:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

• (Subscriber-Only)