G.R. No. L-12962 - Alano vs. Paglinawan

Plaintiffs filed Civil Case No. 5245 in the Quezon court of first instance in August 1951, seeking recovery of a parcel of land along with damages.

In the subsequent month, the plaintiffs petitioned for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the property and its products.

To forestall the receivership, defendant Daniel Paglinawan submitted a bond subscribed by Rizal Surety & Insurance Co. for the amount of P2,000. The bond was conditioned on the defendant’s promise to pay, on demand, any damages adjudged by the court arising out of the case.

After hearing evidence from both sides, the Quezon court rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.

The judgment ordered the defendant to vacate the premises and pay an annual sum of P1,064.00 until departure, with the stipulation that if the defendant failed to pay, his bond would be made liable for the judgment.

Plaintiffs requested that the surety, Rizal Surety & Insurance Co., be directed to deposit the bond amount with the court for the execution of the judgment.

The court, deferring the matter pending appellate resolution, later issued an order on January 11, 1956, directing the surety company to deposit P2,000 with the Clerk of Court, to be disposed of at the plaintiffs’ request upon execution of the judgment.

The surety company received notice of the January 11 order on January 20, 1956, and on February 20, 1956, filed a motion for reconsideration alleging the order was illegal for its failure to include a finding of facts.

The motion for reconsideration was denied on March 14, 1956, with the denial being known to the surety on April 24, 1956.

On May 24, 1956, the surety registered its intention to appeal from the March 14 denial of its motion for reconsideration.

In its brief, however, the appellant questioned not only the March 14 order but also the earlier January 11 order.

It was evident that the appeal was an attempt to effectively set aside the January 11 order, despite the fact that the order had become final long before the appeal was perfected.

The cumulative elapsed period (amounting to 61 days) clearly indicated that the appeal was either tardy or futile, as the finality of the January 11 order could not be circumvented through the subsequent appeal from the motion for reconsideration.

Whether the appeal, as filed by the surety company, is valid considering that it seeks to question an order (January 11, 1956) that had already become final prior to the filing of the appeal.
Whether the surety’s attempt to challenge the final deposit order by appealing from the denial of its motion for reconsideration (March 14, 1956) is procedurally proper or merely a subterfuge.
Whether the finality of the interlocutory order (January 11, 1956) precludes its being revisited through a later, incorrectly timed appeal.