Facts:

The case of David Acebedo y Dalman v. Hon. Malcolm G. Sarmiento, et al. (G.R. No. L-28025) arose from a criminal information filed on August 3, 1959, by the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga against petitioner David Acebedo y Dalman and a co-accused, Chi Chan Tan, for damage to property through reckless imprudence. The case languished without further proceedings until May 19, 1965, when Acebedo filed a motion to dismiss the charges, which was denied by the respondent Judge on July 10, 1965. After a lengthy delay, the trial commenced, with the complainant testifying on direct examination but failing to appear for cross-examination on June 7, 1967. The Provincial Fiscal requested a postponement, but Acebedo's counsel objected and moved for dismissal based on the right to a speedy trial. The respondent Judge initially granted the motion and dismissed the case in open court, which was tantamount to an acquittal. However, later that same day, the Judge reconsidered his dismissal, ...

Facts:

Background of the Criminal Prosecution

• On August 3, 1959, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga filed a criminal information against petitioner David Acebedo y Dalman and a co-accused, Chi Chan Tan, charging them with damage to property through reckless imprudence.
• After the filing of the information, no significant proceedings occurred for several years.

Petitioner’s Motions and Trial Proceedings

• On May 19, 1965, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charge on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was being violated.
• Respondent Judge initially denied the dismissal motion by issuing an order on July 10, 1965, thus allowing the prosecution to continue.

Resumption and Developments at Trial

• After a prolonged delay of additional years, the trial finally commenced. During the trial, the complainant testified during direct examination but was not available for cross-examination.
• When the trial was set for continuation on June 7, 1967, the complainant failed to appear for cross-examination; subsequently, the Provincial Fiscal moved for postponement while petitioner’s counsel objected and again sought the dismissal based on the right to speedy trial.

Order of Dismissal and Subsequent Reconsideration

• In a turn of events, respondent Judge, this time receptive to petitioner’s motion, orally dismissed the case in open court, basing the dismissal on the fact that the complainant’s cross-examination had not yet begun.
• Later on the same day, the respondent Judge reconsidered his order, reinstating the case upon evidence that the cross-examination had commenced, thereby effectively reviving the prosecution.

Constitutional and Legal Contention

• Petitioner contended that the order of dismissal—having been given in open court and resulting from a violation of the right to a speedy trial—amounted to an acquittal.
• Petitioner argued that the subsequent reconsideration and reinstatement of the case would subject him to double jeopardy, as he was already liberated from the menace of prosecution through the earlier dismissal.

Relief Sought and Court’s Initial Action

• Petitioner sought the issuance of certiorari, prohibition, and preliminary injunction to forestall any further prosecution and reinstitution of the criminal case.
• The lower court’s handling, especially the reconsideration of the dismissal order, was viewed by petitioner as a grave abuse of discretion, contravening his constitutional rights.

Issue:

Whether the dismissal of the criminal case based on the right to a speedy trial, as executed by the respondent Judge in open court, is equivalent to an acquittal.

• Consideration of the legal effect of the dismissal order in rendering an ultimate resolution of the criminal charge.
• Analysis of the doctrine of double jeopardy which prohibits subsequent prosecution on the same offense.

Whether the subsequent reconsideration and reinstatement of the case by the respondent Judge constitutes a violation of the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial and subjects him to the risk of double jeopardy.

• Evaluation of whether the judge’s change of mind, despite the dismissal being issued after a significant delay, is legally tenable.
• Discussion on the permissible grounds for a trial judge to reconsider a dismissal based on constitutional guarantees.

Whether the doctrine of speedy trial and its remedial measures (such as dismissal amounting to acquittal) should bar further prosecution or restarting of the criminal case against the petitioner.

• Examination of precedents where dismissal under similar circumstances has been held to be tantamount to an acquittal.
• Assessment of the impact of prolonged delays and multiple postponements on the accused’s right to a speedy trial.

Ruling:

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Ratio:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

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