Facts:

The case involves Pacencio Abejaron, represented by his attorney-in-fact Alejandro Abejaron, as the petitioner against Felix Nabasa and the Court of Appeals as respondents. The dispute centers around a 118-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 located in Silway, General Santos City. The conflict has persisted for over twenty years, stemming from events that began in 1945 when Abejaron and his family started occupying the land, which was not yet surveyed at that time. They constructed a family home and a small store, later improving the house to a two-storey structure in 1949. Over the years, Abejaron made various improvements to the property, including planting coconut, banana, and avocado trees, and installing a pitcher pump. Throughout this period, Nabasa, who began residing on the remaining portion of Lot 1 in 1955, did not contest Abejaron's occupancy.

In 1974, Nabasa applied for a title to the entire Lot 1, Block 5, including the portion occupied by Ab...

Facts:

Disputed Property and Parties’ Background

• The controversy centers on a 118-square meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 in Silway, General Santos City.
• Petitioner Pacencio Abejaron, represented by his attorney-in-fact Alejandro Abejaron, claims actual and lawful possession of this parcel based on long-standing occupancy and numerous improvements.
• Respondent Felix Nabasa asserts title over the entire lot, having obtained a free patent and original certificate of title covering Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953.

History of Possession, Improvement, and Occupation

• Petitioner Abejaron and his family began occupying the disputed land in 1945, constructing initially a nipa house and a small store while the land had not yet been surveyed.
• In 1949, the nipa house was improved into a two-storey structure measuring 16 x 18 feet, and further improvements including the construction of a larger store (in 1950) were made.
• Abejaron also established a fence to delineate the disputed area, planted coconut, banana, and avocado trees, and installed a pitcher pump.
• Despite these improvements and continuous possession, Abejaron declared only his house (not the entire disputed land) for taxation purposes in later years.

Respondent Nabasa’s Claim and Title Application

• Nabasa began occupying a 57-square meter portion of Lot 1, said to be located adjacent (about 4 meters apart) to Abejaron’s house, with conflicting testimonies regarding his period of residence.
• Without Abejaron’s knowledge or consent, Nabasa applied for and was issued Free Patent No. (XI-4)-2877 and subsequently Original Certificate of Title No. P-4140 covering the entire Lot 1, Block 5, including the 118-square meter area held by Abejaron.
• Petitioner’s protest against Nabasa’s titling became entangled in procedural delays and was eventually dismissed due to non-attendance at hearings.

Judicial Proceedings and Contentious Developments

• In 1982, Abejaron filed an action for reconveyance for his 118-square meter portion against Nabasa; the Regional Trial Court ruled in his favor, ordering the reconveyance of the disputed land and retaining Nabasa’s 57-square meter portion.
• Respondent Nabasa subsequently appealed; on April 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that there was no sufficient proof of actual fraud and that title had become indefeasible.
• Abejaron’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied, and he then raised errors regarding the alleged fraud and the evidentiary basis of his claim, emphasizing his long-standing possession.

Evidentiary and Factual Controversies

• Testimonies by neighbors and surveys (notably by geodetic engineer Abner Lagsub) provided evidence of longstanding structures and improvements but failed to clearly establish the precise boundaries or the exact metes and bounds of the 118-square meter area as of January 24, 1947.
• Discrepancies arose regarding the timeline of occupation—petitioner’s claim starting in 1945 versus neighbor testimonies and survey evidence that could not unmistakably confirm possession prior to the statutory time requirements.
• Abejaron’s failure to declare the disputed area for taxation and to distinctly prove the area occupied in 1947 raises questions about whether the possession met the “open, continuous, exclusive and notorious” requirement under the Public Land Act.

Statutory Framework and Underlying Legal Controversy

• The case turns on the interpretation and application of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act (as amended by R.A. No. 1942 and further adjusted by P.D. No. 1073), which presumes that long and uninterrupted possession of public land under a bona fide claim deems the possessor to have performed all conditions essential to a government grant.
• Abejaron contended that his long possession, in combination with his improvements, conferred upon him not absolute ownership but a preferential right to the land—a right that should have allowed him relief in the form of reconveyance.
• However, the evidentiary record and subsequent judicial findings challenge whether the statutory requirements for transforming public land into a private grant had been met.

Issue:

Whether petitioner Abejaron’s open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession for the necessary period (30 years) under the Public Land Act fully qualifies him for a presumption of a government grant.

• Does the available evidence adequately prove that Abejaron met the statutory time and possession requirements?
• How does the failure to declare the disputed land for taxation affect his claim?

Whether actual fraud was committed by respondent Nabasa in procuring title over Lot 1, Block 5, despite knowledge of Abejaron’s occupation and improvements.

• Is there clear and convincing evidence that Nabasa “clandestinely, willfully, fraudulently, and unlawfully” applied for titling in his name?
• How did both parties’ inconsistent testimonies affect the fraud allegation?

Whether Abejaron possesses the legal standing to file an action for reconveyance given that he does not claim absolute ownership but rather a “preferential right” to the land.

• Can a party without a perfected title seek reconveyance if his right is equitable but not legal?
• Should the remedy for erroneous titling be available only to the absolute owner, or can it extend to one with longstanding possession?

• Whether the administrative and judicial handling of the protest against Nabasa’s title, including the dismissal for non-attendance, precluded any substantive resolution of the underlying dispute.

Ruling:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Ratio:

• (Subscriber-Only)

Doctrine:

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